audk/OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.c

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OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
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/** @file
A PEIM with the following responsibilities:
- verify & configure the Q35 TSEG in the entry point,
- provide SMRAM access by producing PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI,
- set aside the SMM_S3_RESUME_STATE object at the bottom of TSEG, and expose
it via the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid GUID HOB.
This PEIM runs from RAM, so we can write to variables with static storage
duration.
Copyright (C) 2013, 2015, Red Hat, Inc.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 19:41:38 +01:00
**/
#include <Guid/AcpiS3Context.h>
#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
#include <Library/HobLib.h>
#include <Library/IoLib.h>
#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
#include <Library/PciLib.h>
#include <Library/PeiServicesLib.h>
#include <Ppi/SmmAccess.h>
#include <OvmfPlatforms.h>
#include "SmramInternal.h"
//
// PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI implementation.
//
/**
Opens the SMRAM area to be accessible by a PEIM driver.
This function "opens" SMRAM so that it is visible while not inside of SMM.
The function should return EFI_UNSUPPORTED if the hardware does not support
hiding of SMRAM. The function should return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR if the SMRAM
configuration is locked.
@param PeiServices General purpose services available to every
PEIM.
@param This The pointer to the SMM Access Interface.
@param DescriptorIndex The region of SMRAM to Open.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The region was successfully opened.
@retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The region could not be opened because locked
by chipset.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The descriptor index was out of bounds.
**/
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
SmmAccessPeiOpen (
IN EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
IN PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI *This,
IN UINTN DescriptorIndex
)
{
if (DescriptorIndex >= DescIdxCount) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
//
// According to current practice, DescriptorIndex is not considered at all,
// beyond validating it.
//
return SmramAccessOpen (&This->LockState, &This->OpenState);
}
/**
Inhibits access to the SMRAM.
This function "closes" SMRAM so that it is not visible while outside of SMM.
The function should return EFI_UNSUPPORTED if the hardware does not support
hiding of SMRAM.
@param PeiServices General purpose services available to every
PEIM.
@param This The pointer to the SMM Access Interface.
@param DescriptorIndex The region of SMRAM to Close.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The region was successfully closed.
@retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The region could not be closed because
locked by chipset.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The descriptor index was out of bounds.
**/
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
SmmAccessPeiClose (
IN EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
IN PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI *This,
IN UINTN DescriptorIndex
)
{
if (DescriptorIndex >= DescIdxCount) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
//
// According to current practice, DescriptorIndex is not considered at all,
// beyond validating it.
//
return SmramAccessClose (&This->LockState, &This->OpenState);
}
/**
Inhibits access to the SMRAM.
This function prohibits access to the SMRAM region. This function is usually
implemented such that it is a write-once operation.
@param PeiServices General purpose services available to every
PEIM.
@param This The pointer to the SMM Access Interface.
@param DescriptorIndex The region of SMRAM to Close.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The region was successfully locked.
@retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The region could not be locked because at
least one range is still open.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The descriptor index was out of bounds.
**/
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
SmmAccessPeiLock (
IN EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
IN PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI *This,
IN UINTN DescriptorIndex
)
{
if (DescriptorIndex >= DescIdxCount) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
//
// According to current practice, DescriptorIndex is not considered at all,
// beyond validating it.
//
return SmramAccessLock (&This->LockState, &This->OpenState);
}
/**
Queries the memory controller for the possible regions that will support
SMRAM.
@param PeiServices General purpose services available to every
PEIM.
@param This The pointer to the SmmAccessPpi Interface.
@param SmramMapSize The pointer to the variable containing size of
the buffer to contain the description
information.
@param SmramMap The buffer containing the data describing the
Smram region descriptors.
@retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The user did not provide a sufficient buffer.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The user provided a sufficiently-sized buffer.
**/
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
SmmAccessPeiGetCapabilities (
IN EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
IN PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI *This,
IN OUT UINTN *SmramMapSize,
IN OUT EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR *SmramMap
)
{
return SmramAccessGetCapabilities (This->LockState, This->OpenState,
SmramMapSize, SmramMap);
}
//
// LockState and OpenState will be filled in by the entry point.
//
STATIC PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI mAccess = {
&SmmAccessPeiOpen,
&SmmAccessPeiClose,
&SmmAccessPeiLock,
&SmmAccessPeiGetCapabilities
};
STATIC EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mPpiList[] = {
{
EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST,
&gPeiSmmAccessPpiGuid, &mAccess
}
};
//
// Utility functions.
//
STATIC
UINT8
CmosRead8 (
IN UINT8 Index
)
{
IoWrite8 (0x70, Index);
return IoRead8 (0x71);
}
STATIC
UINT32
GetSystemMemorySizeBelow4gb (
VOID
)
{
UINT32 Cmos0x34;
UINT32 Cmos0x35;
Cmos0x34 = CmosRead8 (0x34);
Cmos0x35 = CmosRead8 (0x35);
return ((Cmos0x35 << 8 | Cmos0x34) << 16) + SIZE_16MB;
}
//
// Entry point of this driver.
//
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint (
IN EFI_PEI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle,
IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices
)
{
UINT16 HostBridgeDevId;
UINT8 EsmramcVal;
UINT8 RegMask8;
UINT32 TopOfLowRam, TopOfLowRamMb;
EFI_STATUS Status;
UINTN SmramMapSize;
EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR SmramMap[DescIdxCount];
VOID *GuidHob;
//
// This module should only be included if SMRAM support is required.
//
ASSERT (FeaturePcdGet (PcdSmmSmramRequire));
//
// Verify if we're running on a Q35 machine type.
//
HostBridgeDevId = PciRead16 (OVMF_HOSTBRIDGE_DID);
if (HostBridgeDevId != INTEL_Q35_MCH_DEVICE_ID) {
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a: no SMRAM with host bridge DID=0x%04x; only "
"DID=0x%04x (Q35) is supported\n", __FUNCTION__, HostBridgeDevId,
INTEL_Q35_MCH_DEVICE_ID));
goto WrongConfig;
}
//
// Confirm if QEMU supports SMRAM.
//
// With no support for it, the ESMRAMC (Extended System Management RAM
// Control) register reads as zero. If there is support, the cache-enable
// bits are hard-coded as 1 by QEMU.
//
EsmramcVal = PciRead8 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_ESMRAMC));
RegMask8 = MCH_ESMRAMC_SM_CACHE | MCH_ESMRAMC_SM_L1 | MCH_ESMRAMC_SM_L2;
if ((EsmramcVal & RegMask8) != RegMask8) {
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a: this Q35 implementation lacks SMRAM\n",
__FUNCTION__));
goto WrongConfig;
}
TopOfLowRam = GetSystemMemorySizeBelow4gb ();
ASSERT ((TopOfLowRam & (SIZE_1MB - 1)) == 0);
TopOfLowRamMb = TopOfLowRam >> 20;
//
// Some of the following registers are no-ops for QEMU at the moment, but it
// is recommended to set them correctly, since the ESMRAMC that we ultimately
// care about is in the same set of registers.
//
// First, we disable the integrated VGA, and set both the GTT Graphics Memory
// Size and the Graphics Mode Select memory pre-allocation fields to zero.
// This takes just one write to the Graphics Control Register.
//
PciWrite16 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_GGC), MCH_GGC_IVD);
//
// Set Top of Low Usable DRAM.
//
PciWrite16 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_TOLUD),
(UINT16)(TopOfLowRamMb << MCH_TOLUD_MB_SHIFT));
//
// Given the zero graphics memory sizes configured above, set the
// graphics-related stolen memory bases to the same as TOLUD.
//
PciWrite32 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_GBSM),
TopOfLowRamMb << MCH_GBSM_MB_SHIFT);
PciWrite32 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_BGSM),
TopOfLowRamMb << MCH_BGSM_MB_SHIFT);
//
// Set TSEG Memory Base.
//
InitQ35TsegMbytes ();
OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
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PciWrite32 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_TSEGMB),
(TopOfLowRamMb - mQ35TsegMbytes) << MCH_TSEGMB_MB_SHIFT);
OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 19:41:38 +01:00
//
// Set TSEG size, and disable TSEG visibility outside of SMM. Note that the
// T_EN bit has inverse meaning; when T_EN is set, then TSEG visibility is
// *restricted* to SMM.
//
EsmramcVal &= ~(UINT32)MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_MASK;
EsmramcVal |= mQ35TsegMbytes == 8 ? MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_8MB :
mQ35TsegMbytes == 2 ? MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_2MB :
mQ35TsegMbytes == 1 ? MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_1MB :
MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_EXT;
OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
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EsmramcVal |= MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN;
PciWrite8 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_ESMRAMC), EsmramcVal);
//
// TSEG should be closed (see above), but unlocked, initially. Set G_SMRAME
// (Global SMRAM Enable) too, as both D_LCK and T_EN depend on it.
//
PciAndThenOr8 (DRAMC_REGISTER_Q35 (MCH_SMRAM),
(UINT8)((~(UINT32)MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK) & 0xff), MCH_SMRAM_G_SMRAME);
//
// Create the GUID HOB and point it to the first SMRAM range.
//
GetStates (&mAccess.LockState, &mAccess.OpenState);
SmramMapSize = sizeof SmramMap;
Status = SmramAccessGetCapabilities (mAccess.LockState, mAccess.OpenState,
&SmramMapSize, SmramMap);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
DEBUG_CODE_BEGIN ();
{
UINTN Count;
UINTN Idx;
Count = SmramMapSize / sizeof SmramMap[0];
DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%a: SMRAM map follows, %d entries\n", __FUNCTION__,
(INT32)Count));
DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "% 20a % 20a % 20a % 20a\n", "PhysicalStart(0x)",
"PhysicalSize(0x)", "CpuStart(0x)", "RegionState(0x)"));
for (Idx = 0; Idx < Count; ++Idx) {
DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "% 20Lx % 20Lx % 20Lx % 20Lx\n",
SmramMap[Idx].PhysicalStart, SmramMap[Idx].PhysicalSize,
SmramMap[Idx].CpuStart, SmramMap[Idx].RegionState));
}
}
DEBUG_CODE_END ();
GuidHob = BuildGuidHob (&gEfiAcpiVariableGuid,
sizeof SmramMap[DescIdxSmmS3ResumeState]);
if (GuidHob == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
CopyMem (GuidHob, &SmramMap[DescIdxSmmS3ResumeState],
sizeof SmramMap[DescIdxSmmS3ResumeState]);
OvmfPkg/SmmAccess: close and lock SMRAM at default SMBASE During normal boot, when EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL is installed by platform BDS, the SMM IPL locks SMRAM (TSEG) through EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL.Lock(). See SmmIplReadyToLockEventNotify() in "MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmIpl.c". During S3 resume, S3Resume2Pei locks SMRAM (TSEG) through PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI.Lock(), before executing the boot script. See S3ResumeExecuteBootScript() in "UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei/S3Resume.c". Those are precisely the places where the SMRAM at the default SMBASE should be locked too. Add such an action to SmramAccessLock(). Notes: - The SMRAM at the default SMBASE doesn't support the "closed and unlocked" state (and so it can't be closed without locking it, and it cannot be opened after closing it). - The SMRAM at the default SMBASE isn't (and shouldn't) be exposed with another EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR in the GetCapabilities() members of EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL / PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI. That's because the SMRAM in question is not "general purpose"; it's only QEMU's solution to protect the initial SMI handler from the OS, when a VCPU is hot-plugged. Consequently, the state of the SMRAM at the default SMBASE is not reflected in the "OpenState" / "LockState" fields of the protocol and PPI. - An alternative to extending SmramAccessLock() would be to register an EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL notify in SmmAccess2Dxe (for locking at normal boot), and an EDKII_S3_SMM_INIT_DONE_GUID PPI notify in SmmAccessPei (for locking at S3 resume). Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-10-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
2019-09-23 11:41:41 +02:00
//
// SmramAccessLock() depends on "mQ35SmramAtDefaultSmbase"; init the latter
// just before exposing the former via PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI.Lock().
//
InitQ35SmramAtDefaultSmbase ();
OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 19:41:38 +01:00
//
// We're done. The next step should succeed, but even if it fails, we can't
// roll back the above BuildGuidHob() allocation, because PEI doesn't support
// releasing memory.
//
return PeiServicesInstallPpi (mPpiList);
WrongConfig:
//
// We really don't want to continue in this case.
//
ASSERT (FALSE);
CpuDeadLoop ();
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}