upon error the (very sloppy specification) leaves an undefined value in *ret,
so it is wrong to inspect it, the error condition is enough. discussed a
little with nicm, and then much more with millert until we were exasperated
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29258fa51edf8115d244b9d4b84028487bf8923e
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
random data (currently 16KB).
Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
when being saved/serialised.
Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
architecture has become less unsafe.
been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
ok dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
optional, not local-path - sync help
from deraadt:
- prefer -R and undocument -r (but add a comment for future editors)
from schwarze:
- prefer -p and undocument -P (as above. the comment was schwarze's too)
more:
- add the -f flag to reput and reget
- sort help (i can;t remember who suggested this originally)
djm and deraadt were ok with earlier versions of this;
tim and schwarze ok
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c699b53b46111f5c57eed4533f132e7e58bacdd
Cast bitcount to u_in64_t before bit shifting to prevent integer overflow
on 32bit platforms which cause incorrect results when adding a block
>=512M in size. sha1 patch from ante84 at gmail.com via openssh github,
sha2 with djm@, ok tedu@
correct signature algorithm when requested. Patch from Jakub Jelen in bz3016
ok dtucker markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61f86efbeb4a1857a3e91298c1ccc6cf49b79624
the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent
(effectively reversing my commit of yesterday);
ok deraadt markus djm
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667
malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
guenther@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
changing a key pair's comments (using -c and -C) more applicable to both
methods. ok and suggestions djm@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b379338118109eb36e14a65bc0a12735205b3de6
POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW should
update the symlink and not the destination. The compat code doesn't
have a way to do this, so where possible it fails instead of following a
symlink when explicitly asked not to. Instead of checking for an explicit
failure, check that it does not update the destination, which both the
real and compat implmentations should honour.
Inspired by github pull req #125 from chutzpah at gentoo.org.
According to POSIX, pthread_create returns the failure reason in
the non-zero function return code so make the fork wrapper do that.
Matches previous change.
Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware
acceleration to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography
support with the help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via
jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt device driver and so there is a
need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in
that area. I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the
patches to the openssl community.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
overridden.
Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
Some platforms such as HP-UX do not have pam_putenv. Currently the
calls are ifdef'ed out, but a new one was recently added. Remove the
ifdefs and add a no-op implementation. bz#3008, ok djm.
be able to find out from where the request was comming.
Add the same logging for PermitListen violations which where not
logged at all.
Pointed out by Robert Kisteleki (robert AT ripe.net)
input markus
OK deraadt
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a7d0f1b7175504c0d1dca8d9aca1588b66448c8
deraadt@openbsd.org
djm@openbsd.org
Jitendra Sharma
dtucker@openbsd.org
jmc@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
otto@openbsd.org
lum@openbsd.org
Elliott Hughes
Harald Freudenberger
Sorin Adrian Savu
schwarze@openbsd.org
florian@openbsd.org