HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, which more
accurately reflects its effect. This matches a previous change to
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous names are retained as aliases. ok
djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49451c382adc6e69d3fa0e0663eeef2daa4b199e
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. While the two were originally equivalent, this
actually specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. Some key
types (eg RSA) can be used by multiple algorithms (eg ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-512)
so the old name is becoming increasingly misleading. The old name is
retained as an alias. Prompted by bz#3253, help & ok djm@, man page help jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0346b2f73f54c43d4e001089759d149bfe402ca5
exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime (coupled with X25519).
The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org method is
replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com. Per the authors,
sntrup4591761 was replaced almost two years ago by sntrup761.
The sntrup761 implementaion, like sntrup4591761 before it, is public
domain code extracted from the SUPERCOP cryptography benchmark
suite (https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html).
Thanks for Daniel J Bernstein for guidance on algorithm selection.
Patch from Tobias Heider; feedback & ok markus@ and myself
(note this both the updated method and the one that it replaced are
disabled by default)
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf582b772d81ee24e911bb6f4b2aecfd39338ae
log functions receive function, filename and line number of caller.
We can use this to selectively enable logging via pattern-lists.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51a472610cbe37834ce6ce4a3f0e0b1ccc95a349
This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding
sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the
user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt.
Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the
signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag
through and adding ways to require it.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a2313aae153e043d57763d766bb6d55c4e276e6
FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
requires a PIN before each authentication.
feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
While freezero() returns early if the pointer is NULL the tests for
NULL in callers are left to avoid warnings about passing an
uninitialised size argument across a function boundry.
ok deraadt@ djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2660fa334fcc7cd05ec74dd99cb036f9ade6384a
messages.
This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and
distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key".
ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e
sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler
preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce
the potential for short read/write operations.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
keys.
Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose
the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling,
but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is
less risk.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c
a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default
requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their
key to authorize them.
feedback deraadt, ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e
This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that
causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before
a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the
key).
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e434a49802d4ed82bc0aa38cb985c198c407de
This is populated during signature verification with additional fields
that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is
only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags
field.
with and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49
including the new U2F signatures.
Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
change is mechanically adding that.
Suggested by / ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
(most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
strictness helps us in the future.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
enabled by default.
introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
API, started almost exactly six years ago.
This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
steps.
with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were
specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys as the monitor
checks only the base key (not the signature algorithm) type against
*AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117bc3dc54578dbdb515a1d3732988cb5b00461b
Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods
like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor
authentication via PAM or BSD Auth.
remove the legacy one.
Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
dtucker@openbsd.org
djm@openbsd.org
deraadt@openbsd.org
jsg@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
markus@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker