Commit Graph

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
djm@openbsd.org beec17bb31
upstream: remove vestigal support for KRL signatures
When the KRL format was originally defined, it included support for
signing of KRL objects. However, the code to sign KRLs and verify KRL
signatues was never completed in OpenSSH.

Now, some years later, we have SSHSIG support in ssh-keygen that is
more general, well tested and actually works. So this removes the
semi-finished KRL signing/verification support from OpenSSH and
refactors the remaining code to realise the benefit - primarily, we
no longer need to perform multiple parsing passes over KRL objects.

ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 517437bab3d8180f695c775410c052340e038804
2023-07-17 14:52:35 +10:00
djm@openbsd.org 449566f64c
upstream: Support for KRL extensions.
This defines wire formats for optional KRL extensions and implements
parsing of the new submessages. No actual extensions are supported at
this point.

ok markus

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ae2fcde9a22a9ba7f765bd4f36b3f5901d8c3fa7
2023-07-17 14:52:20 +10:00
djm@openbsd.org 6ec7457171 upstream: give ssh-keygen the ability to dump the contents of a
binary key revocation list: ssh-keygen -lQf /path bz#3132; ok dtucker

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b76afc4e3b74ab735dbde4e5f0cfa1f02356033b
2020-04-03 13:33:25 +11:00
djm@openbsd.org 4f7a56d5e0 upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
random data (currently 16KB).

Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.

Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
when being saved/serialised.

Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
architecture has become less unsafe.

been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@

ok dtucker@ deraadt@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
2019-06-21 14:24:35 +10:00
djm@openbsd.org 9405c6214f upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygen
to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94
2018-09-12 16:49:21 +10:00
djm@openbsd.org 6074c84bf9 upstream commit
unused prototype

Upstream-ID: f3eef4389d53ed6c0d5c77dcdcca3060c745da97
2016-01-07 20:13:32 +11:00
djm@openbsd.org e7fd952f4e upstream commit
sync changes from libopenssh; prepared by markus@ mostly
 debug output tweaks, a couple of error return value changes and some other
 minor stuff
2015-01-14 20:32:42 +11:00
djm@openbsd.org 74de254bb9 upstream commit
convert KRL code to new buffer API

ok markus@
2014-12-05 09:29:46 +11:00
Damien Miller f3747bf401 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01
[auth.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5]
     [krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl]
     add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to
     represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as
     a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.
     KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.
     feedback and ok markus@
2013-01-18 11:44:04 +11:00