Turkish locales are unique in their handling of the letters 'i' and
'I' (yes, they are different letters) and OpenSSH isn't remotely
prepared to deal with that. For now, the best we can do is to force
OpenSSH to use the C/POSIX locale and try to preserve the UTF-8
encoding if possible.
ok dtucker@
make IdentityFile successfully load and use certificates that
have no corresponding bare public key. E.g. just a private id_rsa and
certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub).
bz#2617 ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: c1e9699b8c0e3b63cc4189e6972e3522b6292604
Fix public key authentication when multiple
authentication is in use. Instead of deleting and re-preparing the entire
keys list, just reset the 'used' flags; the keys list is already in a good
order (with already- tried keys at the back)
Analysis and patch from Vincent Brillault on bz#2642; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 7123f12dc2f3bcaae715853035a97923d7300176
Unlink PidFile on SIGHUP and always recreate it when the
new sshd starts. Regression tests (and possibly other things) depend on the
pidfile being recreated after SIGHUP, and unlinking it means it won't contain
a stale pid if sshd fails to restart. ok djm@ markus@
Upstream-ID: 132dd6dda0c77dd49d2f15b2573b5794f6160870
add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load
(via ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: fe79769469d9cd6d26fe0dc15751b83ef2a06e8f
Add a sshd_config DisableForwaring option that disables
X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as
anything else we might implement in the future.
This, like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, is intended to be a
simple and future-proof way of restricting an account. Suggested as
a complement to 'restrict' by Jann Horn; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 203803f66e533a474086b38a59ceb4cf2410fcf7
When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and
an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the
certificate unless they are identical.
The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-
command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f
On startup, check to see if sshd is already daemonized
and if so, skip the call to daemon() and do not rewrite the PidFile. This
means that when sshd re-execs itself on SIGHUP the process ID will no longer
change. Should address bz#2641. ok djm@ markus@.
Upstream-ID: 5ea0355580056fb3b25c1fd6364307d9638a37b9
Add a call to RAND_poll() to ensure than more than pid+time gets
stirred into child processes states. Prompted by analysis from Jann
Horn at Project Zero. ok dtucker@
Reverse args to sshd-log-wrapper. Matches change in
portable, where it allows sshd do be optionally run under Valgrind.
Upstream-Regress-ID: b438d1c6726dc5caa2a45153e6103a0393faa906
Clean up MALLOC_OPTIONS. For the unittests, move
MALLOC_OPTIONS and TEST_ENV to unittets/Makefile.inc.
ok otto
Upstream-Regress-ID: 890d497e0a38eeddfebb11cc429098d76cf29f12
use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for
loading keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This doesn't
appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but was observed for
novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: d620e1d46a29fdea56aeadeda120879eddc60ab1
Validate address ranges for AllowUser/DenyUsers at
configuration load time and refuse to accept bad ones. It was previously
possible to specify invalid CIDR address ranges (e.g. djm@127.1.2.3/55) and
these would always match.
Thanks to Laurence Parry for a detailed bug report. ok markus (for
a previous diff version)
Upstream-ID: 9dfcdd9672b06e65233ea4434c38226680d40bfb
Improve pkcs11_add_provider() logging: demote some
excessively verbose error()s to debug()s, include PKCS#11 provider name and
slot in log messages where possible. bz#2610, based on patch from Jakub Jelen
Upstream-ID: 3223ef693cfcbff9079edfc7e89f55bf63e1973d
Fix logic in add_local_forward() that inverted a test
when code was refactored out into bind_permitted(). This broke ssh port
forwarding for non-priv ports as a non root user.
ok dtucker@ 'looks good' deraadt@
Upstream-ID: ddb8156ca03cc99997de284ce7777536ff9570c9
getdefaultproj() returns a pointer so test it for NULL inequality
instead of >0. Fixes compiler warning and is more correct. Patch from
David Binderman.
Factor out "can bind to low ports" check into its own function. This will
make it easier for Portable to support platforms with permissions models
other than uid==0 (eg bz#2625). ok djm@, "doesn't offend me too much"
deraadt@.
Upstream-ID: 86213df4183e92b8f189a6d2dac858c994bfface
When tearing down ControlMaster connecctions, don't
pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet. Patch from Tim Kuijsten via tech@.
Upstream-ID: d9b3a68b2a7c2f2fc7f74678e29a4618d55ceced
Make links to openssh.com HTTPS now that it's supported, point release
notes link to the HTML release notes page, and update a couple of other
links and bits of text.
Remove channel_input_port_forward_request(); the only caller
was the recently-removed SSH1 server code so it's now dead code. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 05453983230a1f439562535fec2818f63f297af9
Install a signal handler for tty-generated signals and
wait for the ssh child to suspend before suspending sftp. This lets ssh
restore the terminal mode as needed when it is suspended at the password
prompt. OK dtucker@
Upstream-ID: a31c1f42aa3e2985dcc91e46e6a17bd22e372d69
Darren Tucker
Damien Miller
djm@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
jmc@openbsd.org
tb@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
jsg@openbsd.org
millert@openbsd.org