operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is
hosted in an agent; bz3429, suggested by Adam Szkoda; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7bc69873b99c32c42c7628ed9ea91565ba08c2f
already supported either sha512 (default) or sha256, but plumbing wasn't
there mostly by Linus Nordberg
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b536404b9da74a84b3a1c8d0b05fd564cdc96cd
matching of principals names against an allowed signers file.
Requested by and mostly written by Fabian Stelzer, towards a TOFU
model for SSH signatures in git. Some tweaks by me.
"doesn't bother me" deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d1b71f5a4127bc5e10a880c8ea6053394465247
back the user ID that was used when the key was created and append it to the
filename the key is written to (if it is not the default).
Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
resident keys with the same application string but different
user IDs.
feedback Pedro Martelletto; ok markus
NB. increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbd658b5950f583106d945641a634bc6562dd3a3
appropriate. Saves 1k of static storage and prevents snprintf "possible
truncation" warnings from newer compilers (although in this case it's false
positive since the actual sizes are limited by the output size of the SHA1).
ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e254ae723f7e3dce352c7d5abc4b6d87faf61bf4
(-Oprint-pubkey) to dump the full public key to stdout; based on patch from
Fabian Stelzer; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0598000e5b9adfb45d42afa76ff80daaa12fc3e2
without OpenSSL since those are not available, similar to what we currently
do with the moduli screening options. We can also use this to skip the
conversion regression tests in this case.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c82caa398cf99cd4518c23bba5a2fc66b16bafe
signatures support key lifetimes, and allow the verification mode to specify
a signature time to check at. This is intended for use by git to support
signing objects using ssh keys. ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e2c67b7dcd94f0610194d1e8e4907829a40cf31
Add load_hostkeys_file() and hostkeys_foreach_file() that accept a
FILE* argument instead of opening the file directly.
Original load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() are implemented using
these new interfaces.
Add a u_int note field to the hostkey_entry and hostkey_foreach_line
structs that is passed directly from the load_hostkeys() and
hostkeys_foreach() call. This is a lightweight way to annotate results
between different invocations of load_hostkeys().
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ff6db13ec9ee4edfa658b2c38baad0f505d8c20
Preprocessor directives inside macro calls, such as the new log macros,
are undefined behaviour and do not work with, eg old GCCs. Put the
entire log call inside the ifdef for OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521.
the data needed to verify the attestation. Previously we were missing the
"authenticator data" that is included in the signature.
spotted by Ian Haken
feedback Pedro Martelletto and Ian Haken; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8439896e63792b2db99c6065dd9a45eabbdb7e0a
When we know that a particular action will require a PIN, such as
downloading resident keys or generating a verify-required key, request
the PIN before attempting it.
joint work with Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 863182d38ef075bad1f7d20ca485752a05edb727
When PINs are in use and multiple FIDO tokens are attached to a host, we
cannot just blast requests at all attached tokens with the PIN specified
as this will cause the per-token PIN failure counter to increment. If
this retry counter hits the token's limit (usually 3 attempts), then the
token will lock itself and render all (web and SSH) of its keys invalid.
We don't want this.
So this reworks the key selection logic for the specific case of
multiple keys being attached. When multiple keys are attached and the
operation requires a PIN, then the user must touch the key that they
wish to use first in order to identify it.
This may require multiple touches, but only if there are multiple keys
attached AND (usually) the operation requires a PIN. The usual case of a
single key attached should be unaffected.
Work by Pedro Martelletto; ok myself and markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 637d3049ced61b7a9ee796914bbc4843d999a864
FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
requires a PIN before each authentication.
feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
Previously if the user specified a custom extension then the everything would
be in order except the custom ones. bz3198 ok dtucker markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d97deb90587b06cb227c66ffebb2d9667bf886f0
Reorder parameters list in the first usage() case - Sentence rewording
ok dtucker@
jmc@ noticed usage() missed -a flag too
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f06b9afe91cc96f260b929a56e9930caecbde246
write to it so we don't leave an empty .ssh directory when it's not needed.
Use the same function to replace the code in ssh-keygen that does the same
thing. bz#3156, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c073b569be1a60f4de36f491a4339bc4ae870f
file across runs of "ssh-keygen -Rf /path". The old behaviour was to remove
all rights for group/other. bz#3146 ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc369d0e0b5dd826430c63fd5f4b269953448a8a
fingerprint of old-format key, key comments were not being displayed. Spotted
by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d98e4f9eb168eea733d17e141e1ead9fe26e533
comment after regression caused by my recent pubkey loading refactor.
Reported by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8db49acbee6a6ccb2a4259135693b3cceedb89e
djm@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
solene@openbsd.org