of files. This has sensible semantics wrt Match blocks and accepts glob(3)
patterns to specify the included files. Based on patch by Jakub Jelen in
bz2468; feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36ed0e845b872e33f03355b936a4fff02d5794ff
frequently used to distinguish between multiple independent instances of the
server. New proctitle looks like this:
$ pgrep -lf sshd
12844 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups
requested by sthen@ and aja@; ok aja@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf235a561c655a3524a82003cf7244ecb48ccc1e
sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler
preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce
the potential for short read/write operations.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
along with the MaxStartups limit in the proctitle; suggestion from Philipp
Marek, w/ feedback from Craig Miskell ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a6db2dc1641a5df8eddf7d6652176e359dffb3
keys.
Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose
the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling,
but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is
less risk.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c
noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section
4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63
including the new U2F signatures.
Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
change is mechanically adding that.
Suggested by / ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
(most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
strictness helps us in the future.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
random data (currently 16KB).
Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
when being saved/serialised.
Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
architecture has become less unsafe.
been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
ok dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
guenther@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
-C does not match, which allows it to work when sshd_config contains a Match
directive with or without -C. bz#2858, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a701f0a33e3bc96753cfda2fe0b0378520b82eb
1. Recently-forked child processes will briefly remain listening to
listen_socks. If the main server sshd process completes its restart
via execv() before these sockets are closed by the child processes
then it can fail to listen at the desired addresses/ports and/or
fail to restart.
2. When a SIGHUP is received, there may be forked child processes that
are awaiting their reexecution state. If the main server sshd
process restarts before passing this state, these child processes
will yield errors and use a fallback path of reading the current
sshd_config from the filesystem rather than use the one that sshd
was started with.
To fix both of these cases, we reuse the startup_pipes that are shared
between the main server sshd and forked children. Previously this was
used solely to implement tracking of pre-auth child processes for
MaxStartups, but this extends the messaging over these pipes to include
a child->parent message that the parent process is safe to restart. This
message is sent from the child after it has completed its preliminaries:
closing listen_socks and receiving its reexec state.
bz#2953, reported by Michal Koutný; ok markus@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7df09eacfa3ce13e9a7b1e9f17276ecc924d65ab
sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
enabled by default.
introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
API, started almost exactly six years ago.
This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
steps.
with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code
from the client and server.
Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only
be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn).
Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt.
(lots of) feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
supports it.
Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
loading the default hostkeys. Hostkeys explicitly specified in the
configuration or on the command-line are still reported as errors, and
failure to load at least one host key remains a fatal error.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Based on patch from Dag-Erling Smørgrav via
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/103
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffc2e35a75d1008effaf05a5e27425041c27b684
OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether
GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config.
This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI
auth later, e.g.
Match user djm
GSSAPIAuthentication yes
bz#2107; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d
causes double-free under some circumstances.
--
date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh;
fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366
feedback and ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137
In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
establishes a minimum time for each failed authentication attempt (5ms) and
adds a per-user constant derived from a host secret (0-4ms). Based on work
by joona.kannisto at tut.fi, ok markus@ djm@.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b7845b355bb7381703339c8fb0e57e81a20ae5ca
remove the legacy one.
Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
djm@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
naddy@openbsd.org
deraadt@openbsd.org
otto@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org