pattern-list of whitelisted environment variable names in addition to yes|no.
bz#1800, feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77dc2b468e0bf04b53f333434ba257008a1fdf24
e.g.
PermitListen 2222 8080
is equivalent to:
PermitListen *:2222 *:8080
Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@
"looks fine" markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24
administrator to explicitly specify environment variables set in sessions
started by sshd. These override the default environment and any variables set
by user configuration (PermitUserEnvironment, etc), but not the SSH_*
variables set by sshd itself.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6a96c0001ccd7dd211df6cae9e961c20fd718c0
environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting
them)
refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be
username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
%U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
interactive and CS1 for bulk
AF21 was selected as this is the highest priority within the low-latency
service class (and it is higher than what we have today). SSH is elastic
and time-sensitive data, where a user is waiting for a response via the
network in order to continue with a task at hand. As such, these flows
should be considered foreground traffic, with delays or drops to such
traffic directly impacting user-productivity.
For bulk SSH traffic, the CS1 "Lower Effort" marker was chosen to enable
networks implementing a scavanger/lower-than-best effort class to
discriminate scp(1) below normal activities, such as web surfing. In
general this type of bulk SSH traffic is a background activity.
An advantage of using "AF21" for interactive SSH and "CS1" for bulk SSH
is that they are recognisable values on all common platforms (IANA
https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xml), and
for AF21 specifically a definition of the intended behavior exists
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594#section-4.7 in addition to the definition
of the Assured Forwarding PHB group https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2597, and
for CS1 (Lower Effort) there is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3662
The first three bits of "AF21" map to the equivalent IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE
802.11e, MPLS EXP/CoS and IP Precedence value of 2 (also known as "Immediate",
or "AC_BE"), and CS1's first 3 bits map to IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e,
MPLS/CoS and IP Precedence value 1 ("Background" or "AC_BK").
OK deraadt@, "no objection" djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d11d2a4484f461524ef0c20870523dfcdeb52181
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
From Jakub Jelen via bz#2826
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51bf769f06e55447f4bfa7306949e62d2401907a
add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on which rdomain(4) a
connection was recevied on. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 27d8fd5a3f1bae18c9c6e533afdf99bff887a4fb
add sshd_config RDomain keyword to place sshd and the
subsequent user session (including the shell and any TCP/IP forwardings) into
the specified rdomain(4)
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: be2358e86346b5cacf20d90f59f980b87d1af0f5
Add optional rdomain qualifier to sshd_config's
ListenAddress option to allow listening on a different rdomain(4), e.g.
ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 rdomain 4
Upstream-ID: 24b6622c376feeed9e9be8b9605e593695ac9091
trim permitrootlogin description somewhat, to avoid
ambiguity; original diff from walter alejandro iglesias, tweaked by sthen and
myself
ok sthen schwarze deraadt
Upstream-ID: 1749418b2bc073f3fdd25fe21f8263c3637fe5d2
Allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an explicit
ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system default; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 77906ff8c7b660b02ba7cb1e47b17d66f54f1f7e
man pages with pseudo synopses which list filenames end
up creating very ugly output in man -k; after some discussion with ingo, we
feel the simplest fix is to remove such SYNOPSIS sections: the info is hardly
helpful at page top, is contained already in FILES, and there are
sufficiently few that just zapping them is simple;
ok schwarze, who also helpfully ran things through a build to check
output;
Upstream-ID: 3e211b99457e2f4c925c5927d608e6f97431336c
refactor authentication logging
optionally record successful auth methods and public credentials
used in a file accessible to user sessions
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 090b93036967015717b9a54fd0467875ae9d32fb
As promised in last release announcement: remove
support for Blowfish, RC4 and CAST ciphers. ok markus@ deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 21f8facdba3fd8da248df6417000867cec6ba222
Mark the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option as
deprecated, effectively making privsep mandatory in sandboxing mode. ok
markus@ deraadt@
(note: this doesn't remove the !privsep code paths, though that will
happen eventually).
Upstream-ID: b4c52666256c4dd865f8ce9431af5d6ce2d74a0a
support =- for removing methods from algorithms lists,
e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc; suggested by Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn in bz#2671 "I like
it" markus@
Upstream-ID: c78c38f9f81a963b33d0eade559f6048add24a6d
Re-add '%k' token for AuthorizedKeysCommand which was
lost during the re-org in rev 1.235. bz#2656, from jboning at gmail.com.
Upstream-ID: 2884e203c02764d7b3fe7472710d9c24bdc73e38
Add a sshd_config DisableForwaring option that disables
X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as
anything else we might implement in the future.
This, like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, is intended to be a
simple and future-proof way of restricting an account. Suggested as
a complement to 'restrict' by Jann Horn; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 203803f66e533a474086b38a59ceb4cf2410fcf7
tidy up the formatting in this file. more specifically,
replace .Dq, which looks appalling, with .Cm, where appropriate;
Upstream-ID: ff8e90aa0343d9bb56f40a535e148607973cc738
restore pre-auth compression support in the client -- the
previous commit was intended to remove it from the server only.
remove a few server-side pre-auth compression bits that escaped
adjust wording of Compression directive in sshd_config(5)
pointed out by naddy@ ok markus@
Upstream-ID: d23696ed72a228dacd4839dd9f2dec424ba2016b
organise the token stuff into a separate section; ok
markus for an earlier version of the diff ok/tweaks djm
Upstream-ID: 81a6daa506a4a5af985fce7cf9e59699156527c8
add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to match those
supported for AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key type, fingerprint, etc) and a
few more to provide access to the certificate's CA key; 'looks ok' dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 6b00fd446dbebe67f4e4e146d2e492d650ae04eb
remove UseLogin option and support for having /bin/login
manage login sessions; ok deraadt markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: bea7213fbf158efab7e602d9d844fba4837d2712
Catch up with the SSH1 code removal and delete all
mention of protocol 1 particularities, key files and formats, command line
options, and configuration keywords from the server documentation and
examples. ok jmc@
Upstream-ID: 850328854675b4b6a0d4a90f0b4a9dd9ca4e905f
Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet for
configuration examples.
This makes the IPv6 example consistent with IPv4, and removes a dubious
mention of a 6bone subnet.
ok sthen@ millert@
Upstream-ID: b027f3d0e0073419a132fd1bf002e8089b233634
Allow wildcard for PermitOpen hosts as well as ports.
bz#2582, patch from openssh at mzpqnxow.com and jjelen at redhat.com. ok
markus@
Upstream-ID: af0294e9b9394c4e16e991424ca0a47a7cc605f2
ban AuthenticationMethods="" and accept
AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not requiring multiple
authentication
bz#2398 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: fabd7f44d59e4518d241d0d01e226435cc23cf27
UseDNS affects ssh hostname processing in authorized_keys,
not known_hosts; bz#2554 reported by jjelen AT redhat.com
Upstream-ID: c1c1bb895dde46095fc6d81d8653703928437591
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 cannot be selected explicitly
in *KeyTypes options yet. Remove them from the lists of algorithms for now.
committing on behalf of markus@ ok djm@
Upstream-ID: c6e8820eb8e610ac21551832c0c89684a9a51bb7
since these pages now clearly tell folks to avoid v1,
normalise the docs from a v2 perspective (i.e. stop pointing out which bits
are v2 only);
ok/tweaks djm ok markus
Upstream-ID: eb474f8c36fb6a532dc05c282f7965e38dcfa129
Replace list of ciphers and MACs adjacent to -1/-2 flag
descriptions in ssh(1) with a strong recommendation not to use protocol 1.
Add a similar warning to the Protocol option descriptions in ssh_config(5)
and sshd_config(5);
prompted by and ok mmcc@
Upstream-ID: 961f99e5437d50e636feca023978950a232ead5e
Support "none" as an argument for sshd_config
ForceCommand and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to override a
global default. bz#2486 ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 7ef478d6592bc7db5c7376fc33b4443e63dccfa5
add prohibit-password as a synonymn for without-password,
since the without-password is causing too many questions. Harden it to ban
all but pubkey, hostbased, and GSSAPI auth (when the latter is enabled) from
djm, ok markus
Upstream-ID: d53317d7b28942153e6236d3fd6e12ceb482db7a
change default: PermitRootLogin without-password matching
install script changes coming as well ok djm markus
Upstream-ID: 0e2a6c4441daf5498b47a61767382bead5eb8ea6
Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be
prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the
default rather than replacing it.
approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a
mention that the default of UseDNS=no implies that
hostnames cannot be used for host matching in sshd_config and
authorized_keys; bz#2045, ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 0812705d5f2dfa59aab01f2764ee800b1741c4e1
Turn off DSA by default; add HostKeyAlgorithms to the
server and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be
tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 8450a9e6d83f80c9bfed864ff061dfc9323cec21
add knob to relax GSSAPI host credential check for
multihomed hosts bz#928, patch by Simon Wilkinson; ok dtucker
(kerberos/GSSAPI is not compiled by default on OpenBSD)
Upstream-ID: 15ddf1c6f7fd9d98eea9962f480079ae3637285d
add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting
authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite
useful in deployments with large userbases
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6
support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand
bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7
Document that the TERM environment variable is not
subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv. bz#2386, based loosely on a patch from
jjelen at redhat, help and ok jmc@
Provide a warning about chroot misuses (which sadly, seem
to have become quite popular because shiny). sshd cannot detect/manage/do
anything about these cases, best we can do is warn in the right spot in the
man page. ok markus
add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public key types
will be accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@
mention ssh -Q feature to list supported { MAC, cipher,
KEX, key } algorithms in more places and include the query string used to
list the relevant information; bz#2288
remember which public keys have been used for
authentication and refuse to accept previously-used keys.
This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require
that users authenticate using two _different_ pubkeys.
ok markus@
Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for
key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to
base64.
Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
/dev/random has created the same effect as /dev/arandom
(and /dev/urandom) for quite some time. Mop up the last few, by using
/dev/random where we actually want it, or not even mentioning arandom where
it is irrelevant.
djm@openbsd.org
jmc@openbsd.org
job@openbsd.org
jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org
benno@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
jca@openbsd.org
sobrado@openbsd.org
deraadt@openbsd.org