This commit adds checks to make sure the UFS devices do not return more
data than the driver expected.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Per USB HID spec, the buffer holding key codes should at least 3-byte
long.
Today's code assumes that the key codes buffer length is longer than
3-byte and unconditionally accesses the key codes buffer.
It's incorrect.
The patch fixes the issue by returning Device Error when the
length is less than 3-byte.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Per USB HID spec, the buffer holding key codes should at least 3-byte
long.
Today's code assumes that the key codes buffer length is longer than
3-byte and unconditionally accesses the key codes buffer.
It's incorrect.
The patch fixes the issue by returning Device Error when the
length is less than 3-byte.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Per USB HID spec, the buffer holding key codes should be 8-byte
long.
Today's code assumes that the key codes buffer length is 8-byte
long and unconditionally accesses the key codes buffer.
It's incorrect.
The patch fixes the issue by returning Device Error when the
length is less than 8-byte.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Today's implementation doesn't check whether the length of
descriptor is valid before using it.
The patch fixes this issue.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Today's implementation reads the Type/Length field in the USB
descriptors data without checking whether the offset to read is
beyond the data boundary.
The patch fixes this issue.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
UsbBootReadWriteBlocks() and UsbBootReadWriteBlocks16() use a UINT16
local variable to hold the value of
USB_BOOT_MAX_CARRY_SIZE (=0x10000) / BlockSize.
When BlockSize is 1, the UINT16 local variable is set to 0x10000
but the high-16 bits are truncated resulting the final value be 0.
It causes the while-loop in the two functions accesses 0 block in
each loop, resulting the loop never ends.
The patch fixes the two functions to make sure no integer overflow
happens.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
The change doesn't have functionality impact.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
This is the part of commit 3948c510ed.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
BrotliCustomDecompressLib has the definition with float type. But,
Floating-point types are not supported by EBC compiler.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Bi Dandan <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Set macro for variable arguments, and remove the hard code definition
to avoid the potential duplicated definition.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
There are five check not necessary in logic ,just for pass static
analysis. More detail please refer to comment in code.
And the rest changes are all accepted by owner, they are reasonable.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1245
In current implementation and according to the description in
MdeModulePkg.dec, PcdSetNvStoreDefaultId should be set in PEI
phase to take effect.
This patch ASSERTs PcdSetNvStoreDefaultId set in PcdDxe to alert
the invalid operation.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Clock control is similar in SDHCI versions greater then version 2. Add
support for more recent versions of the controller specification.
SD card support for 1.8V is also present in controller versions 3 and
greater.
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1233
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jeff Brasen <jbrasen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Add SDHCI controller defines, this is useful as the version in the
register does not explictly map to a specification version. For example
vesion 4.10 of the specification is version 0x04.
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1233
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jeff Brasen <jbrasen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
There are three warnings reported by GCC 4.8 and the later GCC release
are workaround with them.
And all the three warnings are invalid,so I just disable warnings rather
than fix them at now.
Following is the analysis from Laszlo Ersek.
(1)
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regcomp.c: In
> function 'compile_length_tree':
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regcomp.c:1516:7:
> warning: 'len' may be used uninitialized in this function
> [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
> int len;
> ^
I think this is an invalid warning; the type of the controlling expression
(node->type) is enum GimmickType, and the case labels cover all values of
the enum. An assert(0) could be added, I guess, but again, upstream
Oniguruma would be justified to reject the idea.
(2)
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c: In
> function 'parse_callout_args.isra.10.constprop.30':
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c:6753:25:
> warning: 'rl' may be used uninitialized in this function
> [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
> vals[n].l = rl;
> ^
This warning is invalid, given:
6749 if (cn > 0) {
6750 long rl;
6751 r = parse_long(enc, buf, bufend, 1, LONG_MAX, &rl);
6752 if (r == ONIG_NORMAL) {
6753 vals[n].l = rl;
Because parse_long() only returns ONIG_NORMAL after it sets (*rl).
(3)
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c: In
> function 'parse_callout_of_name.constprop.29':
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/RegularExpressionDxe/Oniguruma/regparse.c:6861:38:
> warning: 'tag_end' may be used uninitialized in this function
> [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
> if (! is_allowed_callout_tag_name(enc, tag_start, tag_end))
This warning is also invalid, given:
6852 if (c == '[') {
6853 if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_IN_GROUP;
6854 tag_start = p;
6855 while (! PEND) {
6856 if (PEND) return ONIGERR_END_PATTERN_IN_GROUP;
6857 tag_end = p;
6858 PFETCH_S(c);
6859 if (c == ']') break;
6860 }
6861 if (! is_allowed_callout_tag_name(enc, tag_start, tag_end))
6862 return ONIGERR_INVALID_CALLOUT_TAG_NAME;
6863
To see that, first we should note:
#define PEND (p < end ? 0 : 1)
therefore PEND doesn't change if neither "p" nor "end" change.
Second, when we reach line 6855 (the "while") for the very first time,
(!PEND) is certainly true (i.e., PEND is false), because otherwise we
would have bailed at line 6853. Therefore we reach line 6857, and assign
"tag_end". Regardless of whether we iterate zero or more *additional*
times around the loop, "tag_end" will have been set, whenever we reach
line 6861.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Currently, the implementation of EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL::GetLocation()
in NonDiscoverablePciDeviceDxe returns the same set of dummy values
for each instance of the NON_DISCOVERABLE_DEVICE protocol that it
attaches itself to. However, this turns out to be causing problems
in cases where software (such as the ARM Compliance Test Suite [ACS])
attempts to use these values to uniquely identify controllers, since
the collisions create ambiguity in this regard.
So let's modify GetLocation() to return an arbitrary bus/device tuple
on segment 0xff instead. This is guaranteed not to clash with other
non-discoverable PCI devices, and highly unlikely to clash with real
PCIe devices.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Marcin Wojtas <mw@semihalf.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1224
When covert IFR binary to EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX structure,
Current code has following incorrect code logic:
IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) (IfrOpHdr + 1);
The correct one should be:
IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) IfrOpHdr;
1. The bug is in function "UpdateDefaultSettingInFormPackage()"
which is to update the default setting of some HII Questions
in the IFR binary data. So it only has impact when platform
overrides default setting in HII VarStore through DynamicHii
PCD setting in Platform DSC file. If platform doesn't
override default setting, it has no impact.
2. The implementation updates the "Flags" filed in the
EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX structure to update the default
setting of checkbox.
If using "IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) (IfrOpHdr + 1);"
when wants to update the " Flags" filed in checkbox,
but in fact it will update the opcode binary
data(opcode binary length) behind checkbox binary.
And then it will cause Browser can't parse the IFR
binary data correctly. And then the possible symptom
is that some HII Question and forms may be not parsed
and then cannot be shown.
This patch is to fix this bug.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
Variable\RuntimeDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmVariableHandler():
Under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:",
'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' can be a potential cross boundary access of
the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external input) during speculative execution.
This cross boundary access is later used as the index to access array
'SmmVariableHeader->Name' by code:
"SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1]"
One can observe which part of the content within array was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there are 2 similar cases under
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:" and
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET:" as well.
This commits also handles them.
Also, under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:",
'(UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' points to
the 'CommBuffer' (with some offset) and then passed as parameter 'Data' to
function VariableServiceSetVariable().
Within function VariableServiceSetVariable(), there is a sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor for the data pointed by 'Data'.
If this check is speculatively bypassed, potential cross-boundary data
access for 'Data' is possible to be revealed via the below function calls
sequence during speculative execution:
AuthVariableLibProcessVariable()
ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek()
Within function ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek(), for the code
"PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);", 'AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data)'
can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution.
Then, 'PayloadSize' is possible to be revealed by the function call
sequence:
AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp()
mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable()
VariableExLibUpdateVariable()
UpdateVariable()
CopyMem()
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor upon 'Data' within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() to prevent the speculative execution.
Also, please note that the change made within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() will affect DXE as well. However, since we
only focuses on the SMM codes, the commit will introduce a new module
internal function called VariableLoadFence() to handle this. This internal
function will have 2 implementations (1 for SMM, 1 for DXE). For the SMM
implementation, it is a wrapper to call the AsmLfence() API; for the DXE
implementation, it is empty.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
SmmLockBox driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmLockBoxHandler():
Under "case EFI_SMM_LOCK_BOX_COMMAND_SAVE:", the 'CommBuffer' (controlled
external inputs) is passed to function SmmLockBoxSave().
'TempLockBoxParameterSave.Length' can be a potential cross boundary access
of the 'CommBuffer' during speculative execution. This cross boundary
access is later passed as parameter 'Length' into function SaveLockBox().
Within function SaveLockBox(), the value of 'Length' can be inferred by
code:
"CopyMem ((VOID *)(UINTN)SmramBuffer, (VOID *)(UINTN)Buffer, Length);".
One can observe which part of the content within 'Buffer' was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'Length'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there is a similar case under "case EFI_SMM_LOCK_BOX_COMMAND_UPDATE:"
function SmmLockBoxUpdate() as well. This commits also handles it.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
FaultTolerantWriteDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmFaultTolerantWriteHandler():
Under "case FTW_FUNCTION_WRITE:", 'SmmFtwWriteHeader->Length' can be a
potential cross boundary access of the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external
inputs) during speculative execution. This cross boundary access is later
passed as parameter 'Length' into function FtwWrite().
Within function FtwWrite(), the value of 'Length' can be inferred by code:
"CopyMem (MyBuffer + Offset, Buffer, Length);". One can observe which part
of the content within 'Buffer' was brought into cache to possibly reveal
the value of 'Length'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The PCD below is unused, so it has been removed from inf.
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdExtFpdtBootRecordPadSize
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: shenglei <shenglei.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleMax
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSystemRebootAfterCapsuleProcessFlag
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassCapsule
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeProcessCapsulesBegin
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeProcessCapsulesEnd
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeUpdatingFirmware
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeUpdateFirmwareSuccess
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeUpdateFirmwareFailed
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeResettingSystem
The library Pcdlib is not linked， so "#include <Library/PcdLib.h>"
is deleted.
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: shenglei <shenglei.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1214
This patch only updates comment and function description, so has
no functionality impact.
This patch fixes comment typo 'end' to 'start' in GetStartPointer.
GetStartPointer for PEI and DXE has aligned function description,
but GetEndPointer does not.
This patch also aligns GetEndPointer's function description for
PEI and DXE.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch updates S3SaveStateDxe to use new
EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable() and remove the duplicated code.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=886
This patch is to support the TFTP windowsize option described in RFC 7440.
The feature allows the client and server to negotiate a window size of
consecutive blocks to send as an alternative for replacing the single-block
lockstep schema.
Currently, the windowsize for write request operation is not supported since
there is no real use cases.
Cc: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com>
Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Cc: Shao Ming <ming.shao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com>
The change doesn't have functionality impact.
It just renames the mIoMmuProtocol to mIoMmu and moves the
declaration from PciRootBridgeIo.c to PciHostBridge.h.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1196
RootBridgeIoCheckParameter() verifies that the requested MMIO access
can fit in any of the MEM/PMEM 32/64 ranges. But today's logic
somehow only checks the requested access against MEM 32/64 ranges.
It should also check the requested access against PMEM 32/64 ranges.
The patch fixes this issue.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Garrett Kirkendall <garrett.kirkendall@amd.com>
BZ#1116: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1116
Currently IA32_EFER.NXE is only set against PcdSetNxForStack. This
confuses developers because following two other PCDs also need NXE
to be set, but actually not.
PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy
PcdImageProtectionPolicy
This patch solves this issue by adding logic to enable IA32_EFER.NXE
if any of those PCDs have anything enabled.
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
BZ#1116: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1116
The usage of following PCDs described in MdeModulePkg.dec don't match
the implementation exactly. This patch updates related description in
both .dec and .uni files to avoid confusion in platform configuration.
PcdSetNxForStack
PcdImageProtectionPolicy
PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy
The main change is at the statement on how to handle the FALSE or 0
setting value in those PCDs. Current statement says the implementation
should unset or disable related features but in fact the related code
just do nothing (leave it to AS-IS). That means the result might be
disabled, or might be not. It depends on other features or platform
policy.
For example, if one don't want to enforce NX onto stack memory, he/she
needs to set PcdSetNxForStack to FALSE as well as to clear BIT4 of
PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy.
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The PalLib is IPF specific and will be removed from MdePkg.
So this patch removes PalLib in MdeModulePkg.dsc which was missed
at de005223b7.
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Chen A Chen <chen.a.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Now that Itanium support has been dropped, we can remove the various
occurrences of the ELILO on Itanium PE/COFF header workaround.
Link: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=816
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Remove two redundant Guids which are not used.
They are gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid and
gEfiCertPkcs7Guid.This is an improved version of
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1062
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: shenglei <shenglei.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Hao Wu
Ruiyu Ni
Dongao Guo
Liming Gao
Star Zeng
Jeff Brasen
Ard Biesheuvel
Dandan Bi
Jiaxin Wu
shenglei
Jian J Wang
Marcin Wojtas
Chen A Chen