Key constraints parsing code previously existed in both the "add regular
key" and "add smartcard key" path. This unifies them but also introduces
more consistency checking: duplicated constraints and constraints that
are nonsensical for a particular situation (e.g. FIDO provider for a
smartcard key) are now banned.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 511cb1b1c021ee1d51a4c2d649b937445de7983c
Allow confirm_key() to accept an additional reason suffix
Factor publickey userauth parsing out into its own function and allow
it to optionally return things it parsed out of the message to its
caller.
feedback/ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29006515617d1aa2d8b85cd2bf667e849146477e
also clear socket entries that are being marked as unused.
spinkle in some debug2() spam to make it easier to watch an agent
do its thing.
ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74582c8e82e96afea46f6c7b6813a429cbc75922
On platforms where sizeof(int) != sizeof(long), convtime could accept values
>MAX_INT which subsequently truncate when stored in an int during config
parsing. bz#3250, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8fc932683d6b4660d52f50911d62bd6639c5db31
stdout and/or stderr to /dev/null. Factor all these out to a single
stdfd_devnull() function that allows selection of which of these to redirect.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3033ba5a4c47cacfd5def020d42cabc52fad3099
FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
requires a PIN before each authentication.
feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
keys.
When signing messages in ssh-agent using a FIDO key that has an
application string that does not start with "ssh:", ensure that the
message being signed is one of the forms expected for the SSH protocol
(currently pubkey authentication and sshsig signatures).
This prevents ssh-agent forwarding on a host that has FIDO keys
attached granting the ability for the remote side to sign challenges
for web authentication using those keys too.
Note that the converse case of web browsers signing SSH challenges is
already precluded because no web RP can have the "ssh:" prefix in the
application string that we require.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ab6012574ed0352d2f097d307f4a988222d1b19
While freezero() returns early if the pointer is NULL the tests for
NULL in callers are left to avoid warnings about passing an
uninitialised size argument across a function boundry.
ok deraadt@ djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2660fa334fcc7cd05ec74dd99cb036f9ade6384a
messages.
This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and
distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key".
ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e
avoids malicious client from being able to cause agent to load arbitrary
libraries into ssh-sk-helper.
reported by puck AT puckipedia.com; ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1086643df1b7eee4870825c687cf0c26a6145d1c
Extract the key label or X.509 subject string when PKCS#11 keys
are retrieved from the token and plumb this through to places where
it may be used as a comment.
based on https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/138
by Danielle Church
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cae1fda10d9e10971dea29520916e27cfec7ca35
sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler
preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce
the potential for short read/write operations.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
This extracts and refactors the client interface for ssh-sk-helper
from ssh-agent and generalises it for use by the other programs.
This means that most OpenSSH tools no longer need to link against
libfido2 or directly interact with /dev/uhid*
requested by, feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1abcd3aea9a7460eccfbf8ca154cdfa62f1dc93f
linking against the (previously external) USB HID middleware. The dlopen()
capability still exists for alternate middlewares, e.g. for Bluetooth, NFC
and test/debugging.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14446cf170ac0351f0d4792ba0bca53024930069
to delay the call to shield until we have received key specific options. -
when serializing xmss keys for shield we need to deal with all optional
components (e.g. state might not be loaded). ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc2db82524b209468eb176d6b4d6b9486422f41f
order to perform a signature operation. Notify the user when this is expected
via the TTY (if available) or $SSH_ASKPASS if we can.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef90a99a85d4a2a07217a58efb4df8444818609
including the new U2F signatures.
Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
change is mechanically adding that.
Suggested by / ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
(most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
strictness helps us in the future.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
random data (currently 16KB).
Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
when being saved/serialised.
Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
architecture has become less unsafe.
been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
ok dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
correct signature algorithm when requested. Patch from Jakub Jelen in bz3016
ok dtucker markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61f86efbeb4a1857a3e91298c1ccc6cf49b79624
malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
guenther@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
input buffer is too full to read one, or if the output buffer is too full to
enqueue a response; feedback & ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df3c5b6d57c968975875de40d8955cbfed05a6c8
Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
supports it.
Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
fd rlimit and stop accepting new connections when it is exceeded (with some
grace). Accept is resumed when enough connections are closed.
bz#2576. feedback deraadt; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a85d9cec7b85741961e7116a49f8dae777911ea
djm@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
jmc@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
jsg@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
deraadt@openbsd.org
otto@openbsd.org
Damien Miller