mirror of https://github.com/acidanthera/audk.git
562 lines
17 KiB
NASM
562 lines
17 KiB
NASM
;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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; @file
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; Provide the functions to check whether SEV and SEV-ES is enabled.
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;
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; Copyright (c) 2017 - 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
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; SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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;
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;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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BITS 32
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;
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; SEV-ES #VC exception handler support
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;
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; #VC handler local variable locations
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;
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX 0
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX 4
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX 8
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX 12
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%define VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX 16
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%define VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX 20
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%define VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER 24
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%define VC_CPUID_FUNCTION 28
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; #VC handler total local variable size
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;
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%define VC_VARIABLE_SIZE 32
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; #VC handler GHCB CPUID request/response protocol values
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;
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%define GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST 4
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%define GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE 5
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%define GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT 30
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%define CPUID_INSN_LEN 2
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; #VC handler offsets/sizes for accessing SNP CPUID page
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;
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_SZ 48
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%define SNP_CPUID_COUNT 0
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY 16
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX_IN 0
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX_IN 4
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX 24
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EBX 28
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX 32
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%define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EDX 36
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%define SEV_GHCB_MSR 0xc0010130
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%define SEV_STATUS_MSR 0xc0010131
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; The #VC was not for CPUID
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%define TERM_VC_NOT_CPUID 1
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; The unexpected response code
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%define TERM_UNEXPECTED_RESP_CODE 2
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%define PAGE_PRESENT 0x01
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%define PAGE_READ_WRITE 0x02
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%define PAGE_USER_SUPERVISOR 0x04
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%define PAGE_WRITE_THROUGH 0x08
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%define PAGE_CACHE_DISABLE 0x010
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%define PAGE_ACCESSED 0x020
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%define PAGE_DIRTY 0x040
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%define PAGE_PAT 0x080
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%define PAGE_GLOBAL 0x0100
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%define PAGE_2M_MBO 0x080
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%define PAGE_2M_PAT 0x01000
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%define PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \
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PAGE_DIRTY + \
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PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
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PAGE_PRESENT)
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%define PAGE_PDP_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \
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PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
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PAGE_PRESENT)
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; Macro is used to issue the MSR protocol based VMGEXIT. The caller is
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; responsible to populate values in the EDX:EAX registers. After the vmmcall
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; returns, it verifies that the response code matches with the expected
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; code. If it does not match then terminate the guest. The result of request
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; is returned in the EDX:EAX.
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;
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; args 1:Request code, 2: Response code
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%macro VmgExit 2
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;
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; Add request code:
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Request code
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or eax, %1
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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wrmsr
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; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
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; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
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;
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BITS 64
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rep vmmcall
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BITS 32
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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rdmsr
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;
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; Verify the reponse code, if it does not match then request to terminate
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Response code
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mov ecx, eax
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and ecx, 0xfff
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cmp ecx, %2
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jne SevEsUnexpectedRespTerminate
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%endmacro
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; Macro to terminate the guest using the VMGEXIT.
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; arg 1: reason code
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%macro TerminateVmgExit 1
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mov eax, %1
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;
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; Use VMGEXIT to request termination. At this point the reason code is
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; located in EAX, so shift it left 16 bits to the proper location.
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;
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; EAX[11:0] => 0x100 - request termination
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; EAX[15:12] => 0x1 - OVMF
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; EAX[23:16] => 0xXX - REASON CODE
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;
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shl eax, 16
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or eax, 0x1100
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xor edx, edx
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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wrmsr
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;
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; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
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; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
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;
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BITS 64
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rep vmmcall
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BITS 32
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;
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; We shouldn't come back from the VMGEXIT, but if we do, just loop.
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;
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%%TerminateHlt:
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hlt
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jmp %%TerminateHlt
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%endmacro
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; Terminate the guest due to unexpected response code.
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SevEsUnexpectedRespTerminate:
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TerminateVmgExit TERM_UNEXPECTED_RESP_CODE
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%ifdef ARCH_X64
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; If SEV-ES is enabled then initialize and make the GHCB page shared
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SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPage:
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; Check if SEV is enabled
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cmp byte[WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE], 1
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jnz SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit
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; Check if SEV-ES is enabled
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mov ecx, 1
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bt [SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_STATUS_MSR], ecx
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jnc SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit
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;
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; The initial GHCB will live at GHCB_BASE and needs to be un-encrypted.
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; This requires the 2MB page for this range be broken down into 512 4KB
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; pages. All will be marked encrypted, except for the GHCB.
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;
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mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE >> 21)
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mov eax, GHCB_PT_ADDR + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000)], eax
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;
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; Page Table Entries (512 * 4KB entries => 2MB)
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;
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mov ecx, 512
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pageTableEntries4kLoop:
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mov eax, ecx
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dec eax
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shl eax, 12
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add eax, GHCB_BASE & 0xFFE0_0000
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add eax, PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR
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mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8], eax
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mov [(ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8) + 4], edx
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loop pageTableEntries4kLoop
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;
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; Clear the encryption bit from the GHCB entry
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;
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mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE & 0x1F_FFFF) >> 12
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mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR + 4], strict dword 0
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SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit:
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OneTimeCallRet SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPage
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; Check if SEV is enabled, and get the C-bit mask above 31.
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; Modified: EDX
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;
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; The value is returned in the EDX
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GetSevCBitMaskAbove31:
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xor edx, edx
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; Check if SEV is enabled
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cmp byte[WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE], 1
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jnz GetSevCBitMaskAbove31Exit
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mov edx, dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK + 4]
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GetSevCBitMaskAbove31Exit:
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OneTimeCallRet GetSevCBitMaskAbove31
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%endif
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; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) features are enabled.
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;
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; Register usage is tight in this routine, so multiple calls for the
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; same CPUID and MSR data are performed to keep things simple.
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;
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; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESP
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;
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; If SEV is enabled then EAX will be at least 32.
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; If SEV is disabled then EAX will be zero.
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;
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CheckSevFeatures:
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;
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; Clear the workarea, if SEV is enabled then later part of routine
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; will populate the workarea fields.
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;
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mov ecx, SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_SIZE
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mov eax, SEV_ES_WORK_AREA
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ClearSevEsWorkArea:
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mov byte [eax], 0
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inc eax
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loop ClearSevEsWorkArea
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;
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; Set up exception handlers to check for SEV-ES
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; Load temporary RAM stack based on PCDs (see SevEsIdtVmmComm for
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; stack usage)
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; Establish exception handlers
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;
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mov esp, SEV_ES_VC_TOP_OF_STACK
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mov eax, ADDR_OF(Idtr)
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lidt [cs:eax]
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; Check if we have a valid (0x8000_001F) CPUID leaf
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; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest
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mov eax, 0x80000000
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cpuid
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; This check should fail on Intel or Non SEV AMD CPUs. In future if
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; Intel CPUs supports this CPUID leaf then we are guranteed to have exact
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; same bit definition.
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cmp eax, 0x8000001f
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jl NoSev
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; Check for SEV memory encryption feature:
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; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 1
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; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest
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mov eax, 0x8000001f
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cpuid
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bt eax, 1
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jnc NoSev
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; Check if SEV memory encryption is enabled
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; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 0 (SEV enabled)
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mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR
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rdmsr
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bt eax, 0
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jnc NoSev
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; Set the work area header to indicate that the SEV is enabled
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mov byte[WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE], 1
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; Save the SevStatus MSR value in the workarea
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mov [SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_STATUS_MSR], eax
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mov [SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_STATUS_MSR + 4], edx
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; Check if SEV-ES is enabled
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; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 1 (SEV-ES enabled)
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mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR
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rdmsr
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bt eax, 1
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jnc GetSevEncBit
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GetSevEncBit:
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; Get pte bit position to enable memory encryption
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; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
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;
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and ebx, 0x3f
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mov eax, ebx
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; The encryption bit position is always above 31
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sub ebx, 32
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jns SevSaveMask
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; Encryption bit was reported as 31 or below, enter a HLT loop
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SevEncBitLowHlt:
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cli
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hlt
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jmp SevEncBitLowHlt
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SevSaveMask:
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xor edx, edx
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bts edx, ebx
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mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK], 0
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mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK + 4], edx
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jmp SevExit
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NoSev:
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;
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; Perform an SEV-ES sanity check by seeing if a #VC exception occurred.
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;
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; If SEV-ES is enabled, the CPUID instruction will trigger a #VC exception
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; where the RECEIVED_VC offset in the workarea will be set to one.
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;
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cmp byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_RECEIVED_VC], 0
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jz NoSevPass
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;
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; A #VC was received, yet CPUID indicates no SEV-ES support, something
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; isn't right.
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;
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NoSevEsVcHlt:
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cli
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hlt
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jmp NoSevEsVcHlt
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NoSevPass:
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xor eax, eax
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SevExit:
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;
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; Clear exception handlers and stack
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;
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push eax
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mov eax, ADDR_OF(IdtrClear)
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lidt [cs:eax]
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pop eax
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mov esp, 0
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OneTimeCallRet CheckSevFeatures
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; Start of #VC exception handling routines
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;
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SevEsIdtNotCpuid:
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TerminateVmgExit TERM_VC_NOT_CPUID
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iret
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; Use the SNP CPUID page to handle the cpuid lookup
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;
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; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX
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;
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; Relies on the stack setup/usage in #VC handler:
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;
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; On entry,
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; [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION] contains EAX input to cpuid instruction
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;
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; On return, stores corresponding results of CPUID lookup in:
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; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX]
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; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX]
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; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX]
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; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX]
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;
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SnpCpuidLookup:
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mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION]
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mov ebx, [CPUID_BASE + SNP_CPUID_COUNT]
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mov ecx, CPUID_BASE + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY
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; Zero these out now so we can simply return if lookup fails
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mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX], 0
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mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX], 0
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mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX], 0
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mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX], 0
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SnpCpuidCheckEntry:
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cmp ebx, 0
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je VmmDoneSnpCpuid
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cmp dword[ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX_IN], eax
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jne SnpCpuidCheckEntryNext
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; As with SEV-ES handler we assume requested CPUID sub-leaf/index is 0
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cmp dword[ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX_IN], 0
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je SnpCpuidEntryFound
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SnpCpuidCheckEntryNext:
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dec ebx
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add ecx, SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_SZ
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jmp SnpCpuidCheckEntry
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SnpCpuidEntryFound:
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mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX]
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX], eax
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mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EBX]
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX], eax
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mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EDX]
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX], eax
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mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX]
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX], eax
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jmp VmmDoneSnpCpuid
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;
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; Total stack usage for the #VC handler is 44 bytes:
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; - 12 bytes for the exception IRET (after popping error code)
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; - 32 bytes for the local variables.
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;
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SevEsIdtVmmComm:
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;
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; If we're here, then we are an SEV-ES guest and this
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; was triggered by a CPUID instruction
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;
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; Set the recievedVc field in the workarea to communicate that
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; a #VC was taken.
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mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_RECEIVED_VC], 1
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pop ecx ; Error code
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cmp ecx, 0x72 ; Be sure it was CPUID
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jne SevEsIdtNotCpuid
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; Set up local variable room on the stack
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; CPUID function : + 28
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; CPUID request register : + 24
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; GHCB MSR (EAX) : + 20
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; GHCB MSR (EDX) : + 16
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; CPUID result (EDX) : + 12
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; CPUID result (ECX) : + 8
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; CPUID result (EBX) : + 4
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; CPUID result (EAX) : + 0
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sub esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE
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; Save the CPUID function being requested
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION], eax
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; If SEV-SNP is enabled, use the CPUID page to handle the CPUID
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; instruction.
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mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR
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rdmsr
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bt eax, 2
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jc SnpCpuidLookup
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; The GHCB CPUID protocol uses the following mapping to request
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; a specific register:
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; 0 => EAX, 1 => EBX, 2 => ECX, 3 => EDX
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;
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; Set EAX as the first register to request. This will also be used as a
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; loop variable to request all register values (EAX to EDX).
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xor eax, eax
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER], eax
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; Save current GHCB MSR value
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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rdmsr
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mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX], eax
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mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX], edx
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NextReg:
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;
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; Setup GHCB MSR
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; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID function
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; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID request protocol
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;
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mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER]
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cmp eax, 4
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jge VmmDone
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shl eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT
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mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION]
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VmgExit GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST, GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE
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;
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; Response GHCB MSR
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; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID register value
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; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID response protocol
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;
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; Save returned value
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shr eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT
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mov [esp + eax * 4], edx
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; Next register
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inc word [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER]
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jmp NextReg
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VmmDone:
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;
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; At this point we have all CPUID register values. Restore the GHCB MSR,
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; set the return register values and return.
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;
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mov eax, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX]
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mov edx, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX]
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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wrmsr
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VmmDoneSnpCpuid:
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mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX]
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mov ebx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX]
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mov ecx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX]
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mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX]
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add esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE
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; Update the EIP value to skip over the now handled CPUID instruction
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; (the CPUID instruction has a length of 2)
|
|
add word [esp], CPUID_INSN_LEN
|
|
iret
|
|
|
|
ALIGN 2
|
|
|
|
Idtr:
|
|
dw IDT_END - IDT_BASE - 1 ; Limit
|
|
dd ADDR_OF(IDT_BASE) ; Base
|
|
|
|
IdtrClear:
|
|
dw 0 ; Limit
|
|
dd 0 ; Base
|
|
|
|
ALIGN 16
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
; The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
|
|
; This will be used to determine if SEV-ES is enabled. Upon execution
|
|
; of the CPUID instruction, a VMM Communication Exception will occur.
|
|
; This will tell us if SEV-ES is enabled. We can use the current value
|
|
; of the GHCB MSR to determine the SEV attributes.
|
|
;
|
|
IDT_BASE:
|
|
;
|
|
; Vectors 0 - 28 (No handlers)
|
|
;
|
|
%rep 29
|
|
dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0
|
|
dw 0x10 ; Selector
|
|
db 0 ; Reserved
|
|
db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
|
|
dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16
|
|
%endrep
|
|
;
|
|
; Vector 29 (VMM Communication Exception)
|
|
;
|
|
dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) & 0xffff) ; Offset low bits 15..0
|
|
dw 0x10 ; Selector
|
|
db 0 ; Reserved
|
|
db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
|
|
dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) >> 16) ; Offset high bits 31..16
|
|
;
|
|
; Vectors 30 - 31 (No handlers)
|
|
;
|
|
%rep 2
|
|
dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0
|
|
dw 0x10 ; Selector
|
|
db 0 ; Reserved
|
|
db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
|
|
dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16
|
|
%endrep
|
|
IDT_END:
|