Refactor to use a consistent code path for determining the build
args for a service image regardless of whether BuildKit or the
classic builder is being used.
After recent changes, these code paths had diverged, so the classic
builder was missing the proxy variables from the Docker client
config.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
This was left over from debugging, but we should not block.
OTel will handle the connection in the background.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
Swap the default implementation now that batching is merged.
Keeping the `docker cp` based implementation around for the
moment, but it needs to be _explicitly_ disabled now by setting
`COMPOSE_EXPERIMENTAL_WATCH_TAR=0`.
After the next release, we should remove the `docker cp`
implementation entirely.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
If an optional dependency exits successfully (exit code of 0),
with a service condition of `service_completed_successfully`,
don't log a warning.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
* When waiting for dependencies, `select` on the context as well
as the ticker
* Write multiple progress events "transactionally" (i.e. hold the
lock for the duration to avoid other events being interleaved)
* Do not change "finished" steps back to "in progress" to prevent
flickering
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
Move builder and nodes initialization code up, avoiding to recreate/load them for every service build.
Signed-off-by: Silvin Lubecki <silvin.lubecki@docker.com>
Adjust the debouncing logic so that it applies to all inbound file
events, regardless of whether they match a sync or rebuild rule.
When the batch is flushed out, if any event for the service is a
rebuild event, then the service is rebuilt and all sync events for
the batch are ignored. If _all_ events in the batch are sync events,
then a sync is triggered, passing the entire batch at once. This
provides a substantial performance win for the new `tar`-based
implementation, as it can efficiently transfer the changes in bulk.
Additionally, this helps with jitter, e.g. it's not uncommon for
there to be double-writes in quick succession to a file, so even if
there's not many files being modified at once, it can still prevent
some unnecessary transfers.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
Support services with scale > 1 for the tar watch sync.
Add a "lossy" multi-writer specific to pipes that writes the
tar data to each `io.PipeWriter`, which is connected to `stdin`
for the `tar` process being exec'd in the container.
The data is written serially to each writer. This could be
adjusted to do concurrent writes but that will rapidly increase
the I/O load, so is not done here - in general, 99% of the
time you'll be developing (and thus using watch/sync) with a
single replica of a service.
If a write fails, the corresponding `io.PipeWriter` is removed
from the active set and closed with an error.
This means that a single container copy failing won't stop
writes to the others that are succeeding. Of course, they will
be in an inconsistent state afterwards still, but that's a
different problem.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
We cannot guarantee the exact value of `CapEff` across
environments, and this test has started failing some places,
e.g. Docker Desktop, and now GitHub Actions (likely due to
a kernel upgrade on the runners or similar).
By setting `privileged: true` on the build, we're asking for
the `security.insecure` entitlement on the build. A safe
assumption is that will include `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, which won't
be present otherwise, so mask the `CapEff` value and check
for that.
It's worth noting that realistically, the build won't even
be able to complete without the correct entitlement, since the
`Dockerfile` uses `RUN --security=insecure`, so this is really
an additional sanity check.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
Includes a fix for CVE-2023-29409
go1.20.7 (released 2023-08-01) includes a security fix to the crypto/tls
package, as well as bug fixes to the assembler and the compiler. See the
Go 1.20.7 milestone on our issue tracker for details:
- https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.20.7+label%3ACherryPickApproved
- full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.20.6...go1.20.7
From the mailing list announcement:
[security] Go 1.20.7 and Go 1.19.12 are released
Hello gophers,
We have just released Go versions 1.20.7 and 1.19.12, minor point releases.
These minor releases include 1 security fixes following the security policy:
- crypto/tls: restrict RSA keys in certificates to <= 8192 bits
Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server
to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. Limit this by
restricting the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes to <=
8192 bits.
Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only
three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all
three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It
is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target
the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the
default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.
Thanks to Mateusz Poliwczak for reporting this issue.
View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.20.7
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Just moving some code around in preparation for an alternative
sync implementation that can do bulk transfers by using `tar`.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
It's no longer used in docker/cli, and doesn't do anything other than
creating an empty struct, so replacing it (as we're planning to
deprecate that function)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
When building, if images are being pushed, ensure that only
named images (i.e. services with a populated `image` field)
are attempted to be pushed.
Services without `image` get an auto-generated name, which
will be a "Docker library" reference since they're in the
format `$project-$service`, which is implicitly the same as
`docker.io/library/$project-$service`. A push for that is
never desirable / will always fail.
The key here is that we cannot overwrite the `<svc>.image`
field when doing builds, as we need to be able to check for
its presence to determine whether a push makes sense.
Fixes#10813.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
Fix forthcoming via https://github.com/compose-spec/compose-go/pull/436
which addresses some symlink limitations. These can
actually effect other platforms but are most common
on macOS because the test creates temporary directories,
which are symlinked on macOS.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
Lots of our phony Compose files launch pointless long-lived processes
so we can assert on state. However, this means they often don't respond
well to signals on their own, requiring Compose to timeout and kill
them when doing a `down`.
Add in lots of `init: true` where appropriate so that we don't block
for no reason while running E2E tests all over the place.
Additionally, a couple tests have gotten a cleanup so they don't leave
behind containers. I still want to build this into the framework in
the future, but this is easier for the moment and won't cause any
trouble in the future.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
go1.20.6 (released 2023-07-11) includes a security fix to the net/http package,
as well as bug fixes to the compiler, cgo, the cover tool, the go command,
the runtime, and the crypto/ecdsa, go/build, go/printer, net/mail, and text/template
packages. See the Go 1.20.6 milestone on our issue tracker for details.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.20.6+label%3ACherryPickApproved
Full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.20.5...go1.20.6
These minor releases include 1 security fixes following the security policy:
net/http: insufficient sanitization of Host header
The HTTP/1 client did not fully validate the contents of the Host header.
A maliciously crafted Host header could inject additional headers or entire
requests. The HTTP/1 client now refuses to send requests containing an
invalid Request.Host or Request.URL.Host value.
Thanks to Bartek Nowotarski for reporting this issue.
Includes security fixes for [CVE-2023-29406 ][1] and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60374
[1]: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f8f7-69v5-w4vx
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add an end-to-end test that covers the core watch functionality,
i.e. CRUD on files & directories.
Signed-off-by: Milas Bowman <milas.bowman@docker.com>
Guillaume Lours
Milas Bowman
Silvin Lubecki
Praful Gupta
Silvin Lubecki
Sebastiaan van Stijn
dependabot[bot]
Nicolas De Loof
Sebastiaan van Stijn