2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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/** @file
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2018-03-01 18:55:09 +01:00
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The CPU specific programming for PiSmmCpuDxeSmm module.
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2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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2023-02-16 07:16:33 +01:00
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Copyright (c) 2010 - 2023, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
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2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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2019-04-04 01:06:33 +02:00
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SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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**/
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OvmfPkg/SEV: don't manage the lifecycle of the SMRAM at the default SMBASE
When OVMF runs in a SEV guest, the initial SMM Save State Map is
(1) allocated as EfiBootServicesData type memory in OvmfPkg/PlatformPei,
function AmdSevInitialize(), for preventing unintended information
sharing with the hypervisor;
(2) decrypted in AmdSevDxe;
(3) re-encrypted in OvmfPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib, function
SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), which is called by
PiSmmCpuDxeSmm right after initial SMBASE relocation;
(4) released to DXE at the same location.
The SMRAM at the default SMBASE is a superset of the initial Save State
Map. The reserved memory allocation in InitializeRamRegions(), from the
previous patch, must override the allocating and freeing in (1) and (4),
respectively. (Note: the decrypting and re-encrypting in (2) and (3) are
unaffected.)
In AmdSevInitialize(), only assert the containment of the initial Save
State Map, in the larger area already allocated by InitializeRamRegions().
In SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), preserve the allocation of the
initial Save State Map into OS runtime, as part of the allocation done by
InitializeRamRegions(). Only assert containment.
These changes only affect the normal boot path (the UEFI memory map is
untouched during S3 resume).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-9-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
2019-09-20 17:07:43 +02:00
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#include <IndustryStandard/Q35MchIch9.h>
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2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
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2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
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#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
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2018-03-01 19:20:37 +01:00
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#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
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2018-03-01 20:59:12 +01:00
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#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
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2021-03-12 07:26:52 +01:00
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#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
|
OvmfPkg/SEV: don't manage the lifecycle of the SMRAM at the default SMBASE
When OVMF runs in a SEV guest, the initial SMM Save State Map is
(1) allocated as EfiBootServicesData type memory in OvmfPkg/PlatformPei,
function AmdSevInitialize(), for preventing unintended information
sharing with the hypervisor;
(2) decrypted in AmdSevDxe;
(3) re-encrypted in OvmfPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib, function
SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), which is called by
PiSmmCpuDxeSmm right after initial SMBASE relocation;
(4) released to DXE at the same location.
The SMRAM at the default SMBASE is a superset of the initial Save State
Map. The reserved memory allocation in InitializeRamRegions(), from the
previous patch, must override the allocating and freeing in (1) and (4),
respectively. (Note: the decrypting and re-encrypting in (2) and (3) are
unaffected.)
In AmdSevInitialize(), only assert the containment of the initial Save
State Map, in the larger area already allocated by InitializeRamRegions().
In SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), preserve the allocation of the
initial Save State Map into OS runtime, as part of the allocation done by
InitializeRamRegions(). Only assert containment.
These changes only affect the normal boot path (the UEFI memory map is
untouched during S3 resume).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-9-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
2019-09-20 17:07:43 +02:00
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#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
|
2021-03-12 07:26:52 +01:00
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#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h>
|
2018-03-01 19:20:37 +01:00
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#include <Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib.h>
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2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
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#include <Library/SmmServicesTableLib.h>
|
2018-03-01 20:59:12 +01:00
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#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
|
2023-02-16 07:16:33 +01:00
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#include <Library/HobLib.h>
|
2021-03-12 07:26:52 +01:00
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#include <Pcd/CpuHotEjectData.h>
|
2018-03-01 19:20:37 +01:00
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#include <PiSmm.h>
|
2023-07-04 11:52:30 +02:00
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#include <Register/Amd/SmramSaveStateMap.h>
|
2023-02-16 07:16:33 +01:00
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#include <Guid/SmmBaseHob.h>
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2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
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//
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// EFER register LMA bit
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//
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#define LMA BIT10
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2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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/**
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The constructor function
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@param[in] ImageHandle The firmware allocated handle for the EFI image.
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@param[in] SystemTable A pointer to the EFI System Table.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS The constructor always returns EFI_SUCCESS.
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**/
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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SmmCpuFeaturesLibConstructor (
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IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
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IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
|
|
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)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-02-16 07:16:33 +01:00
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|
|
//
|
|
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// If gSmmBaseHobGuid found, means SmBase info has been relocated and recorded
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|
// in the SmBase array. ASSERT it's not supported in OVMF.
|
|
|
|
//
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ASSERT (GetFirstGuidHob (&gSmmBaseHobGuid) == NULL);
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|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
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//
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
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|
// No need to program SMRRs on our virtual platform.
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
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|
//
|
|
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|
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
|
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|
}
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|
/**
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|
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|
Called during the very first SMI into System Management Mode to initialize
|
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|
CPU features, including SMBASE, for the currently executing CPU. Since this
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|
is the first SMI, the SMRAM Save State Map is at the default address of
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SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET. The currently executing
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CPU is specified by CpuIndex and CpuIndex can be used to access information
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about the currently executing CPU in the ProcessorInfo array and the
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HotPlugCpuData data structure.
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@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU to initialize. The value
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|
must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus field in
|
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|
|
the System Management System Table (SMST).
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@param[in] IsMonarch TRUE if the CpuIndex is the index of the CPU that
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|
|
|
was elected as monarch during System Management
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|
|
|
Mode initialization.
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FALSE if the CpuIndex is not the index of the CPU
|
|
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|
that was elected as monarch during System
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|
|
|
Management Mode initialization.
|
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@param[in] ProcessorInfo Pointer to an array of EFI_PROCESSOR_INFORMATION
|
|
|
|
structures. ProcessorInfo[CpuIndex] contains the
|
|
|
|
information for the currently executing CPU.
|
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|
|
@param[in] CpuHotPlugData Pointer to the CPU_HOT_PLUG_DATA structure that
|
|
|
|
contains the ApidId and SmBase arrays.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
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|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
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SmmCpuFeaturesInitializeProcessor (
|
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IN UINTN CpuIndex,
|
|
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IN BOOLEAN IsMonarch,
|
|
|
|
IN EFI_PROCESSOR_INFORMATION *ProcessorInfo,
|
|
|
|
IN CPU_HOT_PLUG_DATA *CpuHotPlugData
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-07-04 11:52:30 +02:00
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|
AMD_SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP *CpuState;
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
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//
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|
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// Configure SMBASE.
|
|
|
|
//
|
2023-07-04 11:52:30 +02:00
|
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|
CpuState = (AMD_SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP *)(UINTN)(
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SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE +
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|
SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET
|
|
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);
|
2015-11-30 19:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((CpuState->x86.SMMRevId & 0xFFFF) == 0) {
|
|
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|
CpuState->x86.SMBASE = (UINT32)CpuHotPlugData->SmBase[CpuIndex];
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
CpuState->x64.SMBASE = (UINT32)CpuHotPlugData->SmBase[CpuIndex];
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
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|
|
//
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
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|
// No need to program SMRRs on our virtual platform.
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
This function updates the SMRAM save state on the currently executing CPU
|
|
|
|
to resume execution at a specific address after an RSM instruction. This
|
|
|
|
function must evaluate the SMRAM save state to determine the execution mode
|
|
|
|
the RSM instruction resumes and update the resume execution address with
|
|
|
|
either NewInstructionPointer32 or NewInstructionPoint. The auto HALT restart
|
|
|
|
flag in the SMRAM save state must always be cleared. This function returns
|
|
|
|
the value of the instruction pointer from the SMRAM save state that was
|
|
|
|
replaced. If this function returns 0, then the SMRAM save state was not
|
|
|
|
modified.
|
|
|
|
|
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|
This function is called during the very first SMI on each CPU after
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesInitializeProcessor() to set a flag in normal execution mode
|
|
|
|
to signal that the SMBASE of each CPU has been updated before the default
|
|
|
|
SMBASE address is used for the first SMI to the next CPU.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU to hook. The value
|
|
|
|
must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus
|
2018-03-01 18:55:09 +01:00
|
|
|
field in the System Management System
|
|
|
|
Table (SMST).
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuState Pointer to SMRAM Save State Map for the
|
|
|
|
currently executing CPU.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] NewInstructionPointer32 Instruction pointer to use if resuming to
|
|
|
|
32-bit execution mode from 64-bit SMM.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] NewInstructionPointer Instruction pointer to use if resuming to
|
|
|
|
same execution mode as SMM.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@retval 0 This function did modify the SMRAM save state.
|
|
|
|
@retval > 0 The original instruction pointer value from the SMRAM save state
|
|
|
|
before it was replaced.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
UINT64
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesHookReturnFromSmm (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex,
|
|
|
|
IN SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP *CpuState,
|
|
|
|
IN UINT64 NewInstructionPointer32,
|
|
|
|
IN UINT64 NewInstructionPointer
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-07-04 11:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
UINT64 OriginalInstructionPointer;
|
|
|
|
AMD_SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP *CpuSaveState;
|
2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-07-04 11:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
CpuSaveState = (AMD_SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP *)CpuState;
|
2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((CpuSaveState->x86.SMMRevId & 0xFFFF) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
OriginalInstructionPointer = (UINT64)CpuSaveState->x86._EIP;
|
|
|
|
CpuSaveState->x86._EIP = (UINT32)NewInstructionPointer;
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Clear the auto HALT restart flag so the RSM instruction returns
|
|
|
|
// program control to the instruction following the HLT instruction.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if ((CpuSaveState->x86.AutoHALTRestart & BIT0) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
CpuSaveState->x86.AutoHALTRestart &= ~BIT0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
OriginalInstructionPointer = CpuSaveState->x64._RIP;
|
2023-07-04 11:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((CpuSaveState->x64.EFER & LMA) == 0) {
|
2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
|
|
|
CpuSaveState->x64._RIP = (UINT32)NewInstructionPointer32;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
CpuSaveState->x64._RIP = (UINT32)NewInstructionPointer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-12-05 23:54:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Clear the auto HALT restart flag so the RSM instruction returns
|
|
|
|
// program control to the instruction following the HLT instruction.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if ((CpuSaveState->x64.AutoHALTRestart & BIT0) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
CpuSaveState->x64.AutoHALTRestart &= ~BIT0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-12-05 23:54:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-30 19:46:37 +01:00
|
|
|
return OriginalInstructionPointer;
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-12 07:26:52 +01:00
|
|
|
STATIC CPU_HOT_EJECT_DATA *mCpuHotEjectData = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Initialize mCpuHotEjectData if PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber > 1.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Also setup the corresponding PcdCpuHotEjectDataAddress.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
STATIC
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
InitCpuHotEjectData (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
UINTN Size;
|
|
|
|
UINT32 Idx;
|
|
|
|
UINT32 MaxNumberOfCpus;
|
|
|
|
RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MaxNumberOfCpus = PcdGet32 (PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber);
|
|
|
|
if (MaxNumberOfCpus == 1) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// We allocate CPU_HOT_EJECT_DATA and CPU_HOT_EJECT_DATA->QemuSelectorMap[]
|
|
|
|
// in a single allocation, and explicitly align the QemuSelectorMap[] (which
|
|
|
|
// is a UINT64 array) at its natural boundary.
|
|
|
|
// Accordingly, allocate:
|
|
|
|
// sizeof(*mCpuHotEjectData) + (MaxNumberOfCpus * sizeof(UINT64))
|
|
|
|
// and, add sizeof(UINT64) - 1 to use as padding if needed.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (RETURN_ERROR (SafeUintnMult (MaxNumberOfCpus, sizeof (UINT64), &Size)) ||
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ERROR (SafeUintnAdd (Size, sizeof (*mCpuHotEjectData), &Size)) ||
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ERROR (SafeUintnAdd (Size, sizeof (UINT64) - 1, &Size)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-04-06 21:49:41 +02:00
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: invalid CPU_HOT_EJECT_DATA\n", __func__));
|
2021-03-12 07:26:52 +01:00
|
|
|
goto Fatal;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotEjectData = AllocatePool (Size);
|
|
|
|
if (mCpuHotEjectData == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (mCpuHotEjectData != NULL);
|
|
|
|
goto Fatal;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotEjectData->Handler = NULL;
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotEjectData->ArrayLength = MaxNumberOfCpus;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotEjectData->QemuSelectorMap = ALIGN_POINTER (
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotEjectData + 1,
|
|
|
|
sizeof (UINT64)
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// We use mCpuHotEjectData->QemuSelectorMap to map
|
|
|
|
// ProcessorNum -> QemuSelector. Initialize to invalid values.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
for (Idx = 0; Idx < mCpuHotEjectData->ArrayLength; Idx++) {
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotEjectData->QemuSelectorMap[Idx] = CPU_EJECT_QEMU_SELECTOR_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Expose address of CPU Hot eject Data structure
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (
|
|
|
|
PcdCpuHotEjectDataAddress,
|
|
|
|
(UINTN)(VOID *)mCpuHotEjectData
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fatal:
|
|
|
|
CpuDeadLoop ();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Hook point in normal execution mode that allows the one CPU that was elected
|
|
|
|
as monarch during System Management Mode initialization to perform additional
|
|
|
|
initialization actions immediately after all of the CPUs have processed their
|
|
|
|
first SMI and called SmmCpuFeaturesInitializeProcessor() relocating SMBASE
|
|
|
|
into a buffer in SMRAM and called SmmCpuFeaturesHookReturnFromSmm().
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-01 20:59:12 +01:00
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
UINTN MapPagesBase;
|
|
|
|
UINTN MapPagesCount;
|
2021-03-12 07:26:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
InitCpuHotEjectData ();
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-01 20:59:12 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!MemEncryptSevIsEnabled ()) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Now that SMBASE relocation is complete, re-encrypt the original SMRAM save
|
|
|
|
// state map's container pages, and release the pages to DXE. (The pages were
|
|
|
|
// allocated in PlatformPei.)
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPages (
|
|
|
|
&MapPagesBase,
|
|
|
|
&MapPagesCount
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Status = MemEncryptSevSetPageEncMask (
|
|
|
|
0, // Cr3BaseAddress -- use current CR3
|
|
|
|
MapPagesBase, // BaseAddress
|
2021-05-19 20:19:49 +02:00
|
|
|
MapPagesCount // NumPages
|
2018-03-01 20:59:12 +01:00
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((
|
|
|
|
DEBUG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"%a: MemEncryptSevSetPageEncMask(): %r\n",
|
2023-04-06 21:49:41 +02:00
|
|
|
__func__,
|
2018-03-01 20:59:12 +01:00
|
|
|
Status
|
|
|
|
));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (FALSE);
|
|
|
|
CpuDeadLoop ();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ZeroMem ((VOID *)MapPagesBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (MapPagesCount));
|
|
|
|
|
OvmfPkg/SEV: don't manage the lifecycle of the SMRAM at the default SMBASE
When OVMF runs in a SEV guest, the initial SMM Save State Map is
(1) allocated as EfiBootServicesData type memory in OvmfPkg/PlatformPei,
function AmdSevInitialize(), for preventing unintended information
sharing with the hypervisor;
(2) decrypted in AmdSevDxe;
(3) re-encrypted in OvmfPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib, function
SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), which is called by
PiSmmCpuDxeSmm right after initial SMBASE relocation;
(4) released to DXE at the same location.
The SMRAM at the default SMBASE is a superset of the initial Save State
Map. The reserved memory allocation in InitializeRamRegions(), from the
previous patch, must override the allocating and freeing in (1) and (4),
respectively. (Note: the decrypting and re-encrypting in (2) and (3) are
unaffected.)
In AmdSevInitialize(), only assert the containment of the initial Save
State Map, in the larger area already allocated by InitializeRamRegions().
In SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), preserve the allocation of the
initial Save State Map into OS runtime, as part of the allocation done by
InitializeRamRegions(). Only assert containment.
These changes only affect the normal boot path (the UEFI memory map is
untouched during S3 resume).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-9-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
2019-09-20 17:07:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (PcdGetBool (PcdQ35SmramAtDefaultSmbase)) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// The initial SMRAM Save State Map has been covered as part of a larger
|
|
|
|
// reserved memory allocation in PlatformPei's InitializeRamRegions(). That
|
|
|
|
// allocation is supposed to survive into OS runtime; we must not release
|
|
|
|
// any part of it. Only re-assert the containment here.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE <= MapPagesBase);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (
|
|
|
|
(MapPagesBase + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (MapPagesCount) <=
|
|
|
|
SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + MCH_DEFAULT_SMBASE_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
Status = gBS->FreePages (MapPagesBase, MapPagesCount);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Return the size, in bytes, of a custom SMI Handler in bytes. If 0 is
|
|
|
|
returned, then a custom SMI handler is not provided by this library,
|
|
|
|
and the default SMI handler must be used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@retval 0 Use the default SMI handler.
|
2018-03-01 18:55:09 +01:00
|
|
|
@retval > 0 Use the SMI handler installed by
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesInstallSmiHandler(). The caller is required to
|
|
|
|
allocate enough SMRAM for each CPU to support the size of the
|
|
|
|
custom SMI handler.
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
UINTN
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesGetSmiHandlerSize (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2018-03-01 18:55:09 +01:00
|
|
|
Install a custom SMI handler for the CPU specified by CpuIndex. This
|
|
|
|
function is only called if SmmCpuFeaturesGetSmiHandlerSize() returns a size
|
|
|
|
is greater than zero and is called by the CPU that was elected as monarch
|
|
|
|
during System Management Mode initialization.
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU to install the custom SMI handler.
|
|
|
|
The value must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus field
|
|
|
|
in the System Management System Table (SMST).
|
|
|
|
@param[in] SmBase The SMBASE address for the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] SmiStack The stack to use when an SMI is processed by the
|
|
|
|
the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] StackSize The size, in bytes, if the stack used when an SMI is
|
|
|
|
processed by the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] GdtBase The base address of the GDT to use when an SMI is
|
|
|
|
processed by the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] GdtSize The size, in bytes, of the GDT used when an SMI is
|
|
|
|
processed by the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] IdtBase The base address of the IDT to use when an SMI is
|
|
|
|
processed by the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] IdtSize The size, in bytes, of the IDT used when an SMI is
|
|
|
|
processed by the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Cr3 The base address of the page tables to use when an SMI
|
|
|
|
is processed by the CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesInstallSmiHandler (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex,
|
|
|
|
IN UINT32 SmBase,
|
|
|
|
IN VOID *SmiStack,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN StackSize,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN GdtBase,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN GdtSize,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN IdtBase,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN IdtSize,
|
|
|
|
IN UINT32 Cr3
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Determines if MTRR registers must be configured to set SMRAM cache-ability
|
|
|
|
when executing in System Management Mode.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@retval TRUE MTRR registers must be configured to set SMRAM cache-ability.
|
|
|
|
@retval FALSE MTRR registers do not need to be configured to set SMRAM
|
|
|
|
cache-ability.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesNeedConfigureMtrrs (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
|
|
return FALSE;
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2018-03-01 18:55:09 +01:00
|
|
|
Disable SMRR register if SMRR is supported and
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesNeedConfigureMtrrs() returns TRUE.
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesDisableSmrr (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// No SMRR support, nothing to do
|
|
|
|
//
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2018-03-01 18:55:09 +01:00
|
|
|
Enable SMRR register if SMRR is supported and
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesNeedConfigureMtrrs() returns TRUE.
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesReenableSmrr (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// No SMRR support, nothing to do
|
|
|
|
//
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Processor specific hook point each time a CPU enters System Management Mode.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU that has entered SMM. The value
|
|
|
|
must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus field in the
|
|
|
|
System Management System Table (SMST).
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesRendezvousEntry (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
//
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
|
|
// No SMRR support, nothing to do
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Processor specific hook point each time a CPU exits System Management Mode.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-01 18:55:09 +01:00
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU that is exiting SMM. The value
|
|
|
|
must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus field in the
|
|
|
|
System Management System Table (SMST).
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesRendezvousExit (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-03-12 07:26:53 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// We only call the Handler if CPU hot-eject is enabled
|
|
|
|
// (PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber > 1), and hot-eject is needed
|
|
|
|
// in this SMI exit (otherwise mCpuHotEjectData->Handler is not armed.)
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mCpuHotEjectData != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
CPU_HOT_EJECT_HANDLER Handler;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// As the comment above mentions, mCpuHotEjectData->Handler might be
|
|
|
|
// written to on the BSP as part of handling of the CPU-ejection.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// We know that any initial assignment to mCpuHotEjectData->Handler
|
|
|
|
// (on the BSP, in the CpuHotplugMmi() context) is ordered-before the
|
|
|
|
// load below, since it is guaranteed to happen before the
|
|
|
|
// control-dependency of the BSP's SMI exit signal -- by way of a store
|
|
|
|
// to AllCpusInSync (on the BSP, in BspHandler()) and the corresponding
|
|
|
|
// AllCpusInSync loop (on the APs, in SmiRendezvous()) which depends on
|
|
|
|
// that store.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This guarantees that these pieces of code can never execute
|
|
|
|
// simultaneously. In addition, we ensure that the following load is
|
|
|
|
// ordered-after the AllCpusInSync loop by using a MemoryFence() with
|
|
|
|
// acquire semantics.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
MemoryFence ();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Handler = mCpuHotEjectData->Handler;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (Handler != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
Handler (CpuIndex);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Check to see if an SMM register is supported by a specified CPU.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU to check for SMM register support.
|
|
|
|
The value must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus field
|
|
|
|
in the System Management System Table (SMST).
|
|
|
|
@param[in] RegName Identifies the SMM register to check for support.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@retval TRUE The SMM register specified by RegName is supported by the CPU
|
|
|
|
specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
@retval FALSE The SMM register specified by RegName is not supported by the
|
|
|
|
CPU specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesIsSmmRegisterSupported (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex,
|
|
|
|
IN SMM_REG_NAME RegName
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
|
|
ASSERT (RegName == SmmRegFeatureControl);
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Returns the current value of the SMM register for the specified CPU.
|
|
|
|
If the SMM register is not supported, then 0 is returned.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU to read the SMM register. The
|
|
|
|
value must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus field in
|
|
|
|
the System Management System Table (SMST).
|
|
|
|
@param[in] RegName Identifies the SMM register to read.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@return The value of the SMM register specified by RegName from the CPU
|
|
|
|
specified by CpuIndex.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
UINT64
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesGetSmmRegister (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex,
|
|
|
|
IN SMM_REG_NAME RegName
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This is called for SmmRegSmmDelayed, SmmRegSmmBlocked, SmmRegSmmEnable.
|
|
|
|
// The last of these should actually be SmmRegSmmDisable, so we can just
|
|
|
|
// return FALSE.
|
|
|
|
//
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Sets the value of an SMM register on a specified CPU.
|
|
|
|
If the SMM register is not supported, then no action is performed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] CpuIndex The index of the CPU to write the SMM register. The
|
|
|
|
value must be between 0 and the NumberOfCpus field in
|
|
|
|
the System Management System Table (SMST).
|
|
|
|
@param[in] RegName Identifies the SMM register to write.
|
|
|
|
registers are read-only.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Value The value to write to the SMM register.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesSetSmmRegister (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex,
|
|
|
|
IN SMM_REG_NAME RegName,
|
|
|
|
IN UINT64 Value
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-11-30 19:46:32 +01:00
|
|
|
ASSERT (FALSE);
|
2015-11-30 19:46:27 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
This function is hook point called after the gEfiSmmReadyToLockProtocolGuid
|
|
|
|
notification is completely processed.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesCompleteSmmReadyToLock (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|