[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
[digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c]
[kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c]
[kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c]
[schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c]
Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations
rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier
to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future;
feedback, ok markus@
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the
obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
[ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c]
make the original RSA and DSA signing/verification code look more like
the ECDSA/Ed25519 ones: use key_type_plain() when checking the key type
rather than tediously listing all variants, use __func__ for debug/
error messages
[auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c]
[packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the
string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
a string(3) function.
Use the new API in a few sensitive places.
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
[ssh-rsa.c]
more timing paranoia - compare all parts of the expected decrypted
data before returning. AFAIK not exploitable in the SSH protocol.
"groovy" deraadt@
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
[packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
[buffer.c channels.c deattack.c misc.c scp.c session.c sftp-client.c]
[sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-rsa.c xmalloc.c xmalloc.h auth-pam.c]
[uidswap.c]
change OpenSSH's xrealloc() function from being xrealloc(p, new_size)
to xrealloc(p, new_nmemb, new_itemsize).
realloc is particularly prone to integer overflows because it is
almost always allocating "n * size" bytes, so this is a far safer
API; ok deraadt@
[channels.c monitor.c session.c session.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshlogin.c]
annoying spacing fixes getting in the way of real diffs
[ssh-rsa.c]
make sure the signature has at least the expected length (don't
insist on len == hlen + oidlen, since this breaks some smartcards)
bugzilla #592; ok djm@
[ssh-rsa.c]
pad received signature with leading zeros, because RSA_verify expects
a signature of RSA_size. the drafts says the signature is transmitted
unpadded (e.g. putty does not pad), reported by anakin@pobox.com
NEED TO BE GENERATED* =) Refer to to entry "2001/01/16 19:20:06"
for more details.
20010118
- (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus
[sshd.c]
maxfd+1
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18
[ssh-keygen.1]
small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07
[scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c]
getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54
[ssh-keyscan.c]
use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47
[ssh-keyscan.c]
free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13
[ssh-add.c]
typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50
[packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com)
set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45
[packet.c packet.h]
reorder, typo
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00
[auth-options.c]
fix comment
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31
[session.c]
Wall
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08
[clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c]
move callback to headerfile
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10
[ssh.c]
use log() instead of stderr
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51
[dh.c]
use error() not stderr!
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29
[sftp-server.c]
rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38
[sftp-server.c]
readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06
[key.c ssh-rsa.c]
make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from
galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys,
since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from
.ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc.
(cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP
.ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that
BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27
[sftp-server.c]
remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08
[bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c]
indent
- (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may
be missing such feature.
Damien Miller
Darren Tucker
Ben Lindstrom