OpenSSh privilege separation model - http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
Posix_spawn is implemented in POSIX adapter as an alternative to fork() that is heavily used in Privilege separation.
Additional state info is added to sshd to accommodate distinguishing the various modes (privileged monitor, unprivileged child, authenticated child).
Required service state (like config and host keys) is transmitted over pipes from monitor to child processes.
Changes to installation scripts and tests to accomodate new architectural changes
fix problem in configuration parsing when in config dump mode
(sshd -T) without providing a full connection specification (sshd -T -C ...)
spotted by bluhm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7125faf5740eaa9d3a2f25400a0bc85e94e28b8f
When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the
attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an
incomplete list of) all criteria. ok djm@, man page help jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4e773c4212d3dea486d0259ae977551aab2c1fc
add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on which rdomain(4) a
connection was recevied on. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 27d8fd5a3f1bae18c9c6e533afdf99bff887a4fb
add sshd_config RDomain keyword to place sshd and the
subsequent user session (including the shell and any TCP/IP forwardings) into
the specified rdomain(4)
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: be2358e86346b5cacf20d90f59f980b87d1af0f5
Add optional rdomain qualifier to sshd_config's
ListenAddress option to allow listening on a different rdomain(4), e.g.
ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 rdomain 4
Upstream-ID: 24b6622c376feeed9e9be8b9605e593695ac9091
replace statically-sized arrays in ServerOptions with
dynamic ones managed by xrecallocarray, removing some arbitrary (though
large) limits and saving a bit of memory; "much nicer" markus@
Upstream-ID: 1732720b2f478fe929d6687ac7b0a97ff2efe9d2
refactor channels.c
Move static state to a "struct ssh_channels" that is allocated at
runtime and tracked as a member of struct ssh.
Explicitly pass "struct ssh" to all channels functions.
Replace use of the legacy packet APIs in channels.c.
Rework sshd_config PermitOpen handling: previously the configuration
parser would call directly into the channels layer. After the refactor
this is not possible, as the channels structures are allocated at
connection time and aren't available when the configuration is parsed.
The server config parser now tracks PermitOpen itself and explicitly
configures the channels code later.
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 11828f161656b965cc306576422613614bea2d8f
remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge
the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus
Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f
If running with privsep (mandatory now) as a non-privileged user, we
don't chroot or change to an unprivileged user however we still checked
the existence of the user and directory. Don't do those checks if we're
not going to use them. Based in part on a patch from Lionel Fourquaux
via Corinna Vinschen, ok djm@
Fix segfault when sshd attempts to load RSA1 keys (can
only happen when protocol v.1 support is enabled for the client). Reported by
Jakub Jelen in bz#2686; ok dtucker
Upstream-ID: 8fdaec2ba4b5f65db1d094f6714ce64b25d871d7
Restore \r\n newline sequence for server ident string. The CR
got lost in the flensing of SSHv1. Pointed out by Stef Bon
Upstream-ID: 5333fd43ce5396bf5999496096fac5536e678fac
Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of
seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time).
This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison
warning.
rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op
on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on
anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually
wraps, anyway).
some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c
log connections dropped in excess of MaxStartups at
verbose LogLevel; bz#2613 based on diff from Tomas Kuthan; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 703ae690dbf9b56620a6018f8a3b2389ce76d92b
Unlink PidFile on SIGHUP and always recreate it when the
new sshd starts. Regression tests (and possibly other things) depend on the
pidfile being recreated after SIGHUP, and unlinking it means it won't contain
a stale pid if sshd fails to restart. ok djm@ markus@
Upstream-ID: 132dd6dda0c77dd49d2f15b2573b5794f6160870
On startup, check to see if sshd is already daemonized
and if so, skip the call to daemon() and do not rewrite the PidFile. This
means that when sshd re-execs itself on SIGHUP the process ID will no longer
change. Should address bz#2641. ok djm@ markus@.
Upstream-ID: 5ea0355580056fb3b25c1fd6364307d9638a37b9
Add a call to RAND_poll() to ensure than more than pid+time gets
stirred into child processes states. Prompted by analysis from Jann
Horn at Project Zero. ok dtucker@
bagajjal
Manoj Ampalam
Manoj Ampalam
djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
djm@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
Oleg S
Darren Tucker
Yanbing
deraadt@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org