signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by
wildcard.
Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs
are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps
(e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected.
Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they
aren't full pattern-lists that support negation.
(lots of) feedback, ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207
In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
Remove all guards for calls to OpenSSL free functions -
all of these functions handle NULL, from at least OpenSSL 1.0.1g onwards.
Prompted by dtucker@ asking about guards for RSA_free(), when looking at
openssh-portable pr#84 on github.
ok deraadt@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 954f1c51b94297d0ae1f749271e184141e0cadae
Drop compatibility hacks for some ancient SSH
implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
compliant SSH implementations.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be81c67db57647f907f4e881fb9341448606138
Do not require that unknown EXT_INFO extension values not
contain \0 characters. This would cause fatal connection errors if an
implementation sent e.g. string-encoded sub-values inside a value.
Reported by Denis Bider; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 030e10fdc605563c040244c4b4f1d8ae75811a5c
fix regression in 7.4 server-sig-algs, where we were
accidentally excluding SHA2 RSA signature methods. bz#2680, patch from Nuno
Goncalves; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 81ac8bfb30960447740b9b8f6a214dcf322f12e8
support =- for removing methods from algorithms lists,
e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc; suggested by Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn in bz#2671 "I like
it" markus@
Upstream-ID: c78c38f9f81a963b33d0eade559f6048add24a6d
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05
put back some pre-auth zlib bits that I shouldn't have
removed - they are still used by the client. Spotted by naddy@
Upstream-ID: 80919468056031037d56a1f5b261c164a6f90dc2
restore pre-auth compression support in the client -- the
previous commit was intended to remove it from the server only.
remove a few server-side pre-auth compression bits that escaped
adjust wording of Compression directive in sshd_config(5)
pointed out by naddy@ ok markus@
Upstream-ID: d23696ed72a228dacd4839dd9f2dec424ba2016b
support plain curve25519-sha256 KEX algorithm now that it
is approaching standardisation (same algorithm is currently supported as
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org)
Upstream-ID: 5e2b6db2e72667048cf426da43c0ee3fc777baa2
move inbound NEWKEYS handling to kex layer; otherwise
early NEWKEYS causes NULL deref; found by Robert Swiecki/honggfuzz; fixed
with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 9a68b882892e9f51dc7bfa9f5a423858af358b2f
list all supported signature algorithms in the
server-sig-algs Reported by mb AT smartftp.com in bz#2547 and (independantly)
Ron Frederick; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: ddf702d721f54646b11ef2cee6d916666cb685cd
Add MAXIMUM(), MINIMUM(), and ROUNDUP() to misc.h, then
use those definitions rather than pulling <sys/param.h> and unknown namespace
pollution. ok djm markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: 712cafa816c9f012a61628b66b9fbd5687223fb8
update ext_info_c every time we receive a kexinit msg;
fixes sending of ext_info if privsep is disabled; report Aris Adamantiadis &
Mancha; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 2ceaa1076e19dbd3542254b4fb8e42d608f28856
add support for additional fixed DH groups from
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group)
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group)
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group)
based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
refactor activation of rekeying
This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously
the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes
application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets
about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events
themselves.
Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch
Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8
implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
Improve printing of KEX offers and decisions
The debug output now labels the client and server offers and the
negotiated options. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 8db921b3f92a4565271b1c1fbce6e7f508e1a2cb
Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be
prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the
default rather than replacing it.
approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a
include the peer's offer when logging a failure to
negotiate a mutual set of algorithms (kex, pubkey, ciphers, etc.) ok markus@
Upstream-ID: bbb8caabf5c01790bb845f5ce135565248d7c796
correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for
offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when
a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely
unlikely configuration).
ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@
update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch
packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b)
(de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old
packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and
integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@
Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't
work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This
will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom.
Considered highly experimental for now.
[cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c]
Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an
effective strength much lower than the key size. This causes problems
with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger
than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as
specified in the RFC. Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat,
reduced by me with input from Markus. ok djm@ markus@
[bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c]
[kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c]
avoid use of OpenSSL BIGNUM type and functions for KEX with
Curve25519 by adding a buffer_put_bignum2_from_string() that stores
a string using the bignum encoding rules. Will make it easier to
build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in the future;
ok markus@
[digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c]
[kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c]
[kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c]
[schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c]
Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations
rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier
to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future;
feedback, ok markus@
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the
latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1
that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
[cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h mac.c mac.h servconf.c ssh.c]
Output the effective values of Ciphers, MACs and KexAlgorithms when
the default has not been overridden. ok markus@
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org);
initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
[authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c]
[key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c]
add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX
algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling
to be table-driven; ok markus@
[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c]
[myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
ok and feedback djm@
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]
[servconf.c servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow
selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
and their order of preference.
ok markus@
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
(SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.
This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
client.
ok naddy@
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
[auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c]
[packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the
string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
a string(3) function.
Use the new API in a few sensitive places.
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
[kex.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c mac.h kex.h mac.c]
Preserve MAC ctx between packets, saving 2xhash calls per-packet.
Yields around a 12-16% end-to-end speedup for arcfour256/hmac-md5
patch from markus@ tested dtucker@ and myself, ok markus@ and me (I'm
committing at his request)
[auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth2-chall.c channels.c]
[clientloop.c deattack.c gss-genr.c kex.c key.c misc.c moduli.c]
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c scard.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uuencode.c]
[xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations
functions and use them throughout openssh
xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it
to die
feedback and ok deraadt@
[openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
[openbsd-compat/sha2.c] First stab at portability glue for SHA256
KEX support, should work with libc SHA256 support or OpenSSL
EVP_sha256 if present
[kex.c kex.h monitor.c myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
Implement the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key exchange method
using the SHA256 code in libc (and wrapper to make it into an OpenSSL
EVP), interop tested against CVS PuTTY
NB. no portability bits committed yet
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h packet.c packet.h servconf.c session.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
add a new compression method that delays compression until the user
has been authenticated successfully and set compression to 'delayed'
for sshd.
this breaks older openssh clients (< 3.5) if they insist on
compression, so you have to re-enable compression in sshd_config.
ok djm@
[auth-rsa.c auth2-gss.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c canohost.c channels.c
cipher.c dns.c kex.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_wrap.c
monitor_wrap.h nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c scp.c sftp-server.c sftp.c
ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshlogin.c
sshpty.c]
make ssh -Wshadow clean, no functional changes
markus@ ok
There are also some portable-specific -Wshadow warnings to be fixed in
monitor.c and montior_wrap.c.
[kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c ssh-keyscan.c]
split kex into client and server code, no need to link
server code into the client; ok provos@
djm@openbsd.org
jsing@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
dtucker@openbsd.org
deraadt@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
mmcc@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
Tim Rice
Ben Lindstrom