refactor activation of rekeying
This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously
the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes
application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets
about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events
themselves.
Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch
Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8
implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be
prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the
default rather than replacing it.
approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a
include the peer's offer when logging a failure to
negotiate a mutual set of algorithms (kex, pubkey, ciphers, etc.) ok markus@
Upstream-ID: bbb8caabf5c01790bb845f5ce135565248d7c796
Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension.
The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private
halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client.
Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the
user manually review keys offered.
ok markus@
correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for
offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when
a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely
unlikely configuration).
ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@
update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch
packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b)
(de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old
packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and
integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c]
[misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c defines.h]
revert __bounded change; it causes way more problems for portable than
it solves; pointed out by dtucker@
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c
[misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c]
use __bounded(...) attribute recently added to sys/cdefs.h instead of
longform __attribute__(__bounded(...));
for brevity and a warning free compilation with llvm/clang
[Makefile.in digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.h mac.c hmac.c hmac.h]
replace openssl HMAC with an implementation based on our ssh_digest_*
ok and feedback djm@
[cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c]
Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an
effective strength much lower than the key size. This causes problems
with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger
than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as
specified in the RFC. Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat,
reduced by me with input from Markus. ok djm@ markus@
[bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c]
[kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c]
avoid use of OpenSSL BIGNUM type and functions for KEX with
Curve25519 by adding a buffer_put_bignum2_from_string() that stores
a string using the bignum encoding rules. Will make it easier to
build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in the future;
ok markus@
[digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c]
[kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c]
[kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c]
[schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c]
Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations
rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier
to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future;
feedback, ok markus@
[cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h mac.c mac.h servconf.c ssh.c]
Output the effective values of Ciphers, MACs and KexAlgorithms when
the default has not been overridden. ok markus@
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org);
initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
[auth.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c monitor.c servconf.c]
[servconf.h session.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add ssh-agent(1) support to sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys,
or hostkeys on smartcards; most of the work by Zev Weiss; bz #1974
ok djm@
[authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c]
[key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c]
add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX
algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling
to be table-driven; ok markus@
[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c]
[myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
ok and feedback djm@
[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h]
[packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms
that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted
message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data;
these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default.
feedback and ok djm@
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]
[servconf.c servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow
selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
and their order of preference.
ok markus@
[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on
platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
(SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.
This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
client.
ok naddy@
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
[kex.h mac.c mac.h monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c ssh.1]
[ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
Add a new MAC algorithm for data integrity, UMAC-64 (not default yet,
must specify umac-64@openssh.com). Provides about 20% end-to-end speedup
compared to hmac-md5. Represents a different approach to message
authentication to that of HMAC that may be beneficial if HMAC based on
one of its underlying hash algorithms is found to be vulnerable to a
new attack. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4418.txt
in conjunction with and OK djm@
[kex.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c mac.h kex.h mac.c]
Preserve MAC ctx between packets, saving 2xhash calls per-packet.
Yields around a 12-16% end-to-end speedup for arcfour256/hmac-md5
patch from markus@ tested dtucker@ and myself, ok markus@ and me (I'm
committing at his request)
[auth.h clientloop.c dispatch.c dispatch.h kex.h]
replace the last non-sig_atomic_t flag used in a signal handler with a
sig_atomic_t, unfortunately with some knock-on effects in other (non-
signal) contexts in which it is used; ok markus@
[kex.c kex.h monitor.c myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
Implement the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key exchange method
using the SHA256 code in libc (and wrapper to make it into an OpenSSL
EVP), interop tested against CVS PuTTY
NB. no portability bits committed yet
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h packet.c packet.h servconf.c session.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
add a new compression method that delays compression until the user
has been authenticated successfully and set compression to 'delayed'
for sshd.
this breaks older openssh clients (< 3.5) if they insist on
compression, so you have to re-enable compression in sshd_config.
ok djm@
[kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c ssh-keyscan.c]
split kex into client and server code, no need to link
server code into the client; ok provos@
djm@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
Darren Tucker
Ben Lindstrom