- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync

- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17
     [dh.c sshd.c]
     Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output
     Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound
     is not a power of two
     ok deraadt@ millert@
This commit is contained in:
Damien Miller 2008-05-19 14:50:00 +10:00
parent a4be7c23fd
commit 354c48c641
3 changed files with 17 additions and 28 deletions

View File

@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.c]
[configure.ac] Implement arc4random_buf(), import implementation of
arc4random_uniform() from OpenBSD
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17
[dh.c sshd.c]
Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output
Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound
is not a power of two
ok deraadt@ millert@
20080403
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Include stdlib.h to avoid compile-
@ -3874,4 +3881,4 @@
OpenServer 6 and add osr5bigcrypt support so when someone migrates
passwords between UnixWare and OpenServer they will still work. OK dtucker@
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4909 2008/05/19 04:47:37 djm Exp $
$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4910 2008/05/19 04:50:00 djm Exp $

4
dh.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.45 2007/09/27 00:15:57 ray Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.46 2008/04/13 00:22:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
}
linenum = 0;
which = arc4random() % bestcount;
which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
continue;

32
sshd.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.355 2008/02/14 13:10:31 mbalmer Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.356 2008/04/13 00:22:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -368,9 +368,6 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
static void
generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
{
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
int i;
verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
@ -379,12 +376,7 @@ generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
options.server_key_bits);
verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
rnd >>= 8;
}
arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
arc4random_stir();
}
@ -583,16 +575,14 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
u_int32_t rnd[256];
gid_t gidset[1];
u_int i;
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
arc4random_stir();
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
rnd[i] = arc4random();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
@ -666,7 +656,6 @@ static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
u_int i;
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
@ -700,8 +689,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
demote_sensitive_data();
arc4random_stir();
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
rnd[i] = arc4random();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* Drop privileges */
@ -803,7 +791,7 @@ drop_connection(int startups)
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
r = arc4random() % 100;
r = arc4random_uniform(100);
debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
@ -1956,7 +1944,6 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
u_char cookie[8];
u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
/*
* Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
@ -1967,12 +1954,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
* cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
* of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
*/
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
rnd >>= 8;
}
arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
/*
* Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random