On some Arm platforms the boot firmware volume passed in the HOB
by the secure world firmware (TF-A) is never freed and is always
mapped as read-only.
On such platforms the heap memory can be saved by disabling the
shadow copy of the boot firmware volume. This is useful as on
some platforms the amount of memory available is limited.
Therefore, introduce a PCD PcdShadowBfv that platforms
can configure to disable the shadow boot FV. This PCD is set to
TRUE by default.
Signed-off-by: Levi Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Add support to dispatch multiple standalone MM FVs for StandaloneMmCore.
Set the maximum supported FV count to 2.
Signed-off-by: Wei6 Xu <wei6.xu@intel.com>
StandaloneMmCore should not support dispatching traditional MM
driver which has dependency on UEFI services. Therefore, remove
the related code that supports traditional MM driver.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei6 Xu <wei6.xu@intel.com>
The MmCoreFfsFindMmDriver only checks for encapsulated compressed FVs.
When an inner FV is uncompressed, StandaloneMmCore will miss the FV and
all the MM drivers in the FV will not be dispatched.
Add checks for uncompressed inner FV to fix this issue.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei6 Xu <wei6.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
MmCoreFfsFindMmDriver() assumes FileHeader is EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER.
If FileHeader is an EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2, 'FileHeader + 1' will get a
wrong section address. Use FfsFindSection to get the section directly,
instead of 'FileHeader + 1' to avoid this issue.
MmCoreFfsFindMmDriver() also assumes section is EFI_COMMON_SECTION_HEADER.
If Section is EFI_COMMON_SECTION_HEADER2, 'Section + 1' will get a wrong
wrong InnerFvHeader adress. Add section head detection and calculate the
address accordingly.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei6 Xu <wei6.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
In MmCoreFfsFindMmDriver(),
- ScratchBuffer is not freed in the error return path that DstBuffer page
allocation fails. Free ScratchBuffer before return with error.
- If the decoded buffer is identical to the data in InputSection,
ExtractGuidedSectionDecode() will change the value of DstBuffer rather
than changing the contents of the buffer that DstBuffer points at, in
which case freeing DstBuffer is wrong. Introduce a local variable
AllocatedDstBuffer for buffer free, free AllocatedDstBuffer immediately
if it is not used.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei6 Xu <wei6.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
MmCoreFfsFindMmDriver() is called recursively for encapsulation sections.
Currently this recursion is not limited. Introduce a new PCD
(fixed-at-build, or patchable-in-module), and make MmCoreFfsFindMmDriver()
track the section nesting depth against that PCD.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei6 Xu <wei6.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737
Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the StandaloneMmPkg package
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Fix few typos in comments.
Cc: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Supreeth Venkatesh <supreeth.venkatesh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antoine Coeur <coeur@gmx.fr>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200207010831.9046-76-philmd@redhat.com>
An extra 's' slipped into the FvIsBeingProcessed function
name. Drop it to fix the typo.
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
The FvHasBeenProcessed() and FvIsBeingProcesssed() functions make sure
that every firmware volume is processed only once (every driver in every
firmware volume should be discovered only once). For this, the functions
use a linked list.
In MdeModulePkg's DXE Core and SMM Core, the key used for identifying
those firmware volumes that have been processed is the EFI_HANDLE on which
the DXE or SMM firmware volume protocol is installed. In the
StandaloneMmPkg core however, the key is the address of the firmware
volume header; that is, it has type (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER*).
(EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER*) has nothing to do with EFI_HANDLE.
EFI_HANDLE just happens to be specified as (VOID*), and therefore the
conversion between (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER*) and EFI_HANDLE is silent.
(The FvHasBeenProcessed() and FvIsBeingProcesssed() functions were likely
copied verbatim from MdeModulePkg's DXE Core and/or the SMM Core, and not
flagged by the compiler in StandaloneMmPkg due to UEFI regrettably
specifying EFI_HANDLE as (VOID*), thereby enabling the above implicit
conversion.)
We should not exploit this circumstance. Represent the key type faithfully
instead.
This is a semantic fix; there is no change in operation.
Cc: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Supreeth Venkatesh <supreeth.venkatesh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Standalone MM requires 4 KB section alignment for all images, so that
strict permissions can be applied. Unfortunately, this results in a
lot of wasted space, which is usually costly in the secure world
environment that standalone MM is expected to operate in.
So let's permit the standalone MM drivers (but not the core) to be
delivered in a compressed firmware volume.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Management Mode (MM) is a generic term used to describe a secure
execution environment provided by the CPU and related silicon that is
entered when the CPU detects a MMI. For x86 systems, this can be
implemented with System Management Mode (SMM). For ARM systems, this can
be implemented with TrustZone (TZ).
A MMI can be a CPU instruction or interrupt. Upon detection of a MMI, a
CPU will jump to the MM Entry Point and save some portion of its state
(the "save state") such that execution can be resumed.
The MMI can be generated synchronously by software or asynchronously by
a hardware event. Each MMI source can be detected, cleared and disabled.
Some systems provide for special memory (Management Mode RAM or MMRAM)
which is set aside for software running in MM. Usually the MMRAM is
hidden during normal CPU execution, but this is not required. Usually,
after MMRAM is hidden it cannot be exposed until the next system reset.
The MM Core Interface Specification describes three pieces of the PI
Management Mode architecture:
1. MM Dispatch
During DXE, the DXE Foundation works with the MM Foundation to
schedule MM drivers for execution in the discovered firmware volumes.
2. MM Initialization
MM related code opens MMRAM, creates the MMRAM memory map, and
launches the MM Foundation, which provides the necessary services to
launch MM-related drivers. Then, sometime before boot, MMRAM is
closed and locked. This piece may be completed during the
SEC, PEI or DXE phases.
3. MMI Management
When an MMI generated, the MM environment is created and then the MMI
sources are detected and MMI handlers called.
This patch implements the MM Core.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.ganu@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Supreeth Venkatesh <supreeth.venkatesh@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
