- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync

- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17
     [dh.c sshd.c]
     Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output
     Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound
     is not a power of two
     ok deraadt@ millert@

ChangeLog

@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.c]
      [configure.ac] Implement arc4random_buf(), import implementation of
      arc4random_uniform() from OpenBSD
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17
+     [dh.c sshd.c]
+     Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output
+     Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound
+     is not a power of two
+     ok deraadt@ millert@
 
 20080403
  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Include stdlib.h to avoid compile-
@@ -3874,4 +3881,4 @@
    OpenServer 6 and add osr5bigcrypt support so when someone migrates
    passwords between UnixWare and OpenServer they will still work. OK dtucker@
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4909 2008/05/19 04:47:37 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4910 2008/05/19 04:50:00 djm Exp $

dh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.45 2007/09/27 00:15:57 ray Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.46 2008/04/13 00:22:17 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
 	}
 
 	linenum = 0;
-	which = arc4random() % bestcount;
+	which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
 	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
 		if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
 			continue;

sshd.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.355 2008/02/14 13:10:31 mbalmer Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.356 2008/04/13 00:22:17 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -368,9 +368,6 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
 static void
 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
 {
-	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-	int i;
-
 	verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
 	    sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
 	if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
@@ -379,12 +376,7 @@ generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
 	    options.server_key_bits);
 	verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
 
-	for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
+	arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-		if (i % 4 == 0)
-			rnd = arc4random();
-		sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
-		rnd >>= 8;
-	}
 	arc4random_stir();
 }
 
@@ -585,14 +577,12 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 {
  	u_int32_t rnd[256];
 	gid_t gidset[1];
-	u_int i;
 
 	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
 	privsep_challenge_enable();
 
 	arc4random_stir();
-	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-		rnd[i] = arc4random();
 	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 
 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
@@ -666,7 +656,6 @@ static void
 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	u_int32_t rnd[256];
-	u_int i;
 
 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
 	if (1) {
@@ -700,8 +689,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	demote_sensitive_data();
 
 	arc4random_stir();
-	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-		rnd[i] = arc4random();
 	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 
 	/* Drop privileges */
@@ -803,7 +791,7 @@ drop_connection(int startups)
 	p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
 	p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
 	p += options.max_startups_rate;
-	r = arc4random() % 100;
+	r = arc4random_uniform(100);
 
 	debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
 	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
@@ -1956,7 +1944,6 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 	u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
 	u_char cookie[8];
 	u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
-	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
@@ -1967,12 +1954,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 	 * cookie.  This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
 	 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
 	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+	arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
-		if (i % 4 == 0)
-			rnd = arc4random();
-		cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
-		rnd >>= 8;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Send our public key.  We include in the packet 64 bits of random