Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Darren Tucker b759c9c2ef - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 13:15:52
[ssh-agent.c clientloop.c misc.h packet.c progressmeter.c misc.c
     channels.c sandbox-systrace.c]
     Use clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC ...) for ssh timers so that things like
     keepalives and rekeying will work properly over clock steps.  Suggested by
     markus@, "looks good" djm@.
2013-06-02 07:46:16 +10:00
Darren Tucker 3b4b2d3021 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/30 14:35:09
[sandbox-systrace.c sshd.c]
     fix a during the load of the sandbox policies (child can still make
     the read-syscall and wait forever for systrace-answers) by replacing
     the read/write synchronisation with SIGSTOP/SIGCONT;
     report and help hshoexer@; ok djm@, dtucker@
2012-07-02 18:54:31 +10:00
Damien Miller 560de922b1 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/26 11:02:30
[sandbox-systrace.c]
     Add mquery to the list of allowed syscalls for "UsePrivilegeSeparation
     sandbox" since malloc now uses it.  From johnw.mail at gmail com.
2012-06-30 08:33:53 +10:00
Damien Miller 35e48198a8 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/07/29 14:42:45
[sandbox-systrace.c]
     fail open(2) with EPERM rather than SIGKILLing the whole process. libc
     will call open() to do strerror() when NLS is enabled;
     feedback and ok markus@
2011-08-06 06:16:23 +10:00
Damien Miller dcbd41e7af - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/23 09:34:13
[sshd.c ssh-sandbox.h sandbox.h sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-systrace.c]
     [sandbox-null.c]
     rename sandbox.h => ssh-sandbox.h to make things easier for portable
2011-06-23 19:45:51 +10:00
Damien Miller 69ff1df952 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/22 21:57:01
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config.5 sandbox-rlimit.c]
     [sandbox-systrace.c sandbox.h configure.ac Makefile.in]
     introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using systrace(4).

     This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for
     sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the
     privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child
     from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying)
     or probing local kernel attack surface.

     The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
     mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
     on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
     that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option.

     UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future
     so please start testing it now.

     feedback dtucker@; ok markus@
2011-06-23 08:30:03 +10:00