Add support to the sftp-server for the home-directory extension defined
in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the
existing expand-path@openssh.com, but uses a more official protocol name,
and so is a bit more likely to be implemented by non-OpenSSH clients.
From Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc580d05cc0c817831ae7ecbac4a481c23566ab
allow server-side copies to be performed without having to go via the client.
Patch by Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00aa510940fedd66dab1843b58682de4eb7156d5
failures; provides better experience for scp in sftp mode, where ~user paths
are more likely to be used; spotted jsg, feedback jsg & deraadt ok jsg &
markus
(forgot to include this file in previous commit)
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d37cc4c8c861ce48cd6ea9899e96aaac3476847b
~-prefixed paths, in particular ~user ones. Allows scp in sftp mode to accept
these paths, like scp in rcp mode does.
prompted by and much discussion deraadt@
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d794def9e4de348e1e777f6030fc9bafdfff392
as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it unavailable in
sftp-server read-only mode. Spotted by Hector Martin via bz3318
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f054465230787e37516c4b57098fc7975e00f067
packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are borderline nonsensical
but not explicitly banned by the spec. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger,
feedback deraadt@ ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e67d60d81bde7b84a742b4ee5a34001bdf80d9c
This is a simple extension that allows the server to clearly
communicate transfer limits it is imposing so the client doesn't
have to guess, or force the user to manually tune. This is
particularly useful when an attempt to use too large of a value
causes the server to abort the connection.
Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f96293221e5aa24102d9bf30e4f4ef04d5f4fb51
sftp-server use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX;
ok deraadt@ (thanks for snaps testing)
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f8cbf7ed8679f6237264301d104ecec64885d55
some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
(most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
strictness helps us in the future.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
guenther@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT operation but
does not follow symlinks. Based on a patch from Bert Haverkamp in bz#2067 but
with more attribute modifications supported.
ok markus@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7234f6e90db19655d55d936a115ee4ccb6aaf80
username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
%U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode;
reported by Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 5d9c8f2fa8511d4ecf95322994ffe73e9283899b
Add MAXIMUM(), MINIMUM(), and ROUNDUP() to misc.h, then
use those definitions rather than pulling <sys/param.h> and unknown namespace
pollution. ok djm markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: 712cafa816c9f012a61628b66b9fbd5687223fb8
Add a function to enable security-related malloc_options.
With and ok deraadt@, something similar has been in the snaps for a while.
Upstream-ID: 43a95523b832b7f3b943d2908662191110c380ed
1) Use xcalloc() instead of xmalloc() to check for
potential overflow. (Feedback from both mmcc@ and djm@) 2) move set_size
just before the for loop. (suggested by djm@)
OK djm@
Upstream-ID: 013534c308187284756c3141f11d2c0f33c47213
djm@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
Tim Rice
jsg@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
deraadt@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
otto@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
logan@openbsd.org