that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or
unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name
"check-novalidate"
from Sebastian Kinne
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b
for OpenSSH
This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH.
Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify
Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this
is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list
of allowed signers.
Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb
the size restrictions and apply the default size only to the matching key
type. tweak and ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b825de92d79cc4cba19b298c61e99909488ff57e
functionality there (wrapping of base64-encoded data) to sshbuf functions;
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dba6735d88c57232f6fccec8a08bdcfea44ac4c
private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
private keys to disk.
The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
round of MD5 as a KDF).
adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
sftp-server use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX;
ok deraadt@ (thanks for snaps testing)
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f8cbf7ed8679f6237264301d104ecec64885d55
some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
(most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
strictness helps us in the future.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
random data (currently 16KB).
Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
when being saved/serialised.
Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
architecture has become less unsafe.
been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
ok dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
guenther@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
changing a key pair's comments (using -c and -C) more applicable to both
methods. ok and suggestions djm@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b379338118109eb36e14a65bc0a12735205b3de6
the estimates from NIST Special Publication 800-57, 3k bits provides security
equivalent to 128 bits which is the smallest symmetric cipher we enable by
default. ok markus@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 461dd32ebe808f88f4fc3ec74749b0e6bef2276b
Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
supports it.
Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
suported by OpenSSH >= 6.5 (released January 2014), so it should be supported
by most OpenSSH versions in active use.
It is possible to convert new-format private keys to the older
format using "ssh-keygen -f /path/key -pm PEM".
ok deraadt dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3bd4f2509a2103bfa2f710733426af3ad6d8ab8
known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF hostname); bz2772
Report and fix from Anton Kremenetsky
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac10ca13eb9bb0bc50fcd42ad11c56c317437b58
Refuse to create a certificate with an unusable number of
principals; Prompted by gdestuynder via github
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cfae2451e8f07810e3e2546dfdcce66984cbd29
fatal if we're unable to write all the public key; previously
we would silently ignore errors writing the comment and terminating newline.
Prompted by github PR from WillerZ; ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18fbfcfd4e8c6adbc84820039b64d70906e49831
Remove some #ifdef notyet code from OpenSSL 0.9.8 days.
These functions have never appeared in OpenSSL and are likely never to do
so.
"kill it with fire" djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fee9560e283fd836efc2631ef381658cc673d23e
pass negotiated signing algorithm though to
sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in
the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9
jmc@openbsd.org
djm@openbsd.org
deraadt@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
otto@openbsd.org
lum@openbsd.org
benno@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
Manoj Ampalam
markus@openbsd.org
jsing@openbsd.org