audk/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec

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## @file
# EFI/Framework Open Virtual Machine Firmware (OVMF) platform
#
# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#
##
[Defines]
DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005
PACKAGE_NAME = OvmfPkg
PACKAGE_GUID = 2daf5f34-50e5-4b9d-b8e3-5562334d87e5
PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.1
[Includes]
Include
Csm/Include
[LibraryClasses]
## @libraryclass Loads and boots a Linux kernel image
#
LoadLinuxLib|Include/Library/LoadLinuxLib.h
## @libraryclass Save and restore variables using a file
#
NvVarsFileLib|Include/Library/NvVarsFileLib.h
## @libraryclass Provides services to work with PCI capabilities in PCI
# config space.
PciCapLib|Include/Library/PciCapLib.h
OvmfPkg: introduce PciCapPciIoLib Add a library class, and a UEFI_DRIVER lib instance, that are layered on top of PciCapLib, and allow clients to plug an EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL backend into PciCapLib, for config space access. (Side note: Although the UEFI spec says that EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL_CONFIG() returns EFI_UNSUPPORTED if "[t]he address range specified by Offset, Width, and Count is not valid for the PCI configuration header of the PCI controller", this patch doesn't directly document the EFI_UNSUPPORTED error code, for ProtoDevTransferConfig() and its callers ProtoDevReadConfig() and ProtoDevWriteConfig(). Instead, the patch refers to "unspecified error codes". The reason is that in edk2, the PciIoConfigRead() and PciIoConfigWrite() functions [1] can also return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER for the above situation. Namely, PciIoConfigRead() and PciIoConfigWrite() first call PciIoVerifyConfigAccess(), which indeed produces the standard EFI_UNSUPPORTED error code, if the device's config space is exceeded. However, if PciIoVerifyConfigAccess() passes, and we reach RootBridgeIoPciRead() and RootBridgeIoPciWrite() [2], then RootBridgeIoCheckParameter() can still fail, e.g. if the root bridge doesn't support extended config space (see commit 014b472053ae3). For all kinds of Limit violations in IO, MMIO, and config space, RootBridgeIoCheckParameter() returns EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, not EFI_UNSUPPORTED. That error code is then propagated up to, and out of, PciIoConfigRead() and PciIoConfigWrite(). [1] MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciIo.c [2] MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciHostBridgeDxe/PciRootBridgeIo.c ) Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
2018-04-28 23:23:10 +02:00
## @libraryclass Layered on top of PciCapLib, allows clients to plug an
# EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL backend into PciCapLib, for config
# space access.
PciCapPciIoLib|Include/Library/PciCapPciIoLib.h
OvmfPkg: introduce PciCapPciSegmentLib Add a library class, and a BASE lib instance, that are layered on top of PciCapLib, and allow clients to plug a PciSegmentLib backend into PciCapLib, for config space access. (Side note: The "MaxDomain" parameter is provided because, in practice, platforms exist where a PCI Express device may show up on a root bridge such that the root bridge doesn't support access to extended config space. Earlier the same issue was handled for MdeModulePkg/PciHostBridgeDxe in commit 014b472053ae3. However, that solution does not apply to the PciSegmentLib class, because: (1) The config space accessor functions of the PciSegmentLib class, such as PciSegmentReadBuffer(), have no way of informing the caller whether access to extended config space actually succeeds. (For example, in the UefiPciSegmentLibPciRootBridgeIo instace, which could in theory benefit from commit 014b472053ae3, the EFI_PCI_ROOT_BRIDGE_IO_PROTOCOL.Pci.Read() status code is explicitly ignored, because there's no way for the lib instance to propagate it to the PciSegmentLib caller. If the EFI_PCI_ROOT_BRIDGE_IO_PROTOCOL.Pci.Read() call fails, then DxePciSegmentLibPciRootBridgeIoReadWorker() returns Data with indeterminate value.) (2) There is no *general* way for any firmware platform to provide, or use, a PciSegmentLib instance in which access to extended config space always succeeds. In brief, on a platform where config space may be limited to 256 bytes, access to extended config space through PciSegmentLib may invoke undefined behavior; therefore PciCapPciSegmentLib must give platforms a way to prevent such access.) Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
2018-04-28 23:22:59 +02:00
## @libraryclass Layered on top of PciCapLib, allows clients to plug a
# PciSegmentLib backend into PciCapLib, for config space
# access.
PciCapPciSegmentLib|Include/Library/PciCapPciSegmentLib.h
## @libraryclass Register a status code handler for printing the Boot
# Manager's LoadImage() and StartImage() preparations, and
# return codes, to the UEFI console.
PlatformBmPrintScLib|Include/Library/PlatformBmPrintScLib.h
## @libraryclass Access QEMU's firmware configuration interface
#
QemuFwCfgLib|Include/Library/QemuFwCfgLib.h
## @libraryclass S3 support for QEMU fw_cfg
#
QemuFwCfgS3Lib|Include/Library/QemuFwCfgS3Lib.h
## @libraryclass Rewrite the BootOrder NvVar based on QEMU's "bootorder"
# fw_cfg file.
#
QemuBootOrderLib|Include/Library/QemuBootOrderLib.h
## @libraryclass Serialize (and deserialize) variables
#
SerializeVariablesLib|Include/Library/SerializeVariablesLib.h
## @libraryclass Invoke Xen hypercalls
#
XenHypercallLib|Include/Library/XenHypercallLib.h
## @libraryclass Manage XenBus device path and I/O handles
#
XenIoMmioLib|Include/Library/XenIoMmioLib.h
[Guids]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid = {0x93bb96af, 0xb9f2, 0x4eb8, {0x94, 0x62, 0xe0, 0xba, 0x74, 0x56, 0x42, 0x36}}
gEfiXenInfoGuid = {0xd3b46f3b, 0xd441, 0x1244, {0x9a, 0x12, 0x0, 0x12, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d}}
gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid = {0x4e32566d, 0x8e9e, 0x4f52, {0x81, 0xd3, 0x5b, 0xb9, 0x71, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x27}}
gOvmfPlatformConfigGuid = {0x7235c51c, 0x0c80, 0x4cab, {0x87, 0xac, 0x3b, 0x08, 0x4a, 0x63, 0x04, 0xb1}}
gVirtioMmioTransportGuid = {0x837dca9e, 0xe874, 0x4d82, {0xb2, 0x9a, 0x23, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x23, 0xd1, 0xe2}}
gQemuRamfbGuid = {0x557423a1, 0x63ab, 0x406c, {0xbe, 0x7e, 0x91, 0xcd, 0xbc, 0x08, 0xc4, 0x57}}
gXenBusRootDeviceGuid = {0xa732241f, 0x383d, 0x4d9c, {0x8a, 0xe1, 0x8e, 0x09, 0x83, 0x75, 0x89, 0xd7}}
OvmfPkg: introduce gRootBridgesConnectedEventGroupGuid QEMU's ACPI table generator can only create meaningful _CRS objects -- apertures -- for the root buses if all of the PCI devices behind those buses are actively decoding their IO and MMIO resources, at the time of the firmware fetching the "etc/table-loader" fw_cfg file. This is not a QEMU error; QEMU follows the definition of BARs (which are meaningless when decoding is disabled). Currently we hook up AcpiPlatformDxe to the PCI Bus driver's gEfiPciEnumerationCompleteProtocolGuid cue. Unfortunately, when the PCI Bus driver installs this protocol, it's *still* not the right time for fetching "etc/table-loader": although resources have been allocated and BARs have been programmed with them, the PCI Bus driver has also cleared IO and MMIO decoding in the command registers of the devices. Furthermore, we couldn't reenable IO and MMIO decoding temporarily in our gEfiPciEnumerationCompleteProtocolGuid callback even if we wanted to, because at that time the PCI Bus driver has not produced PciIo instances yet. Our Platform BDSes are responsible for connecting the root bridges, hence they know exactly when the PciIo instances become available -- not when PCI enumeration completes (signaled by the above protocol), but when the ConnectController() calls return. This is when our Platform BDSes should explicitly cue in AcpiPlatformDxe. Then AcpiPlatformDxe can temporarily enable IO and MMIO decoding for all devices, while it contacts QEMU for the ACPI payload. This patch introduces the event group GUID that we'll use for unleashing AcpiPlatformDxe from our Platform BDSes. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-03-13 17:35:05 +01:00
gRootBridgesConnectedEventGroupGuid = {0x24a2d66f, 0xeedd, 0x4086, {0x90, 0x42, 0xf2, 0x6e, 0x47, 0x97, 0xee, 0x69}}
gMicrosoftVendorGuid = {0x77fa9abd, 0x0359, 0x4d32, {0xbd, 0x60, 0x28, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x8f, 0x78, 0x4b}}
gEfiLegacyBiosGuid = {0x2E3044AC, 0x879F, 0x490F, {0x97, 0x60, 0xBB, 0xDF, 0xAF, 0x69, 0x5F, 0x50}}
gEfiLegacyDevOrderVariableGuid = {0xa56074db, 0x65fe, 0x45f7, {0xbd, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0x96, 0x52}}
[Protocols]
gVirtioDeviceProtocolGuid = {0xfa920010, 0x6785, 0x4941, {0xb6, 0xec, 0x49, 0x8c, 0x57, 0x9f, 0x16, 0x0a}}
gXenBusProtocolGuid = {0x3d3ca290, 0xb9a5, 0x11e3, {0xb7, 0x5d, 0xb8, 0xac, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0x65, 0xe6}}
gXenIoProtocolGuid = {0x6efac84f, 0x0ab0, 0x4747, {0x81, 0xbe, 0x85, 0x55, 0x62, 0x59, 0x04, 0x49}}
gIoMmuAbsentProtocolGuid = {0xf8775d50, 0x8abd, 0x4adf, {0x92, 0xac, 0x85, 0x3e, 0x51, 0xf6, 0xc8, 0xdc}}
gEfiLegacy8259ProtocolGuid = {0x38321dba, 0x4fe0, 0x4e17, {0x8a, 0xec, 0x41, 0x30, 0x55, 0xea, 0xed, 0xc1}}
gEfiFirmwareVolumeProtocolGuid = {0x389F751F, 0x1838, 0x4388, {0x83, 0x90, 0xcd, 0x81, 0x54, 0xbd, 0x27, 0xf8}}
gEfiIsaAcpiProtocolGuid = {0x64a892dc, 0x5561, 0x4536, {0x92, 0xc7, 0x79, 0x9b, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x33, 0x55}}
gEfiIsaIoProtocolGuid = {0x7ee2bd44, 0x3da0, 0x11d4, {0x9a, 0x38, 0x0, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d}}
gEfiLegacyBiosProtocolGuid = {0xdb9a1e3d, 0x45cb, 0x4abb, {0x85, 0x3b, 0xe5, 0x38, 0x7f, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x2d}}
gEfiLegacyBiosPlatformProtocolGuid = {0x783658a3, 0x4172, 0x4421, {0xa2, 0x99, 0xe0, 0x09, 0x07, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0xb4}}
gEfiLegacyInterruptProtocolGuid = {0x31ce593d, 0x108a, 0x485d, {0xad, 0xb2, 0x78, 0xf2, 0x1f, 0x29, 0x66, 0xbe}}
gEfiVgaMiniPortProtocolGuid = {0xc7735a2f, 0x88f5, 0x4882, {0xae, 0x63, 0xfa, 0xac, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xb3}}
[PcdsFixedAtBuild]
OvmfPkg: Split MAINFV into a separate PEI and DXE FVs By splitting the PEI and DXE phases into separate FVs, we can only reserve the PEI FV for ACPI S3 support. This should save about 7MB. Unfortunately, this all has to happen in a single commit. DEC: * Remove PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfPeiMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) FDF: * Add new PEIFV. Move PEI modules here. * Remove MAINFV * Add PEIFV and DXEFV into FVMAIN_COMPACT - They are added as 2 sections of a file, and compressed together so they should retain good compression * PcdOvmf(Pei|Dxe)MemFv(Base|Size) are set SEC: * Find both the PEI and DXE FVs after decompression. - Copy them separately to their memory locations. Platform PEI driver: * Fv.c: Publish both FVs as appropriate * MemDetect.c: PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) => PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) OVMF.fd before: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed MAINFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed FV FFS file compressed with PI_NONE DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed OVMF.fd after: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed PEIFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15151 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2014-01-21 20:39:13 +01:00
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase|0x0|UINT32|0
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvSize|0x0|UINT32|1
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase|0x0|UINT32|0x15
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize|0x0|UINT32|0x16
## This flag is used to control the destination port for PlatformDebugLibIoPort
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugIoPort|0x402|UINT16|4
## When VirtioScsiDxe is instantiated for a HBA, the numbers of targets and
# LUNs are retrieved from the host during virtio-scsi setup.
# MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe then scans all MaxTarget * MaxLun
# possible devices. This can take extremely long, for example with
# MaxTarget=255 and MaxLun=16383. The *inclusive* constants below limit
# MaxTarget and MaxLun, independently, should the host report higher values,
# so that scanning the number of devices given by their product is still
# acceptably fast.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVirtioScsiMaxTargetLimit|31|UINT16|6
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVirtioScsiMaxLunLimit|7|UINT32|7
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageEventLogBase|0x0|UINT32|0x8
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageEventLogSize|0x0|UINT32|0x9
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFirmwareFdSize|0x0|UINT32|0xa
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFirmwareBlockSize|0|UINT32|0xb
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageVariableBase|0x0|UINT32|0xc
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase|0x0|UINT32|0xd
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase|0x0|UINT32|0xe
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFdBaseAddress|0x0|UINT32|0xf
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase|0x0|UINT32|0x11
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesSize|0x0|UINT32|0x12
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|0x0|UINT32|0x13
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize|0x0|UINT32|0x14
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageBase|0x0|UINT32|0x18
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageSize|0x0|UINT32|0x19
OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: protect SEC's GUIDed section handler table thru S3 OVMF's SecMain is unique in the sense that it links against the following two libraries *in combination*: - IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Library/LzmaCustomDecompressLib/ LzmaCustomDecompressLib.inf - MdePkg/Library/BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib/ BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib.inf The ExtractGuidedSectionLib library class allows decompressor modules to register themselves (keyed by GUID) with it, and it allows clients to decompress file sections with a registered decompressor module that matches the section's GUID. BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib is a library instance (of type BASE) for this library class. It has no constructor function. LzmaCustomDecompressLib is a compatible decompressor module (of type BASE). Its section type GUID is gLzmaCustomDecompressGuid == EE4E5898-3914-4259-9D6E-DC7BD79403CF When OVMF's SecMain module starts, the LzmaCustomDecompressLib constructor function is executed, which registers its LZMA decompressor with the above GUID, by calling into BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib: LzmaDecompressLibConstructor() [GuidedSectionExtraction.c] ExtractGuidedSectionRegisterHandlers() [BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib.c] GetExtractGuidedSectionHandlerInfo() PcdGet64 (PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress) -- NOTE THIS Later, during a normal (non-S3) boot, SecMain utilizes this decompressor to get information about, and to decompress, sections of the OVMF firmware image: SecCoreStartupWithStack() [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c] SecStartupPhase2() FindAndReportEntryPoints() FindPeiCoreImageBase() DecompressMemFvs() ExtractGuidedSectionGetInfo() [BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib.c] ExtractGuidedSectionDecode() [BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib.c] Notably, only the extraction depends on full-config-boot; the registration of LzmaCustomDecompressLib occurs unconditionally in the SecMain EFI binary, triggered by the library constructor function. This is where the bug happens. BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib maintains the table of GUIDed decompressors (section handlers) at a fixed memory location; selected by PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress (declared in MdePkg.dec). The default value of this PCD is 0x1000000 (16 MB). This causes SecMain to corrupt guest OS memory during S3, leading to random crashes. Compare the following two memory dumps, the first taken right before suspending, the second taken right after resuming a RHEL-7 guest: crash> rd -8 -p 1000000 0x50 1000000: c0 00 08 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 1000010: d0 33 0c 00 00 c9 ff ff c0 10 00 01 00 88 ff ff .3.............. 1000020: 0a 6d 57 32 0f 00 00 00 38 00 00 01 00 88 ff ff .mW2....8....... 1000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 73 69 67 6e 61 6c 6d 6f ........signalmo 1000040: 64 75 6c 65 2e 73 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 dule.so......... vs. crash> rd -8 -p 1000000 0x50 1000000: 45 47 53 49 01 00 00 00 20 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 EGSI.... ....... 1000010: 20 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 a0 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 ............... 1000020: 98 58 4e ee 14 39 59 42 9d 6e dc 7b d7 94 03 cf .XN..9YB.n.{.... 1000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 73 69 67 6e 61 6c 6d 6f ........signalmo 1000040: 64 75 6c 65 2e 73 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 dule.so......... The "EGSI" signature corresponds to EXTRACT_HANDLER_INFO_SIGNATURE declared in MdePkg/Library/BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib/BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib.c. Additionally, the gLzmaCustomDecompressGuid (quoted above) is visible at guest-phys offset 0x1000020. Fix the problem as follows: - Carve out 4KB from the 36KB gap that we currently have between PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageBase + PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageSize == 8220 KB and PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase == 8256 KB. - Point PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress to 8220 KB (0x00807000). - Cover the area with an EfiACPIMemoryNVS type memalloc HOB, if S3 is supported and we're not currently resuming. The 4KB size that we pick is an upper estimate for BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib's internal storage size. The latter is calculated as follows (see GetExtractGuidedSectionHandlerInfo()): sizeof(EXTRACT_GUIDED_SECTION_HANDLER_INFO) + // 32 PcdMaximumGuidedExtractHandler * ( sizeof(GUID) + // 16 sizeof(EXTRACT_GUIDED_SECTION_DECODE_HANDLER) + // 8 sizeof(EXTRACT_GUIDED_SECTION_GET_INFO_HANDLER) // 8 ) OVMF sets PcdMaximumGuidedExtractHandler to 16 decimal (which is the MdePkg default too), yielding 32 + 16 * (16 + 8 + 8) == 544 bytes. Regarding the lifecycle of the new area: (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM The library linked into SecMain finds that the area lacks the signature. It initializes the signature, plus the rest of the structure. This is independent of S3 support. Consumption of the area is also limited to SEC (but consumption does depend on full-config-boot). (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE It is not, in the general case; and we don't need to. Nothing else links against BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib; it's OK if DXE overwrites the area. (c) how it is protected from the OS When S3 is enabled, we cover it with AcpiNVS in InitializeRamRegions(). When S3 is not supported, the range is not protected. (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path Examined by the library linked into SecMain. Registrations update the table in-place (based on GUID matches). (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path If S3 is enabled, then the OS won't damage the table (due to (c)), hence see (d). If S3 is unsupported, then the OS may or may not overwrite the signature. (It likely will.) This is identical to the pre-patch status. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15433 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2014-04-05 23:26:09 +02:00
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableSize|0x0|UINT32|0x1a
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDecompressionScratchEnd|0x0|UINT32|0x1f
## Pcd8259LegacyModeMask defines the default mask value for platform. This
# value is determined.
# 1) If platform only support pure UEFI, value should be set to 0xFFFF or
# 0xFFFE; Because only clock interrupt is allowed in legacy mode in pure
# UEFI platform.
# 2) If platform install CSM and use thunk module:
# a) If thunk call provided by CSM binary requires some legacy interrupt
# support, the corresponding bit should be opened as 0.
# For example, if keyboard interfaces provided CSM binary use legacy
# keyboard interrupt in 8259 bit 1, then the value should be set to
# 0xFFFC.
# b) If all thunk call provied by CSM binary do not require legacy
# interrupt support, value should be set to 0xFFFF or 0xFFFE.
#
# The default value of legacy mode mask could be changed by
# EFI_LEGACY_8259_PROTOCOL->SetMask(). But it is rarely need change it
# except some special cases such as when initializing the CSM binary, it
# should be set to 0xFFFF to mask all legacy interrupt. Please restore the
# original legacy mask value if changing is made for these special case.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.Pcd8259LegacyModeMask|0xFFFF|UINT16|0x3
## Pcd8259LegacyModeEdgeLevel defines the default edge level for legacy
# mode's interrrupt controller.
# For the corresponding bits, 0 = Edge triggered and 1 = Level triggered.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.Pcd8259LegacyModeEdgeLevel|0x0000|UINT16|0x5
## Indicates if BiosVideo driver will switch to 80x25 Text VGA Mode when
# exiting boot service.
# TRUE - Switch to Text VGA Mode.
# FALSE - Does not switch to Text VGA Mode.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdBiosVideoSetTextVgaModeEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x28
## Indicates if BiosVideo driver will check for VESA BIOS Extension service
# support.
# TRUE - Check for VESA BIOS Extension service.
# FALSE - Does not check for VESA BIOS Extension service.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdBiosVideoCheckVbeEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x29
## Indicates if BiosVideo driver will check for VGA service support.
# NOTE: If both PcdBiosVideoCheckVbeEnable and PcdBiosVideoCheckVgaEnable
# are set to FALSE, that means Graphics Output protocol will not be
# installed, the VGA miniport protocol will be installed instead.
# TRUE - Check for VGA service.<BR>
# FALSE - Does not check for VGA service.<BR>
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdBiosVideoCheckVgaEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x2a
## Indicates if memory space for legacy region will be set as cacheable.
# TRUE - Set cachebility for legacy region.
# FALSE - Does not set cachebility for legacy region.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdLegacyBiosCacheLegacyRegion|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x2b
## Specify memory size with bytes to reserve EBDA below 640K for OPROM.
# The value should be a multiple of 4KB.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEbdaReservedMemorySize|0x8000|UINT32|0x2c
## Specify memory base address for OPROM to find free memory.
# Some OPROMs do not use EBDA or PMM to allocate memory for its usage,
# instead they find the memory filled with zero from 0x20000.
# The value should be a multiple of 4KB.
# The range should be below the EBDA reserved range from
# (CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY_TOP - Reserved EBDA Memory Size) to
# CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY_TOP.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOpromReservedMemoryBase|0x60000|UINT32|0x2d
## Specify memory size with bytes for OPROM to find free memory.
# The value should be a multiple of 4KB. And the range should be below the
# EBDA reserved range from
# (CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY_TOP - Reserved EBDA Memory Size) to
# CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY_TOP.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOpromReservedMemorySize|0x28000|UINT32|0x2e
## Specify the end of address below 1MB for the OPROM.
# The last shadowed OpROM should not exceed this address.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEndOpromShadowAddress|0xdffff|UINT32|0x2f
## Specify the low PMM (Post Memory Manager) size with bytes below 1MB.
# The value should be a multiple of 4KB.
# @Prompt Low PMM (Post Memory Manager) Size
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdLowPmmMemorySize|0x10000|UINT32|0x30
## Specify the high PMM (Post Memory Manager) size with bytes above 1MB.
# The value should be a multiple of 4KB.
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHighPmmMemorySize|0x400000|UINT32|0x31
[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfHostBridgePciDevId|0|UINT16|0x1b
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuSmbiosValidated|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x21
## The IO port aperture shared by all PCI root bridges.
#
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciIoBase|0x0|UINT64|0x22
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciIoSize|0x0|UINT64|0x23
## The 32-bit MMIO aperture shared by all PCI root bridges.
#
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciMmio32Base|0x0|UINT64|0x24
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciMmio32Size|0x0|UINT64|0x25
OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: determine the 64-bit PCI host aperture for X64 DXE The main observation about the 64-bit PCI host aperture is that it is the highest part of the useful address space. It impacts the top of the GCD memory space map, and, consequently, our maximum address width calculation for the CPU HOB too. Thus, modify the GetFirstNonAddress() function to consider the following areas above the high RAM, while calculating the first non-address (i.e., the highest inclusive address, plus one): - the memory hotplug area (optional, the size comes from QEMU), - the 64-bit PCI host aperture (we set a default size). While computing the first non-address, capture the base and the size of the 64-bit PCI host aperture at once in PCDs, since they are natural parts of the calculation. (Similarly to how PcdPciMmio32* are not rewritten on the S3 resume path (see the InitializePlatform() -> MemMapInitialization() condition), nor are PcdPciMmio64*. Only the core PciHostBridgeDxe driver consumes them, through our PciHostBridgeLib instance.) Set 32GB as the default size for the aperture. Issue#59 mentions the NVIDIA Tesla K80 as an assignable device. According to nvidia.com, these cards may have 24GB of memory (probably 16GB + 8GB BARs). As a strictly experimental feature, the user can specify the size of the aperture (in MB) as well, with the QEMU option -fw_cfg name=opt/ovmf/X-PciMmio64Mb,string=65536 The "X-" prefix follows the QEMU tradition (spelled "x-" there), meaning that the property is experimental, unstable, and might go away any time. Gerd has proposed heuristics for sizing the aperture automatically (based on 1GB page support and PCPU address width), but such should be delayed to a later patch (which may very well back out "X-PciMmio64Mb" then). For "everyday" guests, the 32GB default for the aperture size shouldn't impact the PEI memory demand (the size of the page tables that the DXE IPL PEIM builds). Namely, we've never reported narrower than 36-bit addresses; the DXE IPL PEIM has always built page tables for 64GB at least. For the aperture to bump the address width above 36 bits, either the guest must have quite a bit of memory itself (in which case the additional PEI memory demand shouldn't matter), or the user must specify a large aperture manually with "X-PciMmio64Mb" (and then he or she is also responsible for giving enough RAM to the VM, to satisfy the PEI memory demand). Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> Ref: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/issues/59 Ref: http://www.nvidia.com/object/tesla-servers.html Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-03-04 19:30:45 +01:00
## The 64-bit MMIO aperture shared by all PCI root bridges.
#
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciMmio64Base|0x0|UINT64|0x26
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciMmio64Size|0x0|UINT64|0x27
## The following setting controls how many megabytes we configure as TSEG on
# Q35, for SMRAM purposes. Permitted defaults are: 1, 2, 8. Other defaults
# cause undefined behavior. During boot, the PCD is updated by PlatformPei
# to reflect the extended TSEG size, if one is advertized by QEMU.
#
# This PCD is only accessed if PcdSmmSmramRequire is TRUE (see below).
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQ35TsegMbytes|8|UINT16|0x20
[PcdsFeatureFlag]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuBootOrderPciTranslation|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x1c
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuBootOrderMmioTranslation|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x1d
## This feature flag enables SMM/SMRAM support. Note that it also requires
# such support from the underlying QEMU instance; if that support is not
# present, the firmware will reject continuing after a certain point.
#
# The flag also acts as a general "security switch"; when TRUE, many
# components will change behavior, with the goal of preventing a malicious
# runtime OS from tampering with firmware structures (special memory ranges
# used by OVMF, the varstore pflash chip, LockBox etc).
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmmSmramRequire|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x1e