by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g.
HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519
Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
ok djm@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97
Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively.
Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
all options supporting these semantics.
Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417
Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
character to remove from or append to the default list respectively.
Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of
available elements via "ssh -Q ...").
Input and OK jmc
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57
"unresponsive" to clarify what it checks for. Patch from jblaine at
kickflop.net via github pr#129, ok djm@.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3682f8ec7227f5697945daa25d11ce2d933899e9
the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent
(effectively reversing my commit of yesterday);
ok deraadt markus djm
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667
mention of RSA keys only (since we support ECDSA now and might support others
in the future). Inspired by Jakub Jelen via bz#2974
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92e3686561bf624ccc64ab320c96c9e9a263aa5
in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical
between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but
because nobody complained, it also disables the
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
Matches in same pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require
hostname canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906 ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fba1dfe9f6e0cabcd0e2b3be13f7a434199beffa
with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't
try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to
'always').
Patch from Sven Wegener via bz#2896
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 527ff501cf98bf65fb4b29ed0cb847dda10f4d37
it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing
certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f
Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods
like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor
authentication via PAM or BSD Auth.
ssh(1) setuid has been removed, remove supporting code and clean up
references to it in the man pages
We have not shipped ssh(1) the setuid bit since 2002. If ayone
really needs to make connections from a low port number this can
be implemented via a small setuid ProxyCommand.
ok markus@ jmc@ djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d03364610b7123ae4c6792f5274bd147b6de717e
signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by
wildcard.
Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs
are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps
(e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected.
Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they
aren't full pattern-lists that support negation.
(lots of) feedback, ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207
In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting
them)
refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be
username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
%U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
interactive and CS1 for bulk
AF21 was selected as this is the highest priority within the low-latency
service class (and it is higher than what we have today). SSH is elastic
and time-sensitive data, where a user is waiting for a response via the
network in order to continue with a task at hand. As such, these flows
should be considered foreground traffic, with delays or drops to such
traffic directly impacting user-productivity.
For bulk SSH traffic, the CS1 "Lower Effort" marker was chosen to enable
networks implementing a scavanger/lower-than-best effort class to
discriminate scp(1) below normal activities, such as web surfing. In
general this type of bulk SSH traffic is a background activity.
An advantage of using "AF21" for interactive SSH and "CS1" for bulk SSH
is that they are recognisable values on all common platforms (IANA
https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xml), and
for AF21 specifically a definition of the intended behavior exists
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594#section-4.7 in addition to the definition
of the Assured Forwarding PHB group https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2597, and
for CS1 (Lower Effort) there is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3662
The first three bits of "AF21" map to the equivalent IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE
802.11e, MPLS EXP/CoS and IP Precedence value of 2 (also known as "Immediate",
or "AC_BE"), and CS1's first 3 bits map to IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e,
MPLS/CoS and IP Precedence value 1 ("Background" or "AC_BK").
OK deraadt@, "no objection" djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d11d2a4484f461524ef0c20870523dfcdeb52181
command-line argument to ssh(1) that directs it to bind its outgoing
connection to the address of the specified network interface.
BindInterface prefers to use addresses that aren't loopback or link-
local, but will fall back to those if no other addresses of the
required family are available on that interface.
Based on patch by Mike Manning in bz#2820, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5064d285c2851f773dd736a2c342aa384fbf713
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
From Jakub Jelen via bz#2826
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51bf769f06e55447f4bfa7306949e62d2401907a
Mention ServerAliveTimeout in context of TCPKeepAlives;
prompted by Christoph Anton Mitterer via github
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0cf1b5bd3f1fbf41d71c88d75d93afc1c880ca2
Shorter, more accurate explanation of
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost without the confusing example. Prompted by
Christoph Anton Mitterer via github and bz#2293.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19dc96bea25b80d78d416b581fb8506f1e7b76df
Replace "trojan horse" with the correct term (MITM).
From maikel at predikkta.com via bz#2822, ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e86ac64c512057c89edfadb43302ac0aa81a6c53
Expose devices allocated for tun/tap forwarding.
At the client, the device may be obtained from a new %T expansion
for LocalCommand.
At the server, the allocated devices will be listed in a
SSH_TUNNEL variable exposed to the environment of any user sessions
started after the tunnel forwarding was established.
ok markus
Upstream-ID: e61e53f8ae80566e9ddc0d67a5df5bdf2f3c9f9e
Add URI support to ssh, sftp and scp. For example
ssh://user@host or sftp://user@host/path. The connection parameters
described in draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 are not implemented since
the ssh fingerprint format in the draft uses md5 with no way to specify the
hash function type. OK djm@
Upstream-ID: 4ba3768b662d6722de59e6ecb00abf2d4bf9cacc
In the description of pattern-lists, clarify negated
matches by explicitly stating that a negated match will never yield a
positive result, and that at least one positive term in the pattern-list must
match. bz#1918
Upstream-ID: 652d2f9d993f158fc5f83cef4a95cd9d95ae6a14
Add 'reverse' dynamic forwarding which combines dynamic
forwarding (-D) with remote forwarding (-R) where the remote-forwarded port
expects SOCKS-requests.
The SSH server code is unchanged and the parsing happens at the SSH
clients side. Thus the full SOCKS-request is sent over the forwarded
channel and the client parses c->output. Parsing happens in
channel_before_prepare_select(), _before_ the select bitmask is
computed in the pre[] handlers, but after network input processing
in the post[] handlers.
help and ok djm@
Upstream-ID: aa25a6a3851064f34fe719e0bf15656ad5a64b89
djm@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
kn@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
jmc@openbsd.org
schwarze@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
job@openbsd.org
millert@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org