2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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/** @file
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Agent Module to load other modules to deploy SMM Entry Vector for X86 CPU.
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UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
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Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
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2017-02-26 18:43:07 +01:00
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Copyright (c) 2017, AMD Incorporated. All rights reserved.<BR>
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2019-04-04 01:07:22 +02:00
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SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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**/
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#include "PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.h"
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//
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// SMM CPU Private Data structure that contains SMM Configuration Protocol
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// along its supporting fields.
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//
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SMM_CPU_PRIVATE_DATA mSmmCpuPrivateData = {
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SMM_CPU_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE, // Signature
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NULL, // SmmCpuHandle
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NULL, // Pointer to ProcessorInfo array
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NULL, // Pointer to Operation array
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NULL, // Pointer to CpuSaveStateSize array
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NULL, // Pointer to CpuSaveState array
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{ {0} }, // SmmReservedSmramRegion
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{
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SmmStartupThisAp, // SmmCoreEntryContext.SmmStartupThisAp
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0, // SmmCoreEntryContext.CurrentlyExecutingCpu
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0, // SmmCoreEntryContext.NumberOfCpus
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NULL, // SmmCoreEntryContext.CpuSaveStateSize
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NULL // SmmCoreEntryContext.CpuSaveState
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},
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NULL, // SmmCoreEntry
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{
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mSmmCpuPrivateData.SmmReservedSmramRegion, // SmmConfiguration.SmramReservedRegions
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RegisterSmmEntry // SmmConfiguration.RegisterSmmEntry
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},
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2019-07-10 09:49:11 +02:00
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NULL, // pointer to Ap Wrapper Func array
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{NULL, NULL}, // List_Entry for Tokens.
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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};
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CPU_HOT_PLUG_DATA mCpuHotPlugData = {
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CPU_HOT_PLUG_DATA_REVISION_1, // Revision
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0, // Array Length of SmBase and APIC ID
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NULL, // Pointer to APIC ID array
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NULL, // Pointer to SMBASE array
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0, // Reserved
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0, // SmrrBase
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0 // SmrrSize
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};
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//
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// Global pointer used to access mSmmCpuPrivateData from outside and inside SMM
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//
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SMM_CPU_PRIVATE_DATA *gSmmCpuPrivate = &mSmmCpuPrivateData;
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//
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// SMM Relocation variables
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//
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volatile BOOLEAN *mRebased;
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volatile BOOLEAN mIsBsp;
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///
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/// Handle for the SMM CPU Protocol
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///
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EFI_HANDLE mSmmCpuHandle = NULL;
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///
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/// SMM CPU Protocol instance
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///
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EFI_SMM_CPU_PROTOCOL mSmmCpu = {
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SmmReadSaveState,
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SmmWriteSaveState
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};
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2017-11-20 09:14:10 +01:00
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///
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/// SMM Memory Attribute Protocol instance
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///
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EDKII_SMM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL mSmmMemoryAttribute = {
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EdkiiSmmGetMemoryAttributes,
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EdkiiSmmSetMemoryAttributes,
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EdkiiSmmClearMemoryAttributes
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};
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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EFI_CPU_INTERRUPT_HANDLER mExternalVectorTable[EXCEPTION_VECTOR_NUMBER];
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//
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// SMM stack information
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//
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UINTN mSmmStackArrayBase;
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UINTN mSmmStackArrayEnd;
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UINTN mSmmStackSize;
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UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
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UINTN mSmmShadowStackSize;
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BOOLEAN mCetSupported = TRUE;
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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UINTN mMaxNumberOfCpus = 1;
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UINTN mNumberOfCpus = 1;
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//
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// SMM ready to lock flag
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//
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BOOLEAN mSmmReadyToLock = FALSE;
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//
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// Global used to cache PCD for SMM Code Access Check enable
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//
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BOOLEAN mSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable = FALSE;
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2017-02-26 18:43:07 +01:00
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//
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// Global copy of the PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask
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//
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UINT64 mAddressEncMask = 0;
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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//
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// Spin lock used to serialize setting of SMM Code Access Check feature
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//
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2016-03-22 03:15:53 +01:00
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SPIN_LOCK *mConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckLock = NULL;
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
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//
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// Saved SMM ranges information
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//
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EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR *mSmmCpuSmramRanges;
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UINTN mSmmCpuSmramRangeCount;
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2017-08-28 03:45:39 +02:00
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UINT8 mPhysicalAddressBits;
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UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "gSmmCr4" with PatchInstructionX86()
Unlike "gSmmCr3" in the previous patch, "gSmmCr4" is not only used for
machine code patching, but also as a means to communicate the initial CR4
value from SmmRelocateBases() to InitSmmS3ResumeState(). In other words,
the last four bytes of the "mov eax, Cr4Value" instruction's binary
representation are utilized as normal data too.
In order to get rid of the DB for "mov eax, Cr4Value", we have to split
both roles, patching and data flow. Introduce the "mSmmCr4" global (SMRAM)
variable for the data flow purpose. Rename the "gSmmCr4" variable to
"gPatchSmmCr4" so that its association with PatchInstructionX86() is clear
from the declaration, change its type to X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL, and
patch it with PatchInstructionX86(), to the value now contained in
"mSmmCr4".
This lets us remove the binary (DB) encoding of "mov eax, Cr4Value" in
"SmmInit.nasm".
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 02:10:05 +01:00
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//
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// Control register contents saved for SMM S3 resume state initialization.
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//
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UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "gSmmCr0" with PatchInstructionX86()
Like "gSmmCr4" in the previous patch, "gSmmCr0" is not only used for
machine code patching, but also as a means to communicate the initial CR0
value from SmmRelocateBases() to InitSmmS3ResumeState(). In other words,
the last four bytes of the "mov eax, Cr0Value" instruction's binary
representation are utilized as normal data too.
In order to get rid of the DB for "mov eax, Cr0Value", we have to split
both roles, patching and data flow. Introduce the "mSmmCr0" global (SMRAM)
variable for the data flow purpose. Rename the "gSmmCr0" variable to
"gPatchSmmCr0" so that its association with PatchInstructionX86() is clear
from the declaration, change its type to X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL, and
patch it with PatchInstructionX86(), to the value now contained in
"mSmmCr0".
This lets us remove the binary (DB) encoding of "mov eax, Cr0Value" in
"SmmInit.nasm".
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 02:10:05 +01:00
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UINT32 mSmmCr0;
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UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "gSmmCr4" with PatchInstructionX86()
Unlike "gSmmCr3" in the previous patch, "gSmmCr4" is not only used for
machine code patching, but also as a means to communicate the initial CR4
value from SmmRelocateBases() to InitSmmS3ResumeState(). In other words,
the last four bytes of the "mov eax, Cr4Value" instruction's binary
representation are utilized as normal data too.
In order to get rid of the DB for "mov eax, Cr4Value", we have to split
both roles, patching and data flow. Introduce the "mSmmCr4" global (SMRAM)
variable for the data flow purpose. Rename the "gSmmCr4" variable to
"gPatchSmmCr4" so that its association with PatchInstructionX86() is clear
from the declaration, change its type to X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL, and
patch it with PatchInstructionX86(), to the value now contained in
"mSmmCr4".
This lets us remove the binary (DB) encoding of "mov eax, Cr4Value" in
"SmmInit.nasm".
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 02:10:05 +01:00
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UINT32 mSmmCr4;
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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/**
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Initialize IDT to setup exception handlers for SMM.
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**/
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VOID
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InitializeSmmIdt (
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VOID
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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BOOLEAN InterruptState;
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IA32_DESCRIPTOR DxeIdtr;
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2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
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//
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// There are 32 (not 255) entries in it since only processor
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// generated exceptions will be handled.
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//
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gcSmiIdtr.Limit = (sizeof(IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR) * 32) - 1;
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//
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// Allocate page aligned IDT, because it might be set as read only.
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//
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gcSmiIdtr.Base = (UINTN)AllocateCodePages (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES(gcSmiIdtr.Limit + 1));
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ASSERT (gcSmiIdtr.Base != 0);
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ZeroMem ((VOID *)gcSmiIdtr.Base, gcSmiIdtr.Limit + 1);
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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//
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// Disable Interrupt and save DXE IDT table
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//
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InterruptState = SaveAndDisableInterrupts ();
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AsmReadIdtr (&DxeIdtr);
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//
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// Load SMM temporary IDT table
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//
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AsmWriteIdtr (&gcSmiIdtr);
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//
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// Setup SMM default exception handlers, SMM IDT table
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// will be updated and saved in gcSmiIdtr
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//
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Status = InitializeCpuExceptionHandlers (NULL);
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ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
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//
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// Restore DXE IDT table and CPU interrupt
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//
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AsmWriteIdtr ((IA32_DESCRIPTOR *) &DxeIdtr);
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SetInterruptState (InterruptState);
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}
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/**
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Search module name by input IP address and output it.
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@param CallerIpAddress Caller instruction pointer.
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**/
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VOID
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DumpModuleInfoByIp (
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IN UINTN CallerIpAddress
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)
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{
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UINTN Pe32Data;
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VOID *PdbPointer;
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//
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// Find Image Base
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//
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2017-04-24 04:06:31 +02:00
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Pe32Data = PeCoffSearchImageBase (CallerIpAddress);
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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if (Pe32Data != 0) {
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2017-04-01 13:39:22 +02:00
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DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "It is invoked from the instruction before IP(0x%p)", (VOID *) CallerIpAddress));
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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PdbPointer = PeCoffLoaderGetPdbPointer ((VOID *) Pe32Data);
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if (PdbPointer != NULL) {
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2017-04-01 13:39:22 +02:00
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DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " in module (%a)\n", PdbPointer));
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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}
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}
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}
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/**
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Read information from the CPU save state.
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@param This EFI_SMM_CPU_PROTOCOL instance
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@param Width The number of bytes to read from the CPU save state.
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@param Register Specifies the CPU register to read form the save state.
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@param CpuIndex Specifies the zero-based index of the CPU save state.
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@param Buffer Upon return, this holds the CPU register value read from the save state.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS The register was read from Save State
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@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The register is not defined for the Save State of Processor
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2020-02-07 02:08:30 +01:00
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@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER This or Buffer is NULL.
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2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
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**/
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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SmmReadSaveState (
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IN CONST EFI_SMM_CPU_PROTOCOL *This,
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IN UINTN Width,
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IN EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER Register,
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IN UINTN CpuIndex,
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OUT VOID *Buffer
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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//
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// Retrieve pointer to the specified CPU's SMM Save State buffer
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//
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if ((CpuIndex >= gSmst->NumberOfCpus) || (Buffer == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-09-13 09:53:31 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
2018-12-21 03:34:20 +01:00
|
|
|
// The SpeculationBarrier() call here is to ensure the above check for the
|
|
|
|
// CpuIndex has been completed before the execution of subsequent codes.
|
2018-09-13 09:53:31 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
2018-12-21 03:34:20 +01:00
|
|
|
SpeculationBarrier ();
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Check for special EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_PROCESSOR_ID
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if (Register == EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_PROCESSOR_ID) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// The pseudo-register only supports the 64-bit size specified by Width.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if (Width != sizeof (UINT64)) {
|
|
|
|
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// If the processor is in SMM at the time the SMI occurred,
|
|
|
|
// the pseudo register value for EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_PROCESSOR_ID is returned in Buffer.
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, EFI_NOT_FOUND is returned.
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-03-22 03:21:27 +01:00
|
|
|
if (*(mSmmMpSyncData->CpuData[CpuIndex].Present)) {
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
*(UINT64 *)Buffer = gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[CpuIndex].ProcessorId;
|
|
|
|
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 03:21:27 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!(*(mSmmMpSyncData->CpuData[CpuIndex].Present))) {
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Status = SmmCpuFeaturesReadSaveStateRegister (CpuIndex, Register, Width, Buffer);
|
|
|
|
if (Status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED) {
|
|
|
|
Status = ReadSaveStateRegister (CpuIndex, Register, Width, Buffer);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Write data to the CPU save state.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param This EFI_SMM_CPU_PROTOCOL instance
|
|
|
|
@param Width The number of bytes to read from the CPU save state.
|
|
|
|
@param Register Specifies the CPU register to write to the save state.
|
|
|
|
@param CpuIndex Specifies the zero-based index of the CPU save state
|
|
|
|
@param Buffer Upon entry, this holds the new CPU register value.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The register was written from Save State
|
|
|
|
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The register is not defined for the Save State of Processor
|
2020-02-07 02:08:30 +01:00
|
|
|
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ProcessorIndex or Width is not correct
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmWriteSaveState (
|
|
|
|
IN CONST EFI_SMM_CPU_PROTOCOL *This,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN Width,
|
|
|
|
IN EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER Register,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN CpuIndex,
|
|
|
|
IN CONST VOID *Buffer
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve pointer to the specified CPU's SMM Save State buffer
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if ((CpuIndex >= gSmst->NumberOfCpus) || (Buffer == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Writes to EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_PROCESSOR_ID are ignored
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if (Register == EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_PROCESSOR_ID) {
|
|
|
|
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mSmmMpSyncData->CpuData[CpuIndex].Present) {
|
|
|
|
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Status = SmmCpuFeaturesWriteSaveStateRegister (CpuIndex, Register, Width, Buffer);
|
|
|
|
if (Status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED) {
|
|
|
|
Status = WriteSaveStateRegister (CpuIndex, Register, Width, Buffer);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
C function for SMI handler. To change all processor's SMMBase Register.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmInitHandler (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
UINT32 ApicId;
|
|
|
|
UINTN Index;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Update SMM IDT entries' code segment and load IDT
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
AsmWriteIdtr (&gcSmiIdtr);
|
|
|
|
ApicId = GetApicId ();
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: handle dynamic PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber
"UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec" already allows platforms to make
PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber dynamic, however PiSmmCpuDxeSmm does not
take this into account everywhere. As soon as a platform turns the PCD
into a dynamic one, at least S3 fails. When the PCD is dynamic, all
PcdGet() calls translate into PCD DXE protocol calls, which are only
permitted at boot time, not at runtime or during S3 resume.
We already have a variable called mMaxNumberOfCpus; it is initialized in
the entry point function like this:
> //
> // If support CPU hot plug, we need to allocate resources for possibly
> // hot-added processors
> //
> if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuHotPlugSupport)) {
> mMaxNumberOfCpus = PcdGet32 (PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber);
> } else {
> mMaxNumberOfCpus = mNumberOfCpus;
> }
There's another use of the PCD a bit higher up, also in the entry point
function:
> //
> // Use MP Services Protocol to retrieve the number of processors and
> // number of enabled processors
> //
> Status = MpServices->GetNumberOfProcessors (MpServices, &mNumberOfCpus,
> &NumberOfEnabledProcessors);
> ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
> ASSERT (mNumberOfCpus <= PcdGet32 (PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber));
Preserve these calls in the entry point function, and replace all other
uses of PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber -- there are only reads -- with
mMaxNumberOfCpus.
For PcdCpuHotPlugSupport==TRUE, this is an unobservable change.
For PcdCpuHotPlugSupport==FALSE, we even save SMRAM, because we no longer
allocate resources needlessly for CPUs that can never appear in the
system.
PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber is also retrieved in
"UefiCpuPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib/SmmCpuFeaturesLib.c", but only in
the library instance constructor, which runs even before the entry point
function is called.
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
2016-11-24 20:49:43 +01:00
|
|
|
ASSERT (mNumberOfCpus <= mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (Index = 0; Index < mNumberOfCpus; Index++) {
|
|
|
|
if (ApicId == (UINT32)gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index].ProcessorId) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize SMM specific features on the currently executing CPU
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesInitializeProcessor (
|
|
|
|
Index,
|
|
|
|
mIsBsp,
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo,
|
|
|
|
&mCpuHotPlugData
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-02 05:55:58 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!mSmmS3Flag) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Check XD and BTS features on each processor on normal boot
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-07-02 06:01:02 +02:00
|
|
|
CheckFeatureSupported ();
|
2016-07-02 05:55:58 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
if (mIsBsp) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// BSP rebase is already done above.
|
|
|
|
// Initialize private data during S3 resume
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
InitializeMpSyncData ();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Hook return after RSM to set SMM re-based flag
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
SemaphoreHook (Index, &mRebased[Index]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (FALSE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Relocate SmmBases for each processor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Execute on first boot and all S3 resumes
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmRelocateBases (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
UINT8 BakBuf[BACK_BUF_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP BakBuf2;
|
|
|
|
SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP *CpuStatePtr;
|
|
|
|
UINT8 *U8Ptr;
|
|
|
|
UINT32 ApicId;
|
|
|
|
UINTN Index;
|
|
|
|
UINTN BspIndex;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Make sure the reserved size is large enough for procedure SmmInitTemplate.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (sizeof (BakBuf) >= gcSmmInitSize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Patch ASM code template with current CR0, CR3, and CR4 values
|
|
|
|
//
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "gSmmCr0" with PatchInstructionX86()
Like "gSmmCr4" in the previous patch, "gSmmCr0" is not only used for
machine code patching, but also as a means to communicate the initial CR0
value from SmmRelocateBases() to InitSmmS3ResumeState(). In other words,
the last four bytes of the "mov eax, Cr0Value" instruction's binary
representation are utilized as normal data too.
In order to get rid of the DB for "mov eax, Cr0Value", we have to split
both roles, patching and data flow. Introduce the "mSmmCr0" global (SMRAM)
variable for the data flow purpose. Rename the "gSmmCr0" variable to
"gPatchSmmCr0" so that its association with PatchInstructionX86() is clear
from the declaration, change its type to X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL, and
patch it with PatchInstructionX86(), to the value now contained in
"mSmmCr0".
This lets us remove the binary (DB) encoding of "mov eax, Cr0Value" in
"SmmInit.nasm".
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 02:10:05 +01:00
|
|
|
mSmmCr0 = (UINT32)AsmReadCr0 ();
|
|
|
|
PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchSmmCr0, mSmmCr0, 4);
|
2018-02-02 01:48:56 +01:00
|
|
|
PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchSmmCr3, AsmReadCr3 (), 4);
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "gSmmCr4" with PatchInstructionX86()
Unlike "gSmmCr3" in the previous patch, "gSmmCr4" is not only used for
machine code patching, but also as a means to communicate the initial CR4
value from SmmRelocateBases() to InitSmmS3ResumeState(). In other words,
the last four bytes of the "mov eax, Cr4Value" instruction's binary
representation are utilized as normal data too.
In order to get rid of the DB for "mov eax, Cr4Value", we have to split
both roles, patching and data flow. Introduce the "mSmmCr4" global (SMRAM)
variable for the data flow purpose. Rename the "gSmmCr4" variable to
"gPatchSmmCr4" so that its association with PatchInstructionX86() is clear
from the declaration, change its type to X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL, and
patch it with PatchInstructionX86(), to the value now contained in
"mSmmCr4".
This lets us remove the binary (DB) encoding of "mov eax, Cr4Value" in
"SmmInit.nasm".
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 02:10:05 +01:00
|
|
|
mSmmCr4 = (UINT32)AsmReadCr4 ();
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchSmmCr4, mSmmCr4 & (~CR4_CET_ENABLE), 4);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Patch GDTR for SMM base relocation
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
gcSmiInitGdtr.Base = gcSmiGdtr.Base;
|
|
|
|
gcSmiInitGdtr.Limit = gcSmiGdtr.Limit;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
U8Ptr = (UINT8*)(UINTN)(SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + SMM_HANDLER_OFFSET);
|
|
|
|
CpuStatePtr = (SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP *)(UINTN)(SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Backup original contents at address 0x38000
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
CopyMem (BakBuf, U8Ptr, sizeof (BakBuf));
|
|
|
|
CopyMem (&BakBuf2, CpuStatePtr, sizeof (BakBuf2));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Load image for relocation
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
CopyMem (U8Ptr, gcSmmInitTemplate, gcSmmInitSize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve the local APIC ID of current processor
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ApicId = GetApicId ();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Relocate SM bases for all APs
|
|
|
|
// This is APs' 1st SMI - rebase will be done here, and APs' default SMI handler will be overridden by gcSmmInitTemplate
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mIsBsp = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
BspIndex = (UINTN)-1;
|
|
|
|
for (Index = 0; Index < mNumberOfCpus; Index++) {
|
|
|
|
mRebased[Index] = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (ApicId != (UINT32)gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index].ProcessorId) {
|
|
|
|
SendSmiIpi ((UINT32)gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index].ProcessorId);
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Wait for this AP to finish its 1st SMI
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
while (!mRebased[Index]);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// BSP will be Relocated later
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
BspIndex = Index;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Relocate BSP's SMM base
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (BspIndex != (UINTN)-1);
|
|
|
|
mIsBsp = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
SendSmiIpi (ApicId);
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Wait for the BSP to finish its 1st SMI
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
while (!mRebased[BspIndex]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Restore contents at address 0x38000
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
CopyMem (CpuStatePtr, &BakBuf2, sizeof (BakBuf2));
|
|
|
|
CopyMem (U8Ptr, BakBuf, sizeof (BakBuf));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
SMM Ready To Lock event notification handler.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The CPU S3 data is copied to SMRAM for security and mSmmReadyToLock is set to
|
|
|
|
perform additional lock actions that must be performed from SMM on the next SMI.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Protocol Points to the protocol's unique identifier.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Interface Points to the interface instance.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Handle The handle on which the interface was installed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Notification handler runs successfully.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
SmmReadyToLockEventNotify (
|
|
|
|
IN CONST EFI_GUID *Protocol,
|
|
|
|
IN VOID *Interface,
|
|
|
|
IN EFI_HANDLE Handle
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-07-19 10:44:16 +02:00
|
|
|
GetAcpiCpuData ();
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-24 06:36:56 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Cache a copy of UEFI memory map before we start profiling feature.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
GetUefiMemoryMap ();
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Set SMM ready to lock flag and return
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mSmmReadyToLock = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
The module Entry Point of the CPU SMM driver.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param ImageHandle The firmware allocated handle for the EFI image.
|
|
|
|
@param SystemTable A pointer to the EFI System Table.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The entry point is executed successfully.
|
|
|
|
@retval Other Some error occurs when executing this entry point.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
PiCpuSmmEntry (
|
|
|
|
IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
|
|
|
|
IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
EFI_MP_SERVICES_PROTOCOL *MpServices;
|
|
|
|
UINTN NumberOfEnabledProcessors;
|
|
|
|
UINTN Index;
|
|
|
|
VOID *Buffer;
|
2015-11-26 04:56:33 +01:00
|
|
|
UINTN BufferPages;
|
|
|
|
UINTN TileCodeSize;
|
|
|
|
UINTN TileDataSize;
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
UINTN TileSize;
|
|
|
|
UINT8 *Stacks;
|
|
|
|
VOID *Registration;
|
|
|
|
UINT32 RegEax;
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
UINT32 RegEbx;
|
|
|
|
UINT32 RegEcx;
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
UINT32 RegEdx;
|
|
|
|
UINTN FamilyId;
|
|
|
|
UINTN ModelId;
|
|
|
|
UINT32 Cr3;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-11 10:05:15 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize address fixup
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
PiSmmCpuSmmInitFixupAddress ();
|
|
|
|
PiSmmCpuSmiEntryFixupAddress ();
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize Debug Agent to support source level debug in SMM code
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
InitializeDebugAgent (DEBUG_AGENT_INIT_SMM, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Report the start of CPU SMM initialization.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
REPORT_STATUS_CODE (
|
|
|
|
EFI_PROGRESS_CODE,
|
|
|
|
EFI_COMPUTING_UNIT_HOST_PROCESSOR | EFI_CU_HP_PC_SMM_INIT
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Find out SMRR Base and SMRR Size
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
FindSmramInfo (&mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrBase, &mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrSize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Get MP Services Protocol
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = SystemTable->BootServices->LocateProtocol (&gEfiMpServiceProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&MpServices);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Use MP Services Protocol to retrieve the number of processors and number of enabled processors
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = MpServices->GetNumberOfProcessors (MpServices, &mNumberOfCpus, &NumberOfEnabledProcessors);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (mNumberOfCpus <= PcdGet32 (PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// If support CPU hot plug, PcdCpuSmmEnableBspElection should be set to TRUE.
|
|
|
|
// A constant BSP index makes no sense because it may be hot removed.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
DEBUG_CODE (
|
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuHotPlugSupport)) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmEnableBspElection));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Save the PcdCpuSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable value into a global variable.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable = PcdGetBool (PcdCpuSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "PcdCpuSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable = %d\n", mSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable));
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-26 18:43:07 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Save the PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask value into a global variable.
|
|
|
|
// Make sure AddressEncMask is contained to smallest supported address field.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mAddressEncMask = PcdGet64 (PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask) & PAGING_1G_ADDRESS_MASK_64;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "mAddressEncMask = 0x%lx\n", mAddressEncMask));
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// If support CPU hot plug, we need to allocate resources for possibly hot-added processors
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuHotPlugSupport)) {
|
|
|
|
mMaxNumberOfCpus = PcdGet32 (PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
mMaxNumberOfCpus = mNumberOfCpus;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmCoreEntryContext.NumberOfCpus = mMaxNumberOfCpus;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// The CPU save state and code for the SMI entry point are tiled within an SMRAM
|
|
|
|
// allocated buffer. The minimum size of this buffer for a uniprocessor system
|
|
|
|
// is 32 KB, because the entry point is SMBASE + 32KB, and CPU save state area
|
|
|
|
// just below SMBASE + 64KB. If more than one CPU is present in the platform,
|
|
|
|
// then the SMI entry point and the CPU save state areas can be tiles to minimize
|
|
|
|
// the total amount SMRAM required for all the CPUs. The tile size can be computed
|
|
|
|
// by adding the // CPU save state size, any extra CPU specific context, and
|
|
|
|
// the size of code that must be placed at the SMI entry point to transfer
|
|
|
|
// control to a C function in the native SMM execution mode. This size is
|
|
|
|
// rounded up to the nearest power of 2 to give the tile size for a each CPU.
|
|
|
|
// The total amount of memory required is the maximum number of CPUs that
|
|
|
|
// platform supports times the tile size. The picture below shows the tiling,
|
|
|
|
// where m is the number of tiles that fit in 32KB.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+ <-- 2^n offset from Base of allocated buffer
|
|
|
|
// | CPU m+1 Save State |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU m+1 Extra Data |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | Padding |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 2m SMI Entry |
|
|
|
|
// +#############################+ <-- Base of allocated buffer + 64 KB
|
|
|
|
// | CPU m-1 Save State |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU m-1 Extra Data |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | Padding |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 2m-1 SMI Entry |
|
|
|
|
// +=============================+ <-- 2^n offset from Base of allocated buffer
|
|
|
|
// | . . . . . . . . . . . . |
|
|
|
|
// +=============================+ <-- 2^n offset from Base of allocated buffer
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 2 Save State |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 2 Extra Data |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | Padding |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU m+1 SMI Entry |
|
|
|
|
// +=============================+ <-- Base of allocated buffer + 32 KB
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 1 Save State |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 1 Extra Data |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | Padding |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU m SMI Entry |
|
|
|
|
// +#############################+ <-- Base of allocated buffer + 32 KB == CPU 0 SMBASE + 64 KB
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 0 Save State |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 0 Extra Data |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | Padding |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU m-1 SMI Entry |
|
|
|
|
// +=============================+ <-- 2^n offset from Base of allocated buffer
|
|
|
|
// | . . . . . . . . . . . . |
|
|
|
|
// +=============================+ <-- 2^n offset from Base of allocated buffer
|
|
|
|
// | Padding |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 1 SMI Entry |
|
|
|
|
// +=============================+ <-- 2^n offset from Base of allocated buffer
|
|
|
|
// | Padding |
|
|
|
|
// +-----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | CPU 0 SMI Entry |
|
|
|
|
// +#############################+ <-- Base of allocated buffer == CPU 0 SMBASE + 32 KB
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve CPU Family
|
|
|
|
//
|
2015-12-24 01:13:54 +01:00
|
|
|
AsmCpuid (CPUID_VERSION_INFO, &RegEax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
FamilyId = (RegEax >> 8) & 0xf;
|
|
|
|
ModelId = (RegEax >> 4) & 0xf;
|
|
|
|
if (FamilyId == 0x06 || FamilyId == 0x0f) {
|
|
|
|
ModelId = ModelId | ((RegEax >> 12) & 0xf0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-24 01:13:54 +01:00
|
|
|
RegEdx = 0;
|
|
|
|
AsmCpuid (CPUID_EXTENDED_FUNCTION, &RegEax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (RegEax >= CPUID_EXTENDED_CPU_SIG) {
|
|
|
|
AsmCpuid (CPUID_EXTENDED_CPU_SIG, NULL, NULL, NULL, &RegEdx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Determine the mode of the CPU at the time an SMI occurs
|
|
|
|
// Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual
|
|
|
|
// Volume 3C, Section 34.4.1.1
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mSmmSaveStateRegisterLma = EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_LMA_32BIT;
|
|
|
|
if ((RegEdx & BIT29) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mSmmSaveStateRegisterLma = EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_LMA_64BIT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (FamilyId == 0x06) {
|
|
|
|
if (ModelId == 0x17 || ModelId == 0x0f || ModelId == 0x1c) {
|
|
|
|
mSmmSaveStateRegisterLma = EFI_SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_LMA_64BIT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "PcdControlFlowEnforcementPropertyMask = %d\n", PcdGet32 (PcdControlFlowEnforcementPropertyMask)));
|
|
|
|
if (PcdGet32 (PcdControlFlowEnforcementPropertyMask) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
AsmCpuid (CPUID_EXTENDED_FUNCTION, &RegEax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (RegEax > CPUID_EXTENDED_FUNCTION) {
|
|
|
|
AsmCpuidEx (CPUID_STRUCTURED_EXTENDED_FEATURE_FLAGS, CPUID_STRUCTURED_EXTENDED_FEATURE_FLAGS_SUB_LEAF_INFO, NULL, NULL, &RegEcx, &RegEdx);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "CPUID[7/0] ECX - 0x%08x\n", RegEcx));
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CET_SS - 0x%08x\n", RegEcx & CPUID_CET_SS));
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CET_IBT - 0x%08x\n", RegEdx & CPUID_CET_IBT));
|
|
|
|
if ((RegEcx & CPUID_CET_SS) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
mCetSupported = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
PatchInstructionX86 (mPatchCetSupported, mCetSupported, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mCetSupported) {
|
|
|
|
AsmCpuidEx (CPUID_EXTENDED_STATE, CPUID_EXTENDED_STATE_SUB_LEAF, NULL, &RegEbx, &RegEcx, NULL);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "CPUID[D/1] EBX - 0x%08x, ECX - 0x%08x\n", RegEbx, RegEcx));
|
|
|
|
AsmCpuidEx (CPUID_EXTENDED_STATE, 11, &RegEax, NULL, &RegEcx, NULL);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "CPUID[D/11] EAX - 0x%08x, ECX - 0x%08x\n", RegEax, RegEcx));
|
|
|
|
AsmCpuidEx(CPUID_EXTENDED_STATE, 12, &RegEax, NULL, &RegEcx, NULL);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "CPUID[D/12] EAX - 0x%08x, ECX - 0x%08x\n", RegEax, RegEcx));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
mCetSupported = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
PatchInstructionX86 (mPatchCetSupported, mCetSupported, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Compute tile size of buffer required to hold the CPU SMRAM Save State Map, extra CPU
|
2016-11-28 23:13:24 +01:00
|
|
|
// specific context start starts at SMBASE + SMM_PSD_OFFSET, and the SMI entry point.
|
|
|
|
// This size is rounded up to nearest power of 2.
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
2015-11-26 04:56:33 +01:00
|
|
|
TileCodeSize = GetSmiHandlerSize ();
|
|
|
|
TileCodeSize = ALIGN_VALUE(TileCodeSize, SIZE_4KB);
|
2016-11-28 23:13:24 +01:00
|
|
|
TileDataSize = (SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET - SMM_PSD_OFFSET) + sizeof (SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP);
|
2015-11-26 04:56:33 +01:00
|
|
|
TileDataSize = ALIGN_VALUE(TileDataSize, SIZE_4KB);
|
|
|
|
TileSize = TileDataSize + TileCodeSize - 1;
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
TileSize = 2 * GetPowerOfTwo32 ((UINT32)TileSize);
|
2015-11-26 04:56:33 +01:00
|
|
|
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SMRAM TileSize = 0x%08x (0x%08x, 0x%08x)\n", TileSize, TileCodeSize, TileDataSize));
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-11-28 23:13:24 +01:00
|
|
|
// If the TileSize is larger than space available for the SMI Handler of
|
|
|
|
// CPU[i], the extra CPU specific context of CPU[i+1], and the SMRAM Save
|
|
|
|
// State Map of CPU[i+1], then ASSERT(). If this ASSERT() is triggered, then
|
|
|
|
// the SMI Handler size must be reduced or the size of the extra CPU specific
|
|
|
|
// context must be reduced.
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (TileSize <= (SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET + sizeof (SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP) - SMM_HANDLER_OFFSET));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Allocate buffer for all of the tiles.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual
|
|
|
|
// Volume 3C, Section 34.11 SMBASE Relocation
|
|
|
|
// For Pentium and Intel486 processors, the SMBASE values must be
|
|
|
|
// aligned on a 32-KByte boundary or the processor will enter shutdown
|
|
|
|
// state during the execution of a RSM instruction.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Intel486 processors: FamilyId is 4
|
|
|
|
// Pentium processors : FamilyId is 5
|
|
|
|
//
|
2015-11-26 04:56:33 +01:00
|
|
|
BufferPages = EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (SIZE_32KB + TileSize * (mMaxNumberOfCpus - 1));
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((FamilyId == 4) || (FamilyId == 5)) {
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
Buffer = AllocateAlignedCodePages (BufferPages, SIZE_32KB);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
Buffer = AllocateAlignedCodePages (BufferPages, SIZE_4KB);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (Buffer != NULL);
|
2015-11-26 04:56:33 +01:00
|
|
|
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SMRAM SaveState Buffer (0x%08x, 0x%08x)\n", Buffer, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE(BufferPages)));
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Allocate buffer for pointers to array in SMM_CPU_PRIVATE_DATA.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo = (EFI_PROCESSOR_INFORMATION *)AllocatePool (sizeof (EFI_PROCESSOR_INFORMATION) * mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->Operation = (SMM_CPU_OPERATION *)AllocatePool (sizeof (SMM_CPU_OPERATION) * mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (gSmmCpuPrivate->Operation != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveStateSize = (UINTN *)AllocatePool (sizeof (UINTN) * mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveStateSize != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveState = (VOID **)AllocatePool (sizeof (VOID *) * mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveState != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mSmmCpuPrivateData.SmmCoreEntryContext.CpuSaveStateSize = gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveStateSize;
|
|
|
|
mSmmCpuPrivateData.SmmCoreEntryContext.CpuSaveState = gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveState;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Allocate buffer for pointers to array in CPU_HOT_PLUG_DATA.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotPlugData.ApicId = (UINT64 *)AllocatePool (sizeof (UINT64) * mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (mCpuHotPlugData.ApicId != NULL);
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotPlugData.SmBase = (UINTN *)AllocatePool (sizeof (UINTN) * mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (mCpuHotPlugData.SmBase != NULL);
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotPlugData.ArrayLength = (UINT32)mMaxNumberOfCpus;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve APIC ID of each enabled processor from the MP Services protocol.
|
|
|
|
// Also compute the SMBASE address, CPU Save State address, and CPU Save state
|
|
|
|
// size for each CPU in the platform
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
for (Index = 0; Index < mMaxNumberOfCpus; Index++) {
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotPlugData.SmBase[Index] = (UINTN)Buffer + Index * TileSize - SMM_HANDLER_OFFSET;
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveStateSize[Index] = sizeof(SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP);
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveState[Index] = (VOID *)(mCpuHotPlugData.SmBase[Index] + SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET);
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->Operation[Index] = SmmCpuNone;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (Index < mNumberOfCpus) {
|
|
|
|
Status = MpServices->GetProcessorInfo (MpServices, Index, &gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index]);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotPlugData.ApicId[Index] = gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index].ProcessorId;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "CPU[%03x] APIC ID=%04x SMBASE=%08x SaveState=%08x Size=%08x\n",
|
|
|
|
Index,
|
|
|
|
(UINT32)gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index].ProcessorId,
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotPlugData.SmBase[Index],
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveState[Index],
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->CpuSaveStateSize[Index]
|
|
|
|
));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index].ProcessorId = INVALID_APIC_ID;
|
|
|
|
mCpuHotPlugData.ApicId[Index] = INVALID_APIC_ID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Allocate SMI stacks for all processors.
|
|
|
|
//
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
mSmmStackSize = EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (PcdGet32 (PcdCpuSmmStackSize)));
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmStackGuard)) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// 2 more pages is allocated for each processor.
|
|
|
|
// one is guard page and the other is known good stack.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// +-------------------------------------------+-----+-------------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | Known Good Stack | Guard Page | SMM Stack | ... | Known Good Stack | Guard Page | SMM Stack |
|
|
|
|
// +-------------------------------------------+-----+-------------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | | | |
|
|
|
|
// |<-------------- Processor 0 -------------->| |<-------------- Processor n -------------->|
|
|
|
|
//
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
mSmmStackSize += EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mSmmShadowStackSize = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((PcdGet32 (PcdControlFlowEnforcementPropertyMask) != 0) && mCetSupported) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Append Shadow Stack after normal stack
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// |= Stacks
|
|
|
|
// +--------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | Known Good Stack | Guard Page | SMM Stack | Known Good Shadow Stack | Guard Page | SMM Shadow Stack |
|
|
|
|
// +--------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
// | |PcdCpuSmmStackSize| |PcdCpuSmmShadowStackSize|
|
|
|
|
// |<---------------- mSmmStackSize ----------------->|<--------------------- mSmmShadowStackSize ------------------->|
|
|
|
|
// | |
|
|
|
|
// |<-------------------------------------------- Processor N ------------------------------------------------------->|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mSmmShadowStackSize = EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (PcdGet32 (PcdCpuSmmShadowStackSize)));
|
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmStackGuard)) {
|
|
|
|
mSmmShadowStackSize += EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Stacks = (UINT8 *) AllocatePages (gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmCoreEntryContext.NumberOfCpus * (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (mSmmStackSize + mSmmShadowStackSize)));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (Stacks != NULL);
|
|
|
|
mSmmStackArrayBase = (UINTN)Stacks;
|
|
|
|
mSmmStackArrayEnd = mSmmStackArrayBase + gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmCoreEntryContext.NumberOfCpus * (mSmmStackSize + mSmmShadowStackSize) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Stacks - 0x%x\n", Stacks));
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "mSmmStackSize - 0x%x\n", mSmmStackSize));
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "PcdCpuSmmStackGuard - 0x%x\n", FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmStackGuard)));
|
|
|
|
if ((PcdGet32 (PcdControlFlowEnforcementPropertyMask) != 0) && mCetSupported) {
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "mSmmShadowStackSize - 0x%x\n", mSmmShadowStackSize));
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Set SMI stack for SMM base relocation
|
|
|
|
//
|
2018-02-02 04:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
PatchInstructionX86 (
|
|
|
|
gPatchSmmInitStack,
|
|
|
|
(UINTN) (Stacks + mSmmStackSize - sizeof (UINTN)),
|
|
|
|
sizeof (UINTN)
|
|
|
|
);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize IDT
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
InitializeSmmIdt ();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Relocate SMM Base addresses to the ones allocated from SMRAM
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mRebased = (BOOLEAN *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (BOOLEAN) * mMaxNumberOfCpus);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (mRebased != NULL);
|
|
|
|
SmmRelocateBases ();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Call hook for BSP to perform extra actions in normal mode after all
|
|
|
|
// SMM base addresses have been relocated on all CPUs
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete ();
|
|
|
|
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "mXdSupported - 0x%x\n", mXdSupported));
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// SMM Time initialization
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
InitializeSmmTimer ();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize MP globals
|
|
|
|
//
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
Cr3 = InitializeMpServiceData (Stacks, mSmmStackSize, mSmmShadowStackSize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((PcdGet32 (PcdControlFlowEnforcementPropertyMask) != 0) && mCetSupported) {
|
|
|
|
for (Index = 0; Index < gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmCoreEntryContext.NumberOfCpus; Index++) {
|
|
|
|
SetShadowStack (
|
|
|
|
Cr3,
|
|
|
|
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)Stacks + mSmmStackSize + (mSmmStackSize + mSmmShadowStackSize) * Index,
|
|
|
|
mSmmShadowStackSize
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmStackGuard)) {
|
|
|
|
SetNotPresentPage (
|
|
|
|
Cr3,
|
|
|
|
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)Stacks + mSmmStackSize + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE(1) + (mSmmStackSize + mSmmShadowStackSize) * Index,
|
|
|
|
EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE(1)
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Fill in SMM Reserved Regions
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmReservedSmramRegion[0].SmramReservedStart = 0;
|
|
|
|
gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmReservedSmramRegion[0].SmramReservedSize = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Install the SMM Configuration Protocol onto a new handle on the handle database.
|
|
|
|
// The entire SMM Configuration Protocol is allocated from SMRAM, so only a pointer
|
|
|
|
// to an SMRAM address will be present in the handle database
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = SystemTable->BootServices->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
|
|
|
|
&gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmCpuHandle,
|
|
|
|
&gEfiSmmConfigurationProtocolGuid, &gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmConfiguration,
|
|
|
|
NULL
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Install the SMM CPU Protocol into SMM protocol database
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmInstallProtocolInterface (
|
|
|
|
&mSmmCpuHandle,
|
|
|
|
&gEfiSmmCpuProtocolGuid,
|
|
|
|
EFI_NATIVE_INTERFACE,
|
|
|
|
&mSmmCpu
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-20 09:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Install the SMM Memory Attribute Protocol into SMM protocol database
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmInstallProtocolInterface (
|
|
|
|
&mSmmCpuHandle,
|
|
|
|
&gEdkiiSmmMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid,
|
|
|
|
EFI_NATIVE_INTERFACE,
|
|
|
|
&mSmmMemoryAttribute
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-10 09:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize global buffer for MM MP.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
InitializeDataForMmMp ();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Install the SMM Mp Protocol into SMM protocol database
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmInstallProtocolInterface (
|
|
|
|
&mSmmCpuHandle,
|
|
|
|
&gEfiMmMpProtocolGuid,
|
|
|
|
EFI_NATIVE_INTERFACE,
|
|
|
|
&mSmmMp
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Expose address of CPU Hot Plug Data structure if CPU hot plug is supported.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuHotPlugSupport)) {
|
2015-10-27 17:15:03 +01:00
|
|
|
Status = PcdSet64S (PcdCpuHotPlugDataAddress, (UINT64)(UINTN)&mCpuHotPlugData);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize SMM CPU Services Support
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = InitializeSmmCpuServices (mSmmCpuHandle);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// register SMM Ready To Lock Protocol notification
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmRegisterProtocolNotify (
|
|
|
|
&gEfiSmmReadyToLockProtocolGuid,
|
|
|
|
SmmReadyToLockEventNotify,
|
|
|
|
&Registration
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize SMM Profile feature
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
InitSmmProfile (Cr3);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-20 04:24:58 +02:00
|
|
|
GetAcpiS3EnableFlag ();
|
2016-07-19 10:44:16 +02:00
|
|
|
InitSmmS3ResumeState (Cr3);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SMM CPU Module exit from SMRAM with EFI_SUCCESS\n"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Find out SMRAM information including SMRR base and SMRR size.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param SmrrBase SMRR base
|
|
|
|
@param SmrrSize SMRR size
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
FindSmramInfo (
|
|
|
|
OUT UINT32 *SmrrBase,
|
|
|
|
OUT UINT32 *SmrrSize
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
UINTN Size;
|
|
|
|
EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL *SmmAccess;
|
|
|
|
EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR *CurrentSmramRange;
|
|
|
|
UINTN Index;
|
|
|
|
UINT64 MaxSize;
|
|
|
|
BOOLEAN Found;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Get SMM Access Protocol
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiSmmAccess2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&SmmAccess);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Get SMRAM information
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Size = 0;
|
|
|
|
Status = SmmAccess->GetCapabilities (SmmAccess, &Size, NULL);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
mSmmCpuSmramRanges = (EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR *)AllocatePool (Size);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (mSmmCpuSmramRanges != NULL);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
Status = SmmAccess->GetCapabilities (SmmAccess, &Size, mSmmCpuSmramRanges);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
mSmmCpuSmramRangeCount = Size / sizeof (EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Find the largest SMRAM range between 1MB and 4GB that is at least 256K - 4K in size
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
CurrentSmramRange = NULL;
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
for (Index = 0, MaxSize = SIZE_256KB - EFI_PAGE_SIZE; Index < mSmmCpuSmramRangeCount; Index++) {
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Skip any SMRAM region that is already allocated, needs testing, or needs ECC initialization
|
|
|
|
//
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].RegionState & (EFI_ALLOCATED | EFI_NEEDS_TESTING | EFI_NEEDS_ECC_INITIALIZATION)) != 0) {
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
if (mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart >= BASE_1MB) {
|
|
|
|
if ((mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart + mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize) <= SMRR_MAX_ADDRESS) {
|
|
|
|
if (mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize >= MaxSize) {
|
|
|
|
MaxSize = mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize;
|
|
|
|
CurrentSmramRange = &mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index];
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (CurrentSmramRange != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*SmrrBase = (UINT32)CurrentSmramRange->CpuStart;
|
|
|
|
*SmrrSize = (UINT32)CurrentSmramRange->PhysicalSize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
Found = FALSE;
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
for (Index = 0; Index < mSmmCpuSmramRangeCount; Index++) {
|
|
|
|
if (mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart < *SmrrBase &&
|
|
|
|
*SmrrBase == (mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart + mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize)) {
|
|
|
|
*SmrrBase = (UINT32)mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart;
|
|
|
|
*SmrrSize = (UINT32)(*SmrrSize + mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
Found = TRUE;
|
2017-03-28 02:48:17 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if ((*SmrrBase + *SmrrSize) == mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart && mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize > 0) {
|
|
|
|
*SmrrSize = (UINT32)(*SmrrSize + mSmmCpuSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
Found = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} while (Found);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SMRR Base: 0x%x, SMRR Size: 0x%x\n", *SmrrBase, *SmrrSize));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Configure SMM Code Access Check feature on an AP.
|
|
|
|
SMM Feature Control MSR will be locked after configuration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in,out] Buffer Pointer to private data buffer.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
EFIAPI
|
|
|
|
ConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckOnCurrentProcessor (
|
|
|
|
IN OUT VOID *Buffer
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
UINTN CpuIndex;
|
|
|
|
UINT64 SmmFeatureControlMsr;
|
|
|
|
UINT64 NewSmmFeatureControlMsr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve the CPU Index from the context passed in
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
CpuIndex = *(UINTN *)Buffer;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Get the current SMM Feature Control MSR value
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
SmmFeatureControlMsr = SmmCpuFeaturesGetSmmRegister (CpuIndex, SmmRegFeatureControl);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Compute the new SMM Feature Control MSR value
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
NewSmmFeatureControlMsr = SmmFeatureControlMsr;
|
|
|
|
if (mSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable) {
|
|
|
|
NewSmmFeatureControlMsr |= SMM_CODE_CHK_EN_BIT;
|
2015-11-20 02:22:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmFeatureControlMsrLock)) {
|
|
|
|
NewSmmFeatureControlMsr |= SMM_FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCK_BIT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Only set the SMM Feature Control MSR value if the new value is different than the current value
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if (NewSmmFeatureControlMsr != SmmFeatureControlMsr) {
|
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesSetSmmRegister (CpuIndex, SmmRegFeatureControl, NewSmmFeatureControlMsr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Release the spin lock user to serialize the updates to the SMM Feature Control MSR
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-03-22 03:15:53 +01:00
|
|
|
ReleaseSpinLock (mConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckLock);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Configure SMM Code Access Check feature for all processors.
|
|
|
|
SMM Feature Control MSR will be locked after configuration.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
ConfigSmmCodeAccessCheck (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
UINTN Index;
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Check to see if the Feature Control MSR is supported on this CPU
|
|
|
|
//
|
2015-11-02 04:04:19 +01:00
|
|
|
Index = gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmCoreEntryContext.CurrentlyExecutingCpu;
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!SmmCpuFeaturesIsSmmRegisterSupported (Index, SmmRegFeatureControl)) {
|
|
|
|
mSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Check to see if the CPU supports the SMM Code Access Check feature
|
|
|
|
// Do not access this MSR unless the CPU supports the SmmRegFeatureControl
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if ((AsmReadMsr64 (EFI_MSR_SMM_MCA_CAP) & SMM_CODE_ACCESS_CHK_BIT) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
mSmmCodeAccessCheckEnable = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Initialize the lock used to serialize the MSR programming in BSP and all APs
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-03-22 03:15:53 +01:00
|
|
|
InitializeSpinLock (mConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckLock);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Acquire Config SMM Code Access Check spin lock. The BSP will release the
|
|
|
|
// spin lock when it is done executing ConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckOnCurrentProcessor().
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-03-22 03:15:53 +01:00
|
|
|
AcquireSpinLock (mConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckLock);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Enable SMM Code Access Check feature on the BSP.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckOnCurrentProcessor (&Index);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Enable SMM Code Access Check feature for the APs.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
for (Index = 0; Index < gSmst->NumberOfCpus; Index++) {
|
2015-11-02 04:04:19 +01:00
|
|
|
if (Index != gSmmCpuPrivate->SmmCoreEntryContext.CurrentlyExecutingCpu) {
|
2017-05-10 10:32:25 +02:00
|
|
|
if (gSmmCpuPrivate->ProcessorInfo[Index].ProcessorId == INVALID_APIC_ID) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// If this processor does not exist
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Acquire Config SMM Code Access Check spin lock. The AP will release the
|
|
|
|
// spin lock when it is done executing ConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckOnCurrentProcessor().
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-03-22 03:15:53 +01:00
|
|
|
AcquireSpinLock (mConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckLock);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Call SmmStartupThisAp() to enable SMM Code Access Check on an AP.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmStartupThisAp (ConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckOnCurrentProcessor, Index, &Index);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Wait for the AP to release the Config SMM Code Access Check spin lock.
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-03-22 03:15:53 +01:00
|
|
|
while (!AcquireSpinLockOrFail (mConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckLock)) {
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
CpuPause ();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Release the Config SMM Code Access Check spin lock.
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-03-22 03:15:53 +01:00
|
|
|
ReleaseSpinLock (mConfigSmmCodeAccessCheckLock);
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-27 14:48:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
This API provides a way to allocate memory for page table.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This API can be called more once to allocate memory for page tables.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Allocates the number of 4KB pages of type EfiRuntimeServicesData and returns a pointer to the
|
|
|
|
allocated buffer. The buffer returned is aligned on a 4KB boundary. If Pages is 0, then NULL
|
|
|
|
is returned. If there is not enough memory remaining to satisfy the request, then NULL is
|
|
|
|
returned.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param Pages The number of 4 KB pages to allocate.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@return A pointer to the allocated buffer or NULL if allocation fails.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID *
|
|
|
|
AllocatePageTableMemory (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN Pages
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VOID *Buffer;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Buffer = SmmCpuFeaturesAllocatePageTableMemory (Pages);
|
|
|
|
if (Buffer != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return Buffer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return AllocatePages (Pages);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Allocate pages for code.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Pages Number of pages to be allocated.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@return Allocated memory.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID *
|
|
|
|
AllocateCodePages (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN Pages
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Memory;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (Pages == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmAllocatePages (AllocateAnyPages, EfiRuntimeServicesCode, Pages, &Memory);
|
|
|
|
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (VOID *) (UINTN) Memory;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Allocate aligned pages for code.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Pages Number of pages to be allocated.
|
|
|
|
@param[in] Alignment The requested alignment of the allocation.
|
|
|
|
Must be a power of two.
|
|
|
|
If Alignment is zero, then byte alignment is used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@return Allocated memory.
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID *
|
|
|
|
AllocateAlignedCodePages (
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN Pages,
|
|
|
|
IN UINTN Alignment
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Memory;
|
|
|
|
UINTN AlignedMemory;
|
|
|
|
UINTN AlignmentMask;
|
|
|
|
UINTN UnalignedPages;
|
|
|
|
UINTN RealPages;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Alignment must be a power of two or zero.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ASSERT ((Alignment & (Alignment - 1)) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (Pages == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (Alignment > EFI_PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Calculate the total number of pages since alignment is larger than page size.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
AlignmentMask = Alignment - 1;
|
|
|
|
RealPages = Pages + EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Alignment);
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Make sure that Pages plus EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Alignment) does not overflow.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ASSERT (RealPages > Pages);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmAllocatePages (AllocateAnyPages, EfiRuntimeServicesCode, RealPages, &Memory);
|
|
|
|
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AlignedMemory = ((UINTN) Memory + AlignmentMask) & ~AlignmentMask;
|
|
|
|
UnalignedPages = EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (AlignedMemory - (UINTN) Memory);
|
|
|
|
if (UnalignedPages > 0) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Free first unaligned page(s).
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmFreePages (Memory, UnalignedPages);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-17 04:54:10 +01:00
|
|
|
Memory = AlignedMemory + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (Pages);
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
UnalignedPages = RealPages - Pages - UnalignedPages;
|
|
|
|
if (UnalignedPages > 0) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Free last unaligned page(s).
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmFreePages (Memory, UnalignedPages);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Do not over-allocate pages in this case.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
Status = gSmst->SmmAllocatePages (AllocateAnyPages, EfiRuntimeServicesCode, Pages, &Memory);
|
|
|
|
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AlignedMemory = (UINTN) Memory;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (VOID *) AlignedMemory;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Perform the remaining tasks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
PerformRemainingTasks (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (mSmmReadyToLock) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Start SMM Profile feature
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable)) {
|
|
|
|
SmmProfileStart ();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Create a mix of 2MB and 4KB page table. Update some memory ranges absent and execute-disable.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
InitPaging ();
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Mark critical region to be read-only in page table
|
|
|
|
//
|
2016-11-24 06:36:56 +01:00
|
|
|
SetMemMapAttributes ();
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-26 00:13:17 +02:00
|
|
|
if (IsRestrictedMemoryAccess ()) {
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// For outside SMRAM, we only map SMM communication buffer or MMIO.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
SetUefiMemMapAttributes ();
|
2019-07-18 08:58:07 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-26 00:13:17 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Set page table itself to be read-only
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
SetPageTableAttributes ();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Configure SMM Code Access Check feature if available.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
ConfigSmmCodeAccessCheck ();
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-27 14:48:12 +01:00
|
|
|
SmmCpuFeaturesCompleteSmmReadyToLock ();
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 21:12:53 +02:00
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Clean SMM ready to lock flag
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mSmmReadyToLock = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-11-25 05:28:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
Perform the pre tasks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
PerformPreTasks (
|
|
|
|
VOID
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-07-19 10:44:16 +02:00
|
|
|
RestoreSmmConfigurationInS3 ();
|
2015-11-25 05:28:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|