Commit e59db6a732
* MdeModulePkg/UsbMass: Merge UsbBoot(Read|Write)Blocks(16)
introduces a bug that causes writing to USB key always fails.
When that patch is verified, only reading was verified.
The root cause is when the writing operation is performed,
the data direction EfiUsbDataIn is wrongly used. Instead, it
should be EfiUsbDataOut.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1255
For function ReadFile():
If the line
Status = GetAedAdsData (
...
);
is reached multiple times during the 'for' loop, freeing the data pointed
by variable 'Data' may potentially lead to variable 'Ad' referencing the
already-freed data.
After calling function GetAllocationDescriptor(), 'Data' and 'Ad' may
point to the same memory (with some possible offset). Hence, this commit
will move the FreePool() call backwards to ensure the data will no longer
be used.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1254
This commit will add an additional check within function GetPdFromLongAd()
when getting a Partition Descriptor from given a Long Allocation
Descriptor.
According to UDF 2.60 Spec, Section 2.2.13:
> The partition reference numbers used are determined by the order of the
> Partition Maps in the LVD.
(Also the picture comes before the above contents)
And a more detailed explanation of the partition reference numbers is at
https://sites.google.com/site/udfintro/ (seems not a formal documentation
though), Section 5.3.6.
Based on the above findings, the 'PartitionReferenceNumber' field in a
Long Allocation Descriptor is used as an index to access the Partition
Maps data within a Logical Volume Descriptor.
Hence, the new check focuses on the validity of this
'PartitionReferenceNumber' field in a Long Allocation Descriptor. Since
the current implementation of UdfDxe driver supports only one partition on
a Logical Volume, so the value of 'PartitionReferenceNumber' should be 0.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1175
This commit will update the UdfGetInfo() function with the support of
EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_VOLUME_LABEL data information request.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1253
Within function SetFileInfo():
This commit will fix a typo where 'Minute' should be used instead of
'Second'.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1252
Calling the 'SetPosition' service of the EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL with 'Position'
equals to 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF for a file is to set the current position to
the end of the file. But the current implementation of function
UdfSetPosition() is to set it to the last byte (not EOF).
This commit will resolve this issue.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=828
Within GetVolumeSize():
The boundary check will validate the 'NumberOfPartitions' field of a
Logical Volume Integrity Descriptor matches the data within the relating
Logical Volume Descriptor.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=828
Within ResolveSymlink():
The boundary check will validate the 'LengthofComponentIdentifier' field
of a Path Component matches the data within the relating (Extended) File
Entry.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=828
Within ReadFile():
Add checks to ensure that when getting the raw data or the Allocation
Descriptors' data from a FE/EFE, it will not consume data beyond the
size of a FE/EFE.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=828
The commit refines the boundary checks for file/path name string to
prevent possible buffer overrun.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=828
Within FindAnchorVolumeDescriptorPointer():
Add a check for the underlying device block size to ensure it is greater
than the size of an Anchor Volume Descriptor Pointer.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1267
The value 5 Port Speed field of PORTSC is new defined in
XHCI 1.1 spec November 2017.
This patch updates XhciDxe and XhciPei to handle it, otherwise
the USB 3.1 device may not be recognized with the XHCI controller
following XHCI 1.1 spec November 2017.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Current hard code Usb2Hc.XXXRevision may be not accurate.
This patch updates code to assign Usb2Hc.XXXRevision based on
SBRN (Serial Bus Release Number, PCI configuration space offset
0x60) although there is no code consuming them.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
This change is to pass static analysis.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1249
We found potential dead codes within File.c during the code coverage test.
After manual review, we think the below ones are positive reports:
A. For function GetAllocationDescriptor():
Due to the all the calling places for this function, the input parameter
'RecordingFlags' can only with value 'LongAdsSequence' or
'ShortAdsSequence'. Moreover, this is also mentioned in the function
description comments for GetAllocationDescriptor().
So the below code will never be reached:
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
This commit will add "ASSERT (FALSE);" before the above line to indicate
this and thus matching the function description comments.
B. For function GetAllocationDescriptorLsn():
Due to the all the calling places for this function, the input parameter
'RecordingFlags' can only with value 'LongAdsSequence' or
'ShortAdsSequence'. Moreover, this is also mentioned in the function
description comments for GetAllocationDescriptorLsn().
So the below code will never be reached:
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
This commit will add "ASSERT (FALSE);" before the above line to indicate
this and thus matching the function description comments.
Cc: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Cc: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1249
We found potential dead codes within File.c during the code coverage test.
After manual review, we think the below ones are positive reports:
A. In function UdfRead():
else if (IS_FID_DELETED_FILE (Parent->FileIdentifierDesc)) {
Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
A File Identifier Descriptor will be get from the UDF media only by
function ReadDirectoryEntry(). And within this function, all the File
Identifier Descriptor with 'DELETED_FILE' characteristics will be skipped
and will not be returned. Hence, the above codes in function UdfRead()
will never be hit.
This commit will add "ASSERT (FALSE);" before the above line to indicate
this.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1248
Within function UdfOpen():
This commit will use debug messages instead of using ASSERT when an error
occurs after calling GetFileSize().
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1248
This commit will refine the ASSERTs in function GetLongAdLsn() and
GetAllocationDescriptorLsn() when the logical sector number cannot be
returned due to unrecognized media format.
Error handling logic will be used for those ASSERTs.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
This commit adds ASSERTs to address false positive reports of NULL
pointer dereference issues raised from static analysis with regard to
function ReadDirectoryEntry().
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1247
For functions DuplicateFid() and DuplicateFe(), this commit will use error
handling logic instead of ASSERTs for memory allocation failure.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=415
When SetVariable() to a time based auth variable with APPEND_WRITE
attribute, and if the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2.TimeStamp in
the input Data is earlier than current value, it will cause timestamp
zeroing.
This issue may bring time based auth variable downgrade problem.
For example:
A vendor released three certs at 2014, 2015, and 2016, and system
integrated the 2016 cert. User can SetVariable() with 2015 cert and
APPEND_WRITE attribute to cause timestamp zeroing first, then
SetVariable() with 2014 cert to downgrade the cert.
This patch fixes this issue.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
This commit adds checks to make sure the UFS devices do not return more
data than the driver expected.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Per USB HID spec, the buffer holding key codes should at least 3-byte
long.
Today's code assumes that the key codes buffer length is longer than
3-byte and unconditionally accesses the key codes buffer.
It's incorrect.
The patch fixes the issue by returning Device Error when the
length is less than 3-byte.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Per USB HID spec, the buffer holding key codes should at least 3-byte
long.
Today's code assumes that the key codes buffer length is longer than
3-byte and unconditionally accesses the key codes buffer.
It's incorrect.
The patch fixes the issue by returning Device Error when the
length is less than 3-byte.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Per USB HID spec, the buffer holding key codes should be 8-byte
long.
Today's code assumes that the key codes buffer length is 8-byte
long and unconditionally accesses the key codes buffer.
It's incorrect.
The patch fixes the issue by returning Device Error when the
length is less than 8-byte.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Today's implementation doesn't check whether the length of
descriptor is valid before using it.
The patch fixes this issue.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Today's implementation reads the Type/Length field in the USB
descriptors data without checking whether the offset to read is
beyond the data boundary.
The patch fixes this issue.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
UsbBootReadWriteBlocks() and UsbBootReadWriteBlocks16() use a UINT16
local variable to hold the value of
USB_BOOT_MAX_CARRY_SIZE (=0x10000) / BlockSize.
When BlockSize is 1, the UINT16 local variable is set to 0x10000
but the high-16 bits are truncated resulting the final value be 0.
It causes the while-loop in the two functions accesses 0 block in
each loop, resulting the loop never ends.
The patch fixes the two functions to make sure no integer overflow
happens.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
The change doesn't have functionality impact.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
This is the part of commit 3948c510ed.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
BrotliCustomDecompressLib has the definition with float type. But,
Floating-point types are not supported by EBC compiler.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Bi Dandan <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Set macro for variable arguments, and remove the hard code definition
to avoid the potential duplicated definition.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
There are five check not necessary in logic ,just for pass static
analysis. More detail please refer to comment in code.
And the rest changes are all accepted by owner, they are reasonable.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1245
In current implementation and according to the description in
MdeModulePkg.dec, PcdSetNvStoreDefaultId should be set in PEI
phase to take effect.
This patch ASSERTs PcdSetNvStoreDefaultId set in PcdDxe to alert
the invalid operation.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Clock control is similar in SDHCI versions greater then version 2. Add
support for more recent versions of the controller specification.
SD card support for 1.8V is also present in controller versions 3 and
greater.
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1233
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jeff Brasen <jbrasen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Add SDHCI controller defines, this is useful as the version in the
register does not explictly map to a specification version. For example
vesion 4.10 of the specification is version 0x04.
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1233
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jeff Brasen <jbrasen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
There are three warnings reported by GCC 4.8 and the later GCC release
are workaround with them.
And all the three warnings are invalid,so I just disable warnings rather
than fix them at now.
Following is the analysis from Laszlo Ersek.
(1)
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regcomp.c: In
> function 'compile_length_tree':
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regcomp.c:1516:7:
> warning: 'len' may be used uninitialized in this function
> [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
> int len;
> ^
I think this is an invalid warning; the type of the controlling expression
(node->type) is enum GimmickType, and the case labels cover all values of
the enum. An assert(0) could be added, I guess, but again, upstream
Oniguruma would be justified to reject the idea.
(2)
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c: In
> function 'parse_callout_args.isra.10.constprop.30':
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c:6753:25:
> warning: 'rl' may be used uninitialized in this function
> [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
> vals[n].l = rl;
> ^
This warning is invalid, given:
6749 if (cn > 0) {
6750 long rl;
6751 r = parse_long(enc, buf, bufend, 1, LONG_MAX, &rl);
6752 if (r == ONIG_NORMAL) {
6753 vals[n].l = rl;
Because parse_long() only returns ONIG_NORMAL after it sets (*rl).
(3)
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c: In
> function 'parse_callout_of_name.constprop.29':
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c:6861:38:
> warning: 'tag_end' may be used uninitialized in this function
> [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
> if (! is_allowed_callout_tag_name(enc, tag_start, tag_end))
This warning is also invalid, given:
6852 if (c == '[') {
6853 if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_IN_GROUP;
6854 tag_start = p;
6855 while (! PEND) {
6856 if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_IN_GROUP;
6857 tag_end = p;
6858 PFETCH_S(c);
6859 if (c == ']') break;
6860 }
6861 if (! is_allowed_callout_tag_name(enc, tag_start, tag_end))
6862 return ONIGERR_INVALID_CALLOUT_TAG_NAME;
6863
To see that, first we should note:
#define PEND (p < end ? 0 : 1)
therefore PEND doesn't change if neither "p" nor "end" change.
Second, when we reach line 6855 (the "while") for the very first time,
(!PEND) is certainly true (i.e., PEND is false), because otherwise we
would have bailed at line 6853. Therefore we reach line 6857, and assign
"tag_end". Regardless of whether we iterate zero or more *additional*
times around the loop, "tag_end" will have been set, whenever we reach
line 6861.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Currently, the implementation of EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL::GetLocation()
in NonDiscoverablePciDeviceDxe returns the same set of dummy values
for each instance of the NON_DISCOVERABLE_DEVICE protocol that it
attaches itself to. However, this turns out to be causing problems
in cases where software (such as the ARM Compliance Test Suite [ACS])
attempts to use these values to uniquely identify controllers, since
the collisions create ambiguity in this regard.
So let's modify GetLocation() to return an arbitrary bus/device tuple
on segment 0xff instead. This is guaranteed not to clash with other
non-discoverable PCI devices, and highly unlikely to clash with real
PCIe devices.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Marcin Wojtas <mw@semihalf.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1224
When covert IFR binary to EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX structure,
Current code has following incorrect code logic:
IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) (IfrOpHdr + 1);
The correct one should be:
IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) IfrOpHdr;
1. The bug is in function "UpdateDefaultSettingInFormPackage()"
which is to update the default setting of some HII Questions
in the IFR binary data. So it only has impact when platform
overrides default setting in HII VarStore through DynamicHii
PCD setting in Platform DSC file. If platform doesn't
override default setting, it has no impact.
2. The implementation updates the "Flags" filed in the
EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX structure to update the default
setting of checkbox.
If using "IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) (IfrOpHdr + 1);"
when wants to update the " Flags" filed in checkbox,
but in fact it will update the opcode binary
data(opcode binary length) behind checkbox binary.
And then it will cause Browser can't parse the IFR
binary data correctly. And then the possible symptom
is that some HII Question and forms may be not parsed
and then cannot be shown.
This patch is to fix this bug.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
Variable\RuntimeDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmVariableHandler():
Under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:",
'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' can be a potential cross boundary access of
the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external input) during speculative execution.
This cross boundary access is later used as the index to access array
'SmmVariableHeader->Name' by code:
"SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1]"
One can observe which part of the content within array was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there are 2 similar cases under
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:" and
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET:" as well.
This commits also handles them.
Also, under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:",
'(UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' points to
the 'CommBuffer' (with some offset) and then passed as parameter 'Data' to
function VariableServiceSetVariable().
Within function VariableServiceSetVariable(), there is a sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor for the data pointed by 'Data'.
If this check is speculatively bypassed, potential cross-boundary data
access for 'Data' is possible to be revealed via the below function calls
sequence during speculative execution:
AuthVariableLibProcessVariable()
ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek()
Within function ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek(), for the code
"PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);", 'AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data)'
can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution.
Then, 'PayloadSize' is possible to be revealed by the function call
sequence:
AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp()
mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable()
VariableExLibUpdateVariable()
UpdateVariable()
CopyMem()
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor upon 'Data' within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() to prevent the speculative execution.
Also, please note that the change made within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() will affect DXE as well. However, since we
only focuses on the SMM codes, the commit will introduce a new module
internal function called VariableLoadFence() to handle this. This internal
function will have 2 implementations (1 for SMM, 1 for DXE). For the SMM
implementation, it is a wrapper to call the AsmLfence() API; for the DXE
implementation, it is empty.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Ruiyu Ni
Hao Wu
Star Zeng
Liming Gao
Dongao Guo
Jeff Brasen
Ard Biesheuvel
Dandan Bi
Jiaxin Wu