Record failed attempts to session-bind a connection and refuse signing
operations on that connection henceforth.
Prevents a future situation where we add a new hostkey type that is not
recognised by an older ssh-agent, that consequently causes session-bind
to fail (this situation is only likely to arise when people mix ssh(1)
and ssh-agent(1) of different versions on the same host). Previously,
after such a failure the agent socket would be considered unbound and
not subject to restriction.
Spotted by Jann Horn
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b0fdd023e920aa4831413f640de4c5307b53552e
This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
user's specified ProxyCommand.
To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
This makes ssh/sshd more strict in handling non-compliant peers that
send more data than the advertised channel window allows. Previously
the additional data would be silently discarded. This change will
cause ssh/sshd to terminate the connection if the channel window is
exceeded by more than a small grace allowance.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 811e21b41831eba3dd7f67b3d409a438f20d3037
Adds a protocol extension to allow grafting certificates supplied by
ssh-add to keys loaded from PKCS#11 tokens in the agent.
feedback/ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb5433cd28ede2bc910996eb3c0b53e20f86037f
This adds another transport protocol extension to allow a sshd to send
SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO during user authentication, after the server has
learned the username that is being logged in to.
This lets sshd to update the acceptable signature algoritms for public
key authentication, and allows these to be varied via sshd_config(5)
"Match" directives, which are evaluated after the server learns the
username being authenticated.
Full details in the PROTOCOL file
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de7da7f2b6c32a46043d75fcd49b0cbb7db7779
This adds a protocol extension to improve the integrity of the SSH
transport protocol, particular in and around the initial key exchange
(KEX) phase.
Full details of the extension are in the PROTOCOL file.
with markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a66ac962f0a630d7945fee54004ed9e9c439f14
host key algorithms to request, ensure that the hostname passed to the
command is decorated with the port number for ports other than 22.
This matches the behaviour of KnownHostsCommand when invoked to look
up the actual host key.
bz3643, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5cfabc0b7c6c7ab473666df314f377b1f15420b1
* add check for pipes to do_upload
* add parentheses
* add pester tests to sftp
* use pester 3.4 assertions
* add debug
* temp build in debug
* temp build in debug
* revert building CI in debug
* remove pester test for changes; will test manually
* test sending new event from sshd after kex exchange
* rename telemetry event for clarity
* add comments
* remove else since if block has fatal call
* rename method for additional clarity
Tess Gauthier
LexaPrime
Andrew
Steve Lee
Marc-André Moreau
Tess Gauthier
Damien Miller
djm@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
dtucker@openbsd.org