[auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h]
[readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5]
[sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c]
[Makefile.in]
Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication
method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.
This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.
This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
"just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
[sshconnect2.c]
Repair strnvis() buffersize of 4*n+1, with termination gauranteed by the
function.
spotted by des@freebsd, who commited an incorrect fix to the freebsd tree
and (as is fairly typical) did not report the problem to us. But this fix
is correct.
ok djm
[readconf.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c]
promote rekeylimit to a int64 so it can hold the maximum useful limit
of 2^32; report and patch from Jan.Pechanec AT Sun.COM, ok dtucker@
[sshconnect2.c]
fall back to gethostname() when the outgoing connection is not
on a socket, such as is the case when ProxyCommand is used.
Gives hostbased auth an opportunity to work; bz#616, report
and feedback stuart AT kaloram.com; ok markus@
[sshconnect2.c]
Fix regression where SSH2 banner is printed at loglevels ERROR and FATAL
where previously it weren't. bz #1221, found by Dean Kopesky, ok djm@
[authfile.c authfile.h sshconnect2.c ssh.c sshconnect1.c]
Prevent ssh from trying to open private keys with bad permissions more than
once or prompting for their passphrases (which it subsequently ignores
anyway), similar to a previous change in ssh-add. bz #1186, ok djm@
[auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth2-chall.c channels.c]
[clientloop.c deattack.c gss-genr.c kex.c key.c misc.c moduli.c]
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c scard.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uuencode.c]
[xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations
functions and use them throughout openssh
xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it
to die
feedback and ok deraadt@
[kex.c kex.h monitor.c myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
Implement the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key exchange method
using the SHA256 code in libc (and wrapper to make it into an OpenSSL
EVP), interop tested against CVS PuTTY
NB. no portability bits committed yet
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/08/30 22:08:05
[gss-serv.c sshconnect2.c]
destroy credentials if krb5_kuserok() call fails. Stops credentials being
delegated to users who are not authorised for GSSAPIAuthentication when
GSSAPIDeletegateCredentials=yes and another authentication mechanism
succeeds; bz#1073 reported by paul.moore AT centrify.com, fix by
simon AT sxw.org.uk, tested todd@ biorn@ jakob@; ok deraadt@
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h packet.c packet.h servconf.c session.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
add a new compression method that delays compression until the user
has been authenticated successfully and set compression to 'delayed'
for sshd.
this breaks older openssh clients (< 3.5) if they insist on
compression, so you have to re-enable compression in sshd_config.
ok djm@
- henning@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/04/08 16:08:21
[sshconnect2.c]
swap the last two parameters to TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE. matches what FreeBSD and NetBSD do.
ok millert@ mcbride@ markus@ ho@, checked to not affect ports by naddy@
[auth2-gss.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c]
[monitor_wrap.h sshconnect2.c ssh-gss.h]
replace "gssapi" with "gssapi-with-mic"; from Simon Wilkinson;
test + ok jakob.
[auth2.c auth2-gss.c auth.h compat.c compat.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c
gss-serv.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c
readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c session.h ssh-gss.h
ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
support GSS API user authentication; patches from Simon Wilkinson,
stripped down and tested by Jakob and myself.
[auth2.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c auth2-krb5.c]
implement kerberos over ssh2 ("kerberos-2@ssh.com"); tested with jakob@
server interops with commercial client; ok jakob@ djm@
[sshconnect2.c]
for pubkey authentication try the user keys in the following order:
1. agent keys that are found in the config file
2. other agent keys
3. keys that are only listed in the config file
this helps when an agent has many keys, where the server might
close the connection before the correct key is used. report & ok pb@
[clientloop.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c packet.h readconf.c]
[readconf.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c]
rekeying bugfixes and automatic rekeying:
* both client and server rekey _automatically_
(a) after 2^31 packets, because after 2^32 packets
the sequence number for packets wraps
(b) after 2^(blocksize_in_bits/4) blocks
(see: draft-ietf-secsh-newmodes-00.txt)
(a) and (b) are _enabled_ by default, and only disabled for known
openssh versions, that don't support rekeying properly.
* client option 'RekeyLimit'
* do not reply to requests during rekeying
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/04/01 10:22:21
[clientloop.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c packet.h readconf.c]
[readconf.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c]
backout rekeying changes (for 3.6.1)
[kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c ssh-keyscan.c]
split kex into client and server code, no need to link
server code into the client; ok provos@
[sshconnect2.c]
for compression=yes, we fallback to no-compression if the server does
not support compression, vice versa for compression=no. ok mouring@
[sshconnect2.c]
extent ssh-keysign protocol:
pass # of socket-fd to ssh-keysign, keysign verfies locally used
ip-address using this socket-fd, restricts fake local hostnames
to actual local hostnames; ok stevesk@
[authfile.c authfile.h pathnames.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h
sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh-keysign.c Makefile.in]
add /usr/libexec/ssh-keysign: a setuid helper program for hostbased
authentication in protocol v2 (needs to access the hostkeys).
Note: Makefile.in untested. Will test after merge is finished.
[auth2.c auth2-chall.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c dispatch.c]
[dispatch.h kex.c kex.h packet.c packet.h serverloop.c ssh.c]
[sshconnect2.c]
Conformance fix: we should send failing packet sequence number when
responding with a SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED message. Spotted by
yakk@yakk.dot.net; ok markus@
[packet.c packet.h sshconnect2.c]
pad using the padding field from the ssh2 packet instead of sending
extra ignore messages. tested against several other ssh servers.
[kexdh.c kexgex.c kex.h pathnames.h readconf.c servconf.h ssh.1
sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshd.8]
get rid of known_hosts2, use it for hostkey lookup, but do not
modify.
[ssh.1 sshconnect2.c]
change preferredauthentication order to
publickey,hostbased,password,keyboard-interactive
document that hostbased defaults to no, document order
[auth-chall.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c readconf.c
readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
improved kbd-interactive support. work by per@appgate.com and me
[auth2.c compat.c sshconnect2.c]
more ssh v2 hostbased-auth interop: ssh.com >= 2.1.0 works now
(however the 2.1.0 server seems to work only if debug is enabled...)
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c kex.c kex.h serverloop.c
sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
more robust rekeying
don't send channel data after rekeying is started.
[clientloop.c kex.c kex.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
enable server side rekeying + some rekey related clientup.
todo: we should not send any non-KEX messages after we send KEXINIT
[clientloop.c sshconnect2.c]
enable client rekeying
(1) force rekeying with ~R, or
(2) if the server requests rekeying.
works against ssh-2.0.12/2.0.13/2.1.0/2.2.0/2.3.0/2.3.1/2.4.0
[kex.c kex.h packet.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
undo parts of recent my changes: main part of keyexchange does not
need dispatch-callbacks, since application data is delayed until
the keyexchange completes (if i understand the drafts correctly).
add some infrastructure for re-keying.
[compat.c compat.h dh.c dh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
make dh group exchange more flexible, allow min and max group size,
okay markus@, deraadt@
[compat.c compat.h readconf.h ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
implement client side of SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK (test public key ->
no need to do enter passphrase or do expensive sign operations if the
server does not accept key).
[kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
generate a 2*need size (~300 instead of 1024/2048) random private
exponent during the DH key agreement. according to Niels (the great
german advisor) this is safe since /etc/primes contains strong
primes only.
References:
P. C. van Oorschot and M. J. Wiener, On Diffie-Hellman key
agreement with short exponents, In Advances in Cryptology
- EUROCRYPT'96, LNCS 1070, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp.332-343.
[Makefile.in sshd.8 sshconnect2.c readconf.h readconf.c packet.c
sshd.c ssh.c ssh.1 servconf.h servconf.c myproposal.h kex.h kex.c]
1) clean up the MAC support for SSH-2
2) allow you to specify the MAC with 'ssh -m'
3) or the 'MACs' keyword in ssh(d)_config
4) add hmac-{md5,sha1}-96
ok stevesk@, provos@
[sshconnect2.c]
do not ask for passphrase in batch mode; report from ejb@ql.org
- itojun@cvs.opebsd.org 2001/02/08 10:47:05
[sshconnect2.c]
%.30s is too short for IPv6 numeric address. use %.128s for now.
markus ok
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 12:28:35
[sshconnect2.c]
do not free twice, thanks to /etc/malloc.conf
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 17:10:53
[sshconnect2.c]
partial success: debug->log; "Permission denied" if no more auth methods
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 12:09:21
[sshconnect2.c]
remove some lines
- (bal) OpenBSD Sync
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/06 11:23:27
[ssh-rsa.c]
remove unused
- itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/05 08:23:29
[ssh-keyscan.1]
missing .El
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:41:03
[session.c sshconnect.c]
consistent use of _PATH_BSHELL; from stevesk@pobox.com
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:35:32
[ssh.1 sshd.8]
Mention AES as available SSH2 Cipher; ok markus
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:25:58
[sshd.c]
sync usage()/man with defaults; from stevesk@pobox.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:21:26
[sshconnect2.c]
handle SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER; fixes bug when connecting to a server
that prints a banner (e.g. /etc/issue.net)
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 14:25:51
[auth.h auth2.c]
count authentication failures only
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 14:25:03
[sshconnect.c]
fingerprint for MITM attacks, too.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 12:03:57
[sshd.8 sshd.c]
document -D
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 14:19:21
[serverloop.c]
less chatty
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 12:34
[auth1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
typo
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 12:30:19
[readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 sshconnect.c]
new option: HostKeyAlias: allow the user to record the host key
under a different name. This is useful for ssh tunneling over
forwarded connections or if you run multiple sshd's on different
ports on the same machine.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 11:51:53
[ssh.1 ssh.c]
multiple -t force pty allocation, document ORIGINAL_COMMAND
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 11:41:31
[sshd.8]
update for ssh-2
- (bal) More C functions defined in NeXT that are unaccessable without
defining -POSIX.
- (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates:
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:29:04
[compat.c]
remove fallback to SSH_BUG_HMAC now that the drafts are updated
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:27:55
[compat.c]
correctly match "2.1.0.pl2 SSH" etc; from pekkas@netcore.fi/bugzilla.redhat
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:15:03
[auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c]
support f-secure/ssh.com 2.0.12; ok niels@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:04:56
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c]
[session.c ssh.c]
agent forwarding and -R for ssh2, based on work from
jhuuskon@messi.uku.fi
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:13:27
[ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
do not disabled rhosts(rsa) if server port > 1024; from
pekkas@netcore.fi
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:16:35
[sshconnect.c]
downgrade client to 1.3 if server is 1.4; help from mdb@juniper.net
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/09 18:04:40
[auth1.c]
typo; from mouring@pconline.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:03:28
[ssh-agent.c]
off-by-one when removing a key from the agent
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:50:39
[auth-rh-rsa.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h]
[authfile.c hostfile.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h myproposal.h]
[readconf.c readconf.h rsa.c rsa.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config]
[sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-dss.h ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h dsa.c dsa.h]
add support for RSA to SSH2. please test.
there are now 3 types of keys: RSA1 is used by ssh-1 only,
RSA and DSA are used by SSH2.
you can use 'ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ssh2_rsa_file' to generate RSA
keys for SSH2 and use the RSA keys for hostkeys or for user keys.
SSH2 RSA or DSA keys are added to .ssh/authorised_keys2 as before.
- (djm) Fix up Makefile and Redhat init script to create RSA host keys
- (djm) Change to interim version
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 04:01:15
[cipher.c]
debug3
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 04:07:23
[scp.c]
remove spaces from arguments; from djm@mindrot.org
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:09:46
[ssh.1]
Cipher is for SSH-1 only
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:12:09
[servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c sshd.8]
AllowTcpForwarding; from naddy@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:16:56
[auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c version.h]
OpenSSH_2.3; note that is is not complete, but the version number
needs to be changed for interoperability reasons
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:19:45
[auth-rsa.c]
do not send RSA challenge if key is not allowed by key-options; from
eivind@ThinkSec.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/15 08:14:01
[rijndael.c session.c]
typos; from stevesk@sweden.hp.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/15 08:18:31
[rijndael.c]
typo
- Copy manpages back over from OpenBSD - too tedious to wade through diffs
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44
[log.c]
allow loglevel debug
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57
[packet.c]
hmac->mac
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03
[auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c]
move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in
debug-msg
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48
ssh.c
do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44
ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c
-X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34
auth-options.c
clear options on every call.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00
authfd.c authfd.h
interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net>
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45
compat.c
use rexexp for version string matching
- provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h]
First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The
client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman
in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer
keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52
[auth-rsa.c auth2.c]
clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27
[auth-options.h]
clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27
[scp.1 scp.c]
support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35
[dh.c]
Wall
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40
[auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h]
[ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h]
add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by
mkiernan@avantgo.com and me
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24
[auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h]
[myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
new cipher framework
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21
[cipher.c]
remove DES
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20
[cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
enable DES in SSH-1 clients only
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13
[kex.h packet.c]
remove unused
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46
[sshd.c]
Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15
[cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h]
rijndael/aes support
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54
[sshd.8]
more info about -V
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02
[myproposal.h]
prefer no compression
Damien Miller
Darren Tucker
Ben Lindstrom
Tim Rice
Kevin Steves