Allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an explicit
ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system default; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 77906ff8c7b660b02ba7cb1e47b17d66f54f1f7e
don't pass pointer to struct sshcipher between privsep
processes, just redo the lookup in each using the already-passed cipher name.
bz#2704 based on patch from Brooks Davis; ok markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: 2eab434c09bdf549dafd7da3e32a0d2d540adbe0
Fix compression output stats broken in rev 1.201. Patch
originally by Russell Coker via Debian bug #797964 and Christoph Biedl. ok
djm@
Upstream-ID: 83a1903b95ec2e4ed100703debb4b4a313b01016
I was too aggressive with the scalpel in the last commit;
unbreak sshd, spotted quickly by naddy@
Upstream-ID: fb7e75d2b2c7e6ca57dee00ca645e322dd49adbf
As promised in last release announcement: remove
support for Blowfish, RC4 and CAST ciphers. ok markus@ deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 21f8facdba3fd8da248df6417000867cec6ba222
remove the (in)famous SSHv1 CRC compensation attack
detector.
Despite your cameo in The Matrix movies, you will not be missed.
ok markus
Upstream-ID: 44261fce51a56d93cdb2af7b6e184be629f667e0
Don't count the initial block twice when computing how
many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode.
ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL
Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2
small memleak: free fd_set on connection timeout (though
we are heading to exit anyway). From Tom Rix in bz#2683
Upstream-ID: 10e3dadbb8199845b66581473711642d9e6741c4
add ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to allow inclusion of a
preamble string in disconnect messages; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 34cb41182cd76d414c214ccb01c01707849afead
Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of
seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time).
This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison
warning.
rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op
on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on
anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually
wraps, anyway).
some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c
Add a per-packet input hook that is called with the
decrypted packet contents. This will be used for fuzzing; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: a3221cee6b1725dd4ae1dd2c13841b4784cb75dc
ssh proxy mux mode (-O proxy; idea from Simon Tatham): - mux
client speaks the ssh-packet protocol directly over unix-domain socket. - mux
server acts as a proxy, translates channel IDs and relays to the server. - no
filedescriptor passing necessary. - combined with unix-domain forwarding it's
even possible to run mux client and server on different machines. feedback
& ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 666a2fb79f58e5c50e246265fb2b9251e505c25b
put back some pre-auth zlib bits that I shouldn't have
removed - they are still used by the client. Spotted by naddy@
Upstream-ID: 80919468056031037d56a1f5b261c164a6f90dc2
restore pre-auth compression support in the client -- the
previous commit was intended to remove it from the server only.
remove a few server-side pre-auth compression bits that escaped
adjust wording of Compression directive in sshd_config(5)
pointed out by naddy@ ok markus@
Upstream-ID: d23696ed72a228dacd4839dd9f2dec424ba2016b
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing
compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s,
but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple
compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
move inbound NEWKEYS handling to kex layer; otherwise
early NEWKEYS causes NULL deref; found by Robert Swiecki/honggfuzz; fixed
with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 9a68b882892e9f51dc7bfa9f5a423858af358b2f
Add MAXIMUM(), MINIMUM(), and ROUNDUP() to misc.h, then
use those definitions rather than pulling <sys/param.h> and unknown namespace
pollution. ok djm markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: 712cafa816c9f012a61628b66b9fbd5687223fb8
Reduce timing attack against obsolete CBC modes by always
computing the MAC over a fixed size of data. Reported by Jean Paul
Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. ok djm@
Upstream-ID: f20a13279b00ba0afbacbcc1f04e62e9d41c2912
Add some unsigned overflow checks for extra_pad. None of
these are reachable with the amount of padding that we use internally.
bz#2566, pointed out by Torben Hansen. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 4d4be8450ab2fc1b852d5884339f8e8c31c3fd76
Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common protocol
events from LOG_CRIT by replacing fatal() calls with logdie(). Part of
bz#2585, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 9005805227c94edf6ac02a160f0e199638d288e5
Improve crypto ordering for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode
MAC algorithms.
Previously we were computing the MAC, decrypting the packet and then
checking the MAC. This gave rise to the possibility of creating a
side-channel oracle in the decryption step, though no such oracle has
been identified.
This adds a mac_check() function that computes and checks the MAC in
one pass, and uses it to advance MAC checking for EtM algorithms to
before payload decryption.
Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and
Martin Albrecht. feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 1999bb67cab47dda5b10b80d8155fe83d4a1867b
refactor canohost.c: move functions that cache results closer
to the places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is
cached in canohost.c
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 5f2e4df88d4803fc8ec59ec53629105e23ce625e
refactor activation of rekeying
This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously
the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes
application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets
about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events
themselves.
Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch
Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8
Revert "account for packets buffered but not yet
processed" change as it breaks for very small RekeyLimit values due to
continuous rekeying. ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 7e03f636cb45ab60db18850236ccf19079182a19
Allow RekeyLimits in excess of 4G up to 2**63 bits
(limited by the return type of scan_scaled). Part of bz#2521, ok djm.
Upstream-ID: 13bea82be566b9704821b1ea05bf7804335c7979
Account for packets buffered but not yet processed when
computing whether or not it is time to perform rekeying. bz#2521, based
loosely on a patch from olo at fb.com, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 67e268b547f990ed220f3cb70a5624d9bda12b8c
include remote port number in a few more messages; makes
tying log messages together into a session a bit easier; bz#2503 ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 9300dc354015f7a7368d94a8ff4a4266a69d237e
implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return
statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@
Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62
djm@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
deraadt@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
naddy@openbsd.org
mmcc@openbsd.org
gsoares@openbsd.org