unbreak support for clients that advertise a protocol
version of "1.99" (indicating both v2 and v1 support). Busted by me during
SSHv1 purge in r1.358; bz2810, ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8f9c2bee11afc16c872bb79d6abe9c555bd0e4b
avoid modifying pw->pw_passwd; let endpwent() clean up
for us, but keep a scrubbed copy; bz2777, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 715afc0f59c6b82c4929a73279199ed241ce0752
fix problem in configuration parsing when in config dump mode
(sshd -T) without providing a full connection specification (sshd -T -C ...)
spotted by bluhm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7125faf5740eaa9d3a2f25400a0bc85e94e28b8f
When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the
attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an
incomplete list of) all criteria. ok djm@, man page help jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4e773c4212d3dea486d0259ae977551aab2c1fc
add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on which rdomain(4) a
connection was recevied on. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 27d8fd5a3f1bae18c9c6e533afdf99bff887a4fb
add sshd_config RDomain keyword to place sshd and the
subsequent user session (including the shell and any TCP/IP forwardings) into
the specified rdomain(4)
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: be2358e86346b5cacf20d90f59f980b87d1af0f5
Add optional rdomain qualifier to sshd_config's
ListenAddress option to allow listening on a different rdomain(4), e.g.
ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 rdomain 4
Upstream-ID: 24b6622c376feeed9e9be8b9605e593695ac9091
replace statically-sized arrays in ServerOptions with
dynamic ones managed by xrecallocarray, removing some arbitrary (though
large) limits and saving a bit of memory; "much nicer" markus@
Upstream-ID: 1732720b2f478fe929d6687ac7b0a97ff2efe9d2
refactor channels.c
Move static state to a "struct ssh_channels" that is allocated at
runtime and tracked as a member of struct ssh.
Explicitly pass "struct ssh" to all channels functions.
Replace use of the legacy packet APIs in channels.c.
Rework sshd_config PermitOpen handling: previously the configuration
parser would call directly into the channels layer. After the refactor
this is not possible, as the channels structures are allocated at
connection time and aren't available when the configuration is parsed.
The server config parser now tracks PermitOpen itself and explicitly
configures the channels code later.
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 11828f161656b965cc306576422613614bea2d8f
remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge
the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus
Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f
If running with privsep (mandatory now) as a non-privileged user, we
don't chroot or change to an unprivileged user however we still checked
the existence of the user and directory. Don't do those checks if we're
not going to use them. Based in part on a patch from Lionel Fourquaux
via Corinna Vinschen, ok djm@
Fix segfault when sshd attempts to load RSA1 keys (can
only happen when protocol v.1 support is enabled for the client). Reported by
Jakub Jelen in bz#2686; ok dtucker
Upstream-ID: 8fdaec2ba4b5f65db1d094f6714ce64b25d871d7
Restore \r\n newline sequence for server ident string. The CR
got lost in the flensing of SSHv1. Pointed out by Stef Bon
Upstream-ID: 5333fd43ce5396bf5999496096fac5536e678fac
Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of
seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time).
This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison
warning.
rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op
on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on
anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually
wraps, anyway).
some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c
log connections dropped in excess of MaxStartups at
verbose LogLevel; bz#2613 based on diff from Tomas Kuthan; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 703ae690dbf9b56620a6018f8a3b2389ce76d92b
Unlink PidFile on SIGHUP and always recreate it when the
new sshd starts. Regression tests (and possibly other things) depend on the
pidfile being recreated after SIGHUP, and unlinking it means it won't contain
a stale pid if sshd fails to restart. ok djm@ markus@
Upstream-ID: 132dd6dda0c77dd49d2f15b2573b5794f6160870
On startup, check to see if sshd is already daemonized
and if so, skip the call to daemon() and do not rewrite the PidFile. This
means that when sshd re-execs itself on SIGHUP the process ID will no longer
change. Should address bz#2641. ok djm@ markus@.
Upstream-ID: 5ea0355580056fb3b25c1fd6364307d9638a37b9
Add a call to RAND_poll() to ensure than more than pid+time gets
stirred into child processes states. Prompted by analysis from Jann
Horn at Project Zero. ok dtucker@
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing
compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s,
but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple
compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call; harmless
on Unix/BSD but potentially crashy on Cygwin. Reported by James Slepicka ok
deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 1987ccee508ba5b18f016c85100d7ac3f70ff965
remove UseLogin option and support for having /bin/login
manage login sessions; ok deraadt markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: bea7213fbf158efab7e602d9d844fba4837d2712
Remove more SSH1 server code: * Drop sshd's -k option. *
Retire configuration keywords that only apply to protocol 1, as well as the
"protocol" keyword. * Remove some related vestiges of protocol 1 support.
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 9402f82886de917779db12f8ee3f03d4decc244d
Fix bug introduced in rev 1.467 which causes
"buffer_get_bignum_ret: incomplete message" errors when built with WITH_SSH1
and run such that no Protocol 1 ephemeral host key is generated (eg "Protocol
2", no SSH1 host key supplied). Reported by rainer.laatsch at t-online.de,
ok deraadt@
Upstream-ID: aa6b132da5c325523aed7989cc5a320497c919dc
add support for additional fixed DH groups from
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group)
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group)
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group)
based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
fix signed/unsigned errors reported by clang-3.7; add
sshbuf_dup_string() to replace a common idiom of strdup(sshbuf_ptr()) with
better safety checking; feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 71f926d9bb3f1efed51319a6daf37e93d57c8820
refactor canohost.c: move functions that cache results closer
to the places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is
cached in canohost.c
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 5f2e4df88d4803fc8ec59ec53629105e23ce625e
Add a function to enable security-related malloc_options.
With and ok deraadt@, something similar has been in the snaps for a while.
Upstream-ID: 43a95523b832b7f3b943d2908662191110c380ed
Allow RekeyLimits in excess of 4G up to 2**63 bits
(limited by the return type of scan_scaled). Part of bz#2521, ok djm.
Upstream-ID: 13bea82be566b9704821b1ea05bf7804335c7979
implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
always call privsep_preauth_child() regardless of whether
sshd was started by root; it does important priming before sandboxing and
failing to call it could result in sandbox violations later; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: c8a6d0d56c42f3faab38460dc917ca0d1705d383
Plug minor memory leaks when options are used more than
once. bz#2182, patch from Tiago Cunha, ok deraadt djm
Upstream-ID: 5b84d0401e27fe1614c10997010cc55933adb48e
Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be
prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the
default rather than replacing it.
approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a
Turn off DSA by default; add HostKeyAlgorithms to the
server and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be
tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 8450a9e6d83f80c9bfed864ff061dfc9323cec21
turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key
exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by
default too) ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa
add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting
authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite
useful in deployments with large userbases
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6
Don't send hostkey advertisments
(hostkeys-00@openssh.com) to current versions of Tera Term as they can't
handle them. Newer versions should be OK. Patch from Bryan Drewery and
IWAMOTO Kouichi, ok djm@
UpdateHostKeys fixes:
I accidentally changed the format of the hostkeys@openssh.com messages
last week without changing the extension name, and this has been causing
connection failures for people who are running -current. First reported
by sthen@
s/hostkeys@openssh.com/hostkeys-00@openssh.com/
Change the name of the proof message too, and reorder it a little.
Also, UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist (no TTY
available to read the response) so disable UpdateHostKeys if it is in
ask mode and ControlPersist is active (and document this)
partial backout of:
revision 1.441
date: 2015/01/31 20:30:05; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +17 -10; commitid
: x8klYPZMJSrVlt3O;
Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are missing.
Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation.
Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@
hostkey updates now require access to the private key, so we can't
load public keys only. The improved log messages (fingerprints of keys
loaded) are kept.
Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension.
The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private
halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client.
Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the
user manually review keys offered.
ok markus@
Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are
missing. Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation.
Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@
correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for
offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when
a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely
unlikely configuration).
ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@
Host key rotation support.
Add a hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for
a server to inform a client of all its available host key after
authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in
known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms
and a server to gracefully rotate its keys.
The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config
option (default on).
ok markus@
update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch
packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b)
(de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old
packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and
integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@
Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't
work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This
will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom.
Considered highly experimental for now.
make internal handling of filename arguments of "none"
more consistent with ssh. "none" arguments are now replaced with NULL when
the configuration is finalised.
Simplifies checking later on (just need to test not-NULL rather than
that + strcmp) and cleans up some inconsistencies. ok markus@
[PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
[auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h]
[clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c]
[readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
[sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c]
Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port
may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
[compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections
using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail
when connecting with something that implements the spec properly.
Disable this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected
versions.
reported by Aris Adamantiadis; ok markus@
repeatedly):
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03
[myproposal.h]
trimm default proposals.
This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers
(arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration
(the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available
for the config files).
ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26
[myproposal.h]
The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code
makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that
direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh.
Brought up by naddy.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27
[myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
[auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c ssh-gss.h sshd.c]
bz#2107 - cache OIDs of supported GSSAPI mechanisms before privsep
sandboxing, as running this code in the sandbox can cause violations;
ok markus@
[sshd.c]
use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); on most operating systems
they are equivalent, but SUSv2 describes the latter as having undefined
behaviour; from portable; ok dtucker
(Id sync only; change is already in portable)
[sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-seccomp-filter.c]
[sandbox-systrace.c ssh-sandbox.h sshd.c] Support preauth sandboxing
using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. Patch by Dag-Erling
Smorgrav, updated by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok dtucker@
[sshconnect.c sshd.c]
ban clients/servers that suffer from SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY, they are ancient,
deranged and might make some attacks on KEX easier; ok markus@
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the
obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
[sshd.c]
delay closure of in/out fds until after "Bad protocol version
identification..." message, as get_remote_ipaddr/get_remote_port
require them open.
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org);
initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
unnecessary arc4random_stir() calls. The only ones left are to ensure
that the PRNG gets a different state after fork() for platforms that
have broken the API.
[ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
All the instances of arc4random_stir() are bogus, since arc4random()
does this itself, inside itself, and has for a very long time.. Actually,
this was probably reducing the entropy available.
ok djm
ID SYNC ONLY for portable; we don't trust other arc4random implementations
to do this right.
[sshd.c]
Stir PRNG after post-accept fork. The child gets a different PRNG state
anyway via rexec and explicit privsep reseeds, but it's good to be sure.
ok markus@
[auth.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c monitor.c servconf.c]
[servconf.h session.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add ssh-agent(1) support to sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys,
or hostkeys on smartcards; most of the work by Zev Weiss; bz #1974
ok djm@
[sshd.c]
When running sshd -D, close stderr unless we have explicitly requesting
logging to stderr. From james.hunt at ubuntu.com via bz#1976, djm's patch
so, err, ok dtucker.
[sshd_config.5 servconf.c servconf.h packet.c serverloop.c monitor.c sshd_config
sshd.c] Add RekeyLimit to sshd with the same syntax as the client allowing
rekeying based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man
page.
[log.c log.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8 sshd.c]
Add -E option to ssh and sshd to append debugging logs to a specified file
instead of stderr or syslog. ok markus@, man page help jmc@
[auth.h auth1.c auth2.c monitor.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c]
[sshd_config.5]
Support multiple required authentication via an AuthenticationMethods
option. This option lists one or more comma-separated lists of
authentication method names. Successful completion of all the methods in
any list is required for authentication to complete;
feedback and ok markus@
[auth2-pubkey.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Remove default of AuthorizedCommandUser. Administrators are now expected
to explicitly specify a user. feedback and ok markus@
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c servconf.c servconf.h]
[sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
new sshd_config option AuthorizedKeysCommand to support fetching
authorized_keys from a command in addition to (or instead of) from
the filesystem. The command is run as the target server user unless
another specified via a new AuthorizedKeysCommandUser option.
patch originally by jchadima AT redhat.com, reworked by me; feedback
and ok markus@
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config]
Turn on systrace sandboxing of pre-auth sshd by default for new installs
by shipping a config that overrides the current UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes
default. Make it easier to flip the default in the future by adding too.
[sandbox-systrace.c sshd.c]
fix a during the load of the sandbox policies (child can still make
the read-syscall and wait forever for systrace-answers) by replacing
the read/write synchronisation with SIGSTOP/SIGCONT;
report and help hshoexer@; ok djm@, dtucker@
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/13 01:42:32
[servconf.h servconf.c sshd.8 sshd.c auth.c sshd_config.5]
Add "Match LocalAddress" and "Match LocalPort" to sshd and adjust tests
to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus@.
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
VersionAddendum option to allow server operators to append some arbitrary
text to the SSH-... banner; ok deraadt@ "don't care" markus@
[sshd.c ssh-sandbox.h sandbox.h sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-systrace.c]
[sandbox-null.c]
rename sandbox.h => ssh-sandbox.h to make things easier for portable
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config.5 sandbox-rlimit.c]
[sandbox-systrace.c sandbox.h configure.ac Makefile.in]
introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using systrace(4).
This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for
sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the
privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child
from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying)
or probing local kernel attack surface.
The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option.
UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future
so please start testing it now.
feedback dtucker@; ok markus@
[log.c log.h monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h sshd.c]
make the pre-auth privsep slave log via a socketpair shared with the
monitor rather than /var/empty/dev/log; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ markus@
[entropy.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-rand-helper.c]
[ssh.c ssh_prng_cmds.in sshd.c contrib/aix/buildbff.sh]
[regress/README.regress] Remove ssh-rand-helper and all its
tentacles. PRNGd seeding has been rolled into entropy.c directly.
Thanks to tim@ for testing on affected platforms.
[clientloop.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c]
some unsigned long long casts that make things a bit easier for
portable without resorting to dropping PRIu64 formats everywhere
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]
[servconf.c servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow
selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
and their order of preference.
ok markus@
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
reintroduce commit from tedu@, which I pulled out for release
engineering:
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a
man page for, so use that. ok djm
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a man page
for, so use that. ok djm
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
[auth-rhosts.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.c auth-options.c sshd.c]
Hold authentication debug messages until after successful authentication.
Fixes an info leak of environment variables specified in authorized_keys,
reported by Jacob Appelbaum. ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c]
avoid run-time failures when specifying hostkeys via a relative
path by prepending the cwd in these cases; bz#1290; ok dtucker@
[channels.c ssh.1 servconf.c sshd_config.5 sshd.c channels.h servconf.h
ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c readconf.c sshconnect.c misc.c ssh.c
readconf.h scp.1 sftp.1 ssh_config.5 misc.h]
Remove RoutingDomain from ssh since it's now not needed. It can be
replaced with "route exec" or "nc -V" as a proxycommand. "route exec"
also ensures that trafic such as DNS lookups stays withing the specified
routingdomain. For example (from reyk):
# route -T 2 exec /usr/sbin/sshd
or inherited from the parent process
$ route -T 2 exec sh
$ ssh 10.1.2.3
ok deraadt@ markus@ stevesk@ reyk@
[sshd.c]
Afer sshd receives a SIGHUP, ignore subsequent HUPs while sshd re-execs
itself. Prevents two HUPs in quick succession from resulting in sshd
dying. bz#1692, patch from Colin Watson via Ubuntu.
[ssh_config.5 sshd.c misc.h ssh-keyscan.1 readconf.h sshconnect.c
channels.c channels.h servconf.h servconf.c ssh.1 ssh-keyscan.c scp.1
sftp.1 sshd_config.5 readconf.c ssh.c misc.c]
Allow to set the rdomain in ssh/sftp/scp/sshd and ssh-keyscan.
ok markus@
djm@openbsd.org
djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
markus@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
deraadt@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
mmcc@openbsd.org
tedu@openbsd.org
Tim Rice