Avoid potential signed int overflow when parsing the file
size. Use strtoul() instead of parsing manually. OK djm@
Upstream-ID: 1f82640861c7d905bbb05e7d935d46b0419ced02
OpenSSL is using socket() calls (in FIPS mode) when handling ECDSA keys
in privsep child. The socket() syscall is already denied in the seccomp
filter, but in ppc64le kernel, it is implemented using socketcall()
syscall, which is not denied yet (only SYS_SHUTDOWN is allowed) and
therefore fails hard.
Patch from jjelen at redhat.com.
Recognize nl_langinfo(CODESET) return values "646" and ""
as aliases for "US-ASCII", useful for different versions of NetBSD and
Solaris. Found by dtucker@ and by Tom G. Christensen <tgc at jupiterrise dot
com>. OK dtucker@ deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384
Change COMPILER_VERSION tests which limited additional
warnings to gcc4 to instead skip them on gcc3 as clang can handle
-Wpointer-sign and -Wold-style-definition.
Upstream-ID: 5cbe348aa76dc1adf55be6c0e388fafaa945439a
disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode;
reported by Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 5d9c8f2fa8511d4ecf95322994ffe73e9283899b
Fix overly-conservative overflow checks on mulitplications and add checks
on additions. This allows scan_scaled to work up to +/-LLONG_MAX (LLONG_MIN
will still be flagged as a range error). ok millert@
If running with privsep (mandatory now) as a non-privileged user, we
don't chroot or change to an unprivileged user however we still checked
the existence of the user and directory. Don't do those checks if we're
not going to use them. Based in part on a patch from Lionel Fourquaux
via Corinna Vinschen, ok djm@
remove /usr/bin/time calls around tests, makes diffing test
runs harder. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger
Upstream-Regress-ID: 81c1083b14dcf473b23d2817882f40b346ebc95c
Creating the socket in $OBJ could blow past the (quite limited)
path limit for Unix domain sockets. As a bandaid for bz#2660,
reported by Colin Watson; ok dtucker@
fix regression in 7.4: deletion of PKCS#11-hosted keys
would fail unless they were specified by full physical pathname. Report and
fix from Jakub Jelen via bz#2682; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 5b5bc20ca11cacb5d5eb29c3f93fd18425552268
Fix segfault when sshd attempts to load RSA1 keys (can
only happen when protocol v.1 support is enabled for the client). Reported by
Jakub Jelen in bz#2686; ok dtucker
Upstream-ID: 8fdaec2ba4b5f65db1d094f6714ce64b25d871d7
Mark the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option as
deprecated, effectively making privsep mandatory in sandboxing mode. ok
markus@ deraadt@
(note: this doesn't remove the !privsep code paths, though that will
happen eventually).
Upstream-ID: b4c52666256c4dd865f8ce9431af5d6ce2d74a0a
Allow clock_gettime syscall with X32 bit masked off. Apparently
this is required for at least some kernel versions. bz#2142
Patch mostly by Colin Watson. ok dtucker@
This stops the SC_ALLOW(), SC_ALLOW_ARG() and SC_DENY() macros
prepending __NR_ to the syscall number parameter and just makes
them explicit in the macro invocations.
No binary change in stripped object file before/after.
Check for integer overflow when parsing times in
convtime(). Reported by nicolas.iooss at m4x.org, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 35e6a4e98f6fa24df50bfb8ba1307cf70e966f13
Syscall arguments are passed via an array of 64-bit values in struct
seccomp_data, but we were only inspecting the bottom 32 bits and not
even those correctly for BE systems.
Fortunately, the only case argument inspection was used was in the
socketcall filtering so using this for sandbox escape seems
impossible.
ok dtucker
regress tests for loading certificates without public keys;
bz#2617 based on patch from Adam Eijdenberg; ok markus@ dtucker@
Upstream-Regress-ID: 0145d19328ed995b73fe2d9da33596b17429d0d0
allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a private
key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key. bz#2617 based on patch
from Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ markus@
Upstream-ID: 295668dca2c39505281577217583ddd2bd4b00b9
Don't count the initial block twice when computing how
many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode.
ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL
Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2
millert@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
schwarze@openbsd.org
jsg@openbsd.org
djm@openbsd.org
deraadt@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
markus@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org