Commit Graph

98 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Darren Tucker 8ccb7392e7 - (dtucker) [kex.h key.c packet.h ssh-agent.c ssh.c] A few more ECC ifdefs
for missing headers and compiler warnings.
2010-09-10 12:28:24 +10:00
Damien Miller 6af914a15c - (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c]
[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c]
   [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on
   platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 11:39:26 +10:00
Damien Miller 041ab7c1e7 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
     ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
     (SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
     code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.

     This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
     keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
     keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
     when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
     client.

     ok naddy@
2010-09-10 11:23:34 +10:00
Damien Miller eb8b60e320 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
     [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
     [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
     [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
     [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
     [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
     [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
     Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
     host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
     better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
     key length, as well as much shorter keys.

     Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
     three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
     ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).

     Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.

     Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
     subject to change.

     feedback and ok markus@
2010-08-31 22:41:14 +10:00
Damien Miller da108ece68 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 09:58:37
[auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c]
     [packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
     Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the
     string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
     This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
     strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
     a string(3) function.

     Use the new API in a few sensitive places.

     * actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
     we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
     count on this to remain indefinitely.
2010-08-31 22:36:39 +10:00
Damien Miller ea1651c98e - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c]
     [ssh-rsa.c]
     s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
2010-07-16 13:58:37 +10:00
Damien Miller 8a0268f1b3 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
     [packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
     implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
     timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
     some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
     readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
2010-07-16 13:57:51 +10:00
Damien Miller 30da3447d2 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/07 11:30:30
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c]
     [key.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
     add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listed
     in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name
     to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to
     specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable.

     When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
     this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option.

     For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config
     option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing
     the list of acceptable names.

     If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the
     username to appear in principals continues to apply.

     These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces
     and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates.

     feedback and ok markus@
2010-05-10 11:58:03 +10:00
Damien Miller 4e270b05dd - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
     [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
     [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
     [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
     revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
     following changes:

     move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
     better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash

     Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"

     Add a new non-critical "extensions" field

     Add a serial number

     The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
     (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)

     ok markus@
2010-04-16 15:56:21 +10:00
Damien Miller 1cfbfaf4a0 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/15 19:40:02
[key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
     also print certificate type (user or host) for ssh-keygen -L
     ok djm kettenis
2010-03-22 05:58:24 +11:00
Damien Miller 2befbad9b3 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 01:44:57
[key.c]
     use buffer_get_string_ptr_ret() where we are checking the return
     value explicitly instead of the fatal()-causing buffer_get_string_ptr()
2010-03-04 21:52:18 +11:00
Damien Miller 41396573af - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/03 01:44:36
     [auth-options.c key.c]
     reject strings with embedded ASCII nul chars in certificate key IDs,
     principal names and constraints
2010-03-04 21:51:11 +11:00
Damien Miller 0a80ca190a - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
     [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
     [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
     [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
     [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
     [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
     [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
     Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.

     OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
     simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
     some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
     regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
     of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.

     Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
     when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
     see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.

     Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
     CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
     FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.

     Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
     the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.

     Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
     PROTOCOL.certkeys

     feedback and ok markus@
2010-02-27 07:55:05 +11:00
Darren Tucker 561724f38d - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/13 01:10:56
[key.c]
     Ignore and log any Protocol 1 keys where the claimed size is not equal to
     the actual size.  Noted by Derek Martin, ok djm@
2010-01-13 22:43:05 +11:00
Darren Tucker 57e0d01260 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/12/11 18:16:33
[key.c]
     switch from 35 to the more common value of RSA_F4 == (2**16)+1 == 65537
     for the RSA public exponent; discussed with provos; ok djm@
2010-01-08 18:52:27 +11:00
Damien Miller 2f54adabbb - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/10 05:00:12
[key.c]
     typo in error message; ok djm@
2008-11-03 19:24:16 +11:00
Damien Miller c6aadd994d - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/25 07:05:16
[key.c]
     In random art visualization, make sure to use the end marker only at the
     end.  Initial diff by Dirk Loss, tweaks and ok djm@
2008-11-03 19:16:20 +11:00
Damien Miller 87dd5f2804 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/07 23:32:51
[key.c]
     /*NOTREACHED*/ for lint warning:
       warning: function key_equal falls off bottom without returning value
     ok djm@
2008-07-11 17:35:09 +10:00
Damien Miller 007132a7c9 - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/25 11:13:43
[key.c]
     add key length to visual fingerprint; zap magical constants;
     ok grunk@ djm@
2008-06-29 22:45:37 +10:00
Darren Tucker 0f0ef0ab1f - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 22:03:36
[key.c]
     add my copyright, ok djm@
2008-06-13 08:58:05 +10:00
Darren Tucker 4b3b9773ec - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 06:32:59
[key.c]
     We already mark the start of the worm, now also mark the end of the worm
     in our random art drawings.
     ok djm@
2008-06-13 04:55:10 +10:00
Darren Tucker 987ac84a17 - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 05:42:46
[key.c]
     supply the key type (rsa1, rsa, dsa) as a caption in the frame of the
     random art.  while there, stress the fact that the field base should at
     least be 8 characters for the pictures to make sense.
     comment and ok djm@
2008-06-13 04:54:40 +10:00
Darren Tucker 267e28bb75 - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 00:13:13
[key.c]
     use an odd number of rows and columns and a separate start marker, looks
     better; ok grunk@
2008-06-13 04:48:11 +10:00
Darren Tucker d32b28a307 - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:51:57
[key.c]
     #define statements that are not atoms need braces around them, else they
     will cause trouble in some cases.
     Also do a computation of -1 once, and not in a loop several times.
     spotted by otto@
2008-06-13 04:45:50 +10:00
Darren Tucker 014d76fa72 - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:02:22
[key.c]
     simpler way of computing the augmentations; ok grunk@
2008-06-13 04:43:51 +10:00
Darren Tucker 9c16ac9263 - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 21:01:35
[ssh_config.5 key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c key.c
      sshconnect.c]
     Introduce SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualization, a technique inspired by the
     graphical hash visualization schemes known as "random art", and by
     Dan Kaminsky's musings on the subject during a BlackOp talk at the
     23C3 in Berlin.
     Scientific publication (original paper):
     "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
     Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
     Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
     http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
     The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
     leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
     Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise.  Bumping into walls
     makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn,
     thus switching to the other color of the chessboard.
     Graphs are not unambiguous for now, because circles in graphs can be
     walked in either direction.
     discussions with several people,
     help, corrections and ok markus@ djm@
2008-06-13 04:40:35 +10:00
Darren Tucker 3d295a6cf0 - (dtucker) [key.c defines.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Move old OpenSSL
compat glue into openssl-compat.h.
2008-02-28 19:22:04 +11:00
Damien Miller 932040285f - ray@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/07/12 05:48:05
[key.c]
     Delint: remove some unreachable statements, from Bret Lambert.
     OK markus@ and dtucker@.
2007-08-08 14:28:26 +10:00
Darren Tucker 0bc85579a9 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/11/06 21:25:28
[auth-rsa.c kexgexc.c kexdhs.c key.c ssh-dss.c sshd.c kexgexs.c
     ssh-keygen.c bufbn.c moduli.c scard.c kexdhc.c sshconnect1.c dh.c rsa.c]
     add missing checks for openssl return codes; with & ok djm@
2006-11-07 23:14:41 +11:00
Damien Miller ded319cca2 - (djm) [audit-bsm.c audit.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-pam.c]
[auth-rsa.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c]
   [auth2-gss.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c]
   [cipher-3des1.c cipher-aes.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c clientloop.c]
   [dh.c dns.c entropy.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c]
   [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c loginrec.c mac.c]
   [md5crypt.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c readconf.c rsa.c]
   [scard-opensc.c scard.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
   [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
   [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c rc4.diff]
   [openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c]
   [openbsd-compat/port-linux.c openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c]
   [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c]
   Lots of headers for SCO OSR6, mainly adding stdarg.h for log.h;
   compile problems reported by rac AT tenzing.org
2006-09-01 15:38:36 +10:00
Damien Miller d783435315 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42
[OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c]
     [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
     [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c]
     [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ]
     [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
     [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c]
     [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c]
     [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c]
     [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c]
     [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c]
     [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c]
     [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c]
     [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c]
     [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h]
     [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c]
     [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
     [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c]
     [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
     [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
     [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
     [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h]
     almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files"
     ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
     makes the pain stop in one easy step
     NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as
     that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required
     for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 12:39:39 +10:00
Damien Miller a7a73ee35d - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/01 23:22:48
[auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c]
     [auth2-chall.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c buffer.c canohost.c]
     [channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c kex.c kexdhc.c]
     [kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h log.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c]
     [monitor_wrap.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c]
     [servconf.c session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
     [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshtty.c uuencode.c]
     [uuencode.h xmalloc.c]
     move #include <stdio.h> out of includes.h
2006-08-05 11:37:59 +10:00
Damien Miller e3476ed03b - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/22 20:48:23
[atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c]
     [auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-passwd.c auth2.c]
     [authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c canohost.c channels.c]
     [cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c clientloop.c]
     [compat.c deattack.c dh.c dns.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c]
     [includes.h kex.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c]
     [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c]
     [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c rsa.c]
     [progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c]
     [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
     [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
     [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c]
     move #include <string.h> out of includes.h
2006-07-24 14:13:33 +10:00
Damien Miller 57c30117c1 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 13:17:03
[atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c]
     [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c]
     [auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
     [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c]
     [buffer.c canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c]
     [cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c compress.c]
     [deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c fatal.c groupaccess.c hostfile.c kex.c]
     [kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c]
     [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c]
     [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c]
     [readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c]
     [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c]
     [sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
     [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
     [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c]
     Put $OpenBSD$ tags back (as comments) to replace the RCSID()s that
     Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
2006-03-26 14:24:48 +11:00
Damien Miller 07d86bec5e - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 00:05:41
[auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth2-chall.c channels.c]
     [clientloop.c deattack.c gss-genr.c kex.c key.c misc.c moduli.c]
     [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c scard.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
     [ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uuencode.c]
     [xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
     introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations
     functions and use them throughout openssh

     xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
     dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it
     to die

     feedback and ok deraadt@
2006-03-26 14:19:21 +11:00
Damien Miller bbaad7772a - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:13:16
[key.c]
     djm did a typo
2006-03-26 14:03:03 +11:00
Damien Miller 69b7203e6f - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:10:19
[auth.c key.c misc.c packet.c ssh-add.c]
     in a switch (), break after return or goto is stupid
2006-03-26 14:02:35 +11:00
Damien Miller 429fcc23db - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 11:38:46
[key.c]
     (really) last of the Coverity diffs: avoid possible NULL deref in
     key_free. via elad AT netbsd.org; markus@ ok
2006-03-26 14:02:16 +11:00
Damien Miller b0fb6872ed - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:51:18
[atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-options.c]
     [auth-pam.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c]
     [auth-shadow.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c]
     [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c]
     [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.c]
     [canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-acss.c cipher-aes.c]
     [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c]
     [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c entropy.c fatal.c]
     [groupaccess.c hostfile.c includes.h kex.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c]
     [kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c loginrec.c]
     [loginrec.h logintest.c mac.c match.c md-sha256.c md5crypt.c misc.c]
     [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c]
     [nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c]
     [scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c]
     [sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c]
     [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
     [ssh-rand-helper.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
     [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c]
     RCSID() can die
2006-03-26 00:03:21 +11:00
Damien Miller eccb9de72a - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/06/17 02:44:33
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c authfd.c authfile.c]
     [bufaux.c canohost.c channels.c cipher.c clientloop.c dns.c gss-serv.c]
     [kex.c kex.h key.c mac.c match.c misc.c packet.c packet.h scp.c]
     [servconf.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
     [ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
     make this -Wsign-compare clean; ok avsm@ markus@
     NB. auth1.c changes not committed yet (conflicts with uncommitted sync)
     NB2. more work may be needed to make portable Wsign-compare clean
2005-06-17 12:59:34 +10:00
Darren Tucker 08d04faf24 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/10/29 23:57:05
[key.c]
     use new buffer API to avoid fatal errors on corrupt keys in authorized_keys
     files; ok markus@
2004-11-05 20:42:28 +11:00
Darren Tucker 5cb30ad2ec - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/07/28 09:40:29
[auth.c auth1.c auth2.c cipher.c cipher.h key.c session.c ssh.c
     sshconnect1.c]
     more s/illegal/invalid/
2004-08-12 22:40:24 +10:00
Damien Miller f58b58ced1 - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/10 16:23:41
[bufaux.c bufaux.h cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c]
     [key.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-server.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
     [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c uuencode.c uuencode.h]
     constify. ok markus@ & djm@
2003-11-17 21:18:23 +11:00
Darren Tucker 29588616c2 - avsm@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/07/09 13:58:19
[key.c]
     minor tweak: when generating the hex fingerprint, give strlcat the full
     bound to the buffer, and add a comment below explaining why the
     zero-termination is one less than the bound.  markus@ ok
2003-07-14 17:28:34 +10:00
Darren Tucker 502d384b74 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/06/24 08:23:46
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c channels.c key.c key.h
      monitor.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
     int -> u_int; ok djm@, deraadt@, mouring@
2003-06-28 12:38:01 +10:00
Damien Miller 37876e913a - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/05/14 18:16:20
[key.c key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
     [dns.c dns.h README.dns ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
     add experimental support for verifying hos keys using DNS as described
     in draft-ietf-secsh-dns-xx.txt. more information in README.dns.
     ok markus@ and henning@
2003-05-15 10:19:46 +10:00
Damien Miller e8a240f966 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/02/12 09:33:04
[key.c key.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
     merge ssh-dss.h ssh-rsa.h into key.h; ok deraadt@
2003-02-24 12:01:40 +11:00
Damien Miller 386f1f3e6c - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/02/04 09:32:08
[key.c]
     better debug3 message
2003-02-24 11:54:57 +11:00
Damien Miller a10f56151b - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/09 14:54:15
[channels.c kex.h key.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c radix.c uuencode.c]
     signed vs unsigned from -pedantic; ok henning@
2002-09-12 09:49:15 +10:00
Ben Lindstrom 2bf759cba5 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 10:41:47
[key.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
     don't allocate, copy, and discard if there is not interested in the data;
     ok deraadt@
2002-07-07 22:13:31 +00:00