- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/12/03 23:55:27

[auth-rsa.c]
     move check for revoked keys to run earlier (in auth_rsa_key_allowed)
     bz#1829; patch from ldv AT altlinux.org; ok markus@

ChangeLog

@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
      check that g^x^q === 1 mod p; recommended by JPAKE author Feng Hao
      (this code is still disabled, but apprently people are treating it as
      a reference implementation)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/12/03 23:55:27
+     [auth-rsa.c]
+     move check for revoked keys to run earlier (in auth_rsa_key_allowed)
+     bz#1829; patch from ldv AT altlinux.org; ok markus@
 
 20101204
  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c] Use arc4random_uniform(range)

auth-rsa.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.78 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.79 2010/12/03 23:55:27 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -94,9 +94,6 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
 	MD5_CTX md;
 	int len;
 
-	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
-		return 0;
-
 	/* don't allow short keys */
 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
 		error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
@@ -249,6 +246,10 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
 
+		/* Never accept a revoked key */
+		if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+			break;
+
 		/* We have found the desired key. */
 		/*
 		 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,