[sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-seccomp-filter.c]
[sandbox-systrace.c ssh-sandbox.h sshd.c] Support preauth sandboxing
using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. Patch by Dag-Erling
Smorgrav, updated by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok dtucker@
[sshconnect.c sshd.c]
ban clients/servers that suffer from SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY, they are ancient,
deranged and might make some attacks on KEX easier; ok markus@
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the
obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
[sshd.c]
delay closure of in/out fds until after "Bad protocol version
identification..." message, as get_remote_ipaddr/get_remote_port
require them open.
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org);
initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
unnecessary arc4random_stir() calls. The only ones left are to ensure
that the PRNG gets a different state after fork() for platforms that
have broken the API.
[ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
All the instances of arc4random_stir() are bogus, since arc4random()
does this itself, inside itself, and has for a very long time.. Actually,
this was probably reducing the entropy available.
ok djm
ID SYNC ONLY for portable; we don't trust other arc4random implementations
to do this right.
[sshd.c]
Stir PRNG after post-accept fork. The child gets a different PRNG state
anyway via rexec and explicit privsep reseeds, but it's good to be sure.
ok markus@
[auth.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c monitor.c servconf.c]
[servconf.h session.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add ssh-agent(1) support to sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys,
or hostkeys on smartcards; most of the work by Zev Weiss; bz #1974
ok djm@
[sshd.c]
When running sshd -D, close stderr unless we have explicitly requesting
logging to stderr. From james.hunt at ubuntu.com via bz#1976, djm's patch
so, err, ok dtucker.
[sshd_config.5 servconf.c servconf.h packet.c serverloop.c monitor.c sshd_config
sshd.c] Add RekeyLimit to sshd with the same syntax as the client allowing
rekeying based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man
page.
[log.c log.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8 sshd.c]
Add -E option to ssh and sshd to append debugging logs to a specified file
instead of stderr or syslog. ok markus@, man page help jmc@
[auth.h auth1.c auth2.c monitor.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c]
[sshd_config.5]
Support multiple required authentication via an AuthenticationMethods
option. This option lists one or more comma-separated lists of
authentication method names. Successful completion of all the methods in
any list is required for authentication to complete;
feedback and ok markus@
[auth2-pubkey.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Remove default of AuthorizedCommandUser. Administrators are now expected
to explicitly specify a user. feedback and ok markus@
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c servconf.c servconf.h]
[sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
new sshd_config option AuthorizedKeysCommand to support fetching
authorized_keys from a command in addition to (or instead of) from
the filesystem. The command is run as the target server user unless
another specified via a new AuthorizedKeysCommandUser option.
patch originally by jchadima AT redhat.com, reworked by me; feedback
and ok markus@
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config]
Turn on systrace sandboxing of pre-auth sshd by default for new installs
by shipping a config that overrides the current UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes
default. Make it easier to flip the default in the future by adding too.
[sandbox-systrace.c sshd.c]
fix a during the load of the sandbox policies (child can still make
the read-syscall and wait forever for systrace-answers) by replacing
the read/write synchronisation with SIGSTOP/SIGCONT;
report and help hshoexer@; ok djm@, dtucker@
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/13 01:42:32
[servconf.h servconf.c sshd.8 sshd.c auth.c sshd_config.5]
Add "Match LocalAddress" and "Match LocalPort" to sshd and adjust tests
to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus@.
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
VersionAddendum option to allow server operators to append some arbitrary
text to the SSH-... banner; ok deraadt@ "don't care" markus@
[sshd.c ssh-sandbox.h sandbox.h sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-systrace.c]
[sandbox-null.c]
rename sandbox.h => ssh-sandbox.h to make things easier for portable
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config.5 sandbox-rlimit.c]
[sandbox-systrace.c sandbox.h configure.ac Makefile.in]
introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using systrace(4).
This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for
sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the
privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child
from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying)
or probing local kernel attack surface.
The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option.
UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future
so please start testing it now.
feedback dtucker@; ok markus@
[log.c log.h monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h sshd.c]
make the pre-auth privsep slave log via a socketpair shared with the
monitor rather than /var/empty/dev/log; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ markus@
[entropy.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-rand-helper.c]
[ssh.c ssh_prng_cmds.in sshd.c contrib/aix/buildbff.sh]
[regress/README.regress] Remove ssh-rand-helper and all its
tentacles. PRNGd seeding has been rolled into entropy.c directly.
Thanks to tim@ for testing on affected platforms.
[clientloop.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c]
some unsigned long long casts that make things a bit easier for
portable without resorting to dropping PRIu64 formats everywhere
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]
[servconf.c servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow
selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
and their order of preference.
ok markus@
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
reintroduce commit from tedu@, which I pulled out for release
engineering:
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a
man page for, so use that. ok djm
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a man page
for, so use that. ok djm
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
[auth-rhosts.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.c auth-options.c sshd.c]
Hold authentication debug messages until after successful authentication.
Fixes an info leak of environment variables specified in authorized_keys,
reported by Jacob Appelbaum. ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c]
avoid run-time failures when specifying hostkeys via a relative
path by prepending the cwd in these cases; bz#1290; ok dtucker@
[channels.c ssh.1 servconf.c sshd_config.5 sshd.c channels.h servconf.h
ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c readconf.c sshconnect.c misc.c ssh.c
readconf.h scp.1 sftp.1 ssh_config.5 misc.h]
Remove RoutingDomain from ssh since it's now not needed. It can be
replaced with "route exec" or "nc -V" as a proxycommand. "route exec"
also ensures that trafic such as DNS lookups stays withing the specified
routingdomain. For example (from reyk):
# route -T 2 exec /usr/sbin/sshd
or inherited from the parent process
$ route -T 2 exec sh
$ ssh 10.1.2.3
ok deraadt@ markus@ stevesk@ reyk@
[sshd.c]
Afer sshd receives a SIGHUP, ignore subsequent HUPs while sshd re-execs
itself. Prevents two HUPs in quick succession from resulting in sshd
dying. bz#1692, patch from Colin Watson via Ubuntu.
[ssh_config.5 sshd.c misc.h ssh-keyscan.1 readconf.h sshconnect.c
channels.c channels.h servconf.h servconf.c ssh.1 ssh-keyscan.c scp.1
sftp.1 sshd_config.5 readconf.c ssh.c misc.c]
Allow to set the rdomain in ssh/sftp/scp/sshd and ssh-keyscan.
ok markus@
set IPV6_V6ONLY for local forwarding with GatwayPorts=yes. Unify
setting IPV6_V6ONLY behind a new function misc.c:sock_set_v6only()
report and fix from jan.kratochvil AT redhat.com
[sshd.c packet.c serverloop.c monitor_wrap.c clientloop.c sshconnect.c
monitor.c Added roaming.h roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c]
Keep track of number of bytes read and written. Needed for upcoming
changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
ok markus@
Also, applied appropriate changes to Makefile.in
[clientloop.c misc.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h]
[serverloop.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshd.c]
make a2port() return -1 when it encounters an invalid port number
rather than 0, which it will now treat as valid (needed for future work)
adjust current consumers of a2port() to check its return value is <= 0,
which in turn required some things to be converted from u_short => int
make use of int vs. u_short consistent in some other places too
feedback & ok markus@
[packet.c scp.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c]
[sshd.c] Explicitly handle EWOULDBLOCK wherever we handle EAGAIN, on
some platforms (HP nonstop) it is a distinct errno;
bz#1467 reported by sconeu AT yahoo.com; ok dtucker@
[sshd.c sshconnect.c packet.h misc.c misc.h packet.c]
Make keepalive timeouts apply while waiting for a packet, particularly
during key renegotiation (bz #1363). With djm and Matt Day, ok djm@
[sshd.c channels.h channels.c log.c servconf.c log.h servconf.h sshd.8]
Add extended test mode (-T) and connection parameters for test mode (-C).
-T causes sshd to write its effective configuration to stdout and exit.
-C causes any relevant Match rules to be applied before output. The
combination allows tesing of the parser and config files. ok deraadt djm
[auth-options.c auth1.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c gss-serv.c]
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c nchan.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c]
[ssh.c sshd.c]
Implement a channel success/failure status confirmation callback
mechanism. Each channel maintains a queue of callbacks, which will
be drained in order (RFC4253 guarantees confirm messages are not
reordered within an channel).
Also includes a abandonment callback to clean up if a channel is
closed without sending confirmation messages. This probably
shouldn't happen in compliant implementations, but it could be
abused to leak memory.
ok markus@ (as part of a larger diff)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17
[dh.c sshd.c]
Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output
Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound
is not a power of two
ok deraadt@ millert@
openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Bug #1437 Move the OpenSSL compat
header to after OpenSSL headers, since some versions of OpenSSL have
SSLeay_add_all_algorithms as a macro already.
[sshd.c]
When in inetd mode, have sshd generate a Protocol 1 ephemeral server
key only for connections where the client chooses Protocol 1 as opposed
to when it's enabled in the server's config. Speeds up Protocol 2
connections to inetd-mode servers that also allow Protocol 1. bz #440,
based on a patch from bruno at wolff.to, ok markus@
[servconf.c canohost.c misc.c channels.c sshconnect.c misc.h ssh-keyscan.c
sshd.c]
Add a small helper function to consistently handle the EAI_SYSTEM error
code of getaddrinfo. Prompted by vgiffin at apple com via bz #1417.
ok markus@ stevesk@
[servconf.c sshd.c]
Move C/R -> kbdint special case to after the defaults have been
loaded, which makes ChallengeResponse default to yes again. This
was broken by the Match changes and not fixed properly subsequently.
Found by okan at demirmen.com, ok djm@ "please do it" deraadt@
[sshd.c]
Clear alarm() before restarting sshd on SIGHUP. Without this, if there's
a SIGALRM pending (for SSH1 key regeneration) when sshd is SIGHUP'ed, the
newly exec'ed sshd will get the SIGALRM and not have a handler for it,
and the default action will terminate the listening sshd. Analysis and
patch from andrew at gaul.org.
be used to drop privilege to; fixes Solaris GSSAPI crash reported by
Magnus Abrante; suggestion and feedback dtucker@
NB. this change will require that the privilege separation user must
exist on all the time, not just when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes
[platform.c platform.h sshd.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in]
[openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c]
[openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h] Add support for Solaris process
contracts, enabled with --use-solaris-contracts. Patch from Chad
Mynhier, tweaked by dtucker@ and myself; ok dtucker@
[canohost.c channels.c cipher-acss.c defines.h dns.c gss-genr.c]
[gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c log.h loginrec.c logintest.c readconf.c]
[servconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rand-helper.c]
[ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c]
[openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c]
[openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c openbsd-compat/glob.c]
[openbsd-compat/mktemp.c openbsd-compat/port-linux.c]
[openbsd-compat/port-tun.c openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c]
[openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c openbsd-compat/xmmap.c]
make the portable tree compile again - sprinkle unistd.h and string.h
back in. Don't redefine __unused, as it turned out to be used in
headers on Linux, and replace its use in auth-pam.c with ARGSUSED
[sshd.c servconf.h servconf.c sshd_config.5 auth.c]
Add support for conditional directives to sshd_config via a "Match"
keyword, which works similarly to the "Host" directive in ssh_config.
Lines after a Match line override the default set in the main section
if the condition on the Match line is true, eg
AllowTcpForwarding yes
Match User anoncvs
AllowTcpForwarding no
will allow port forwarding by all users except "anoncvs".
Currently only a very small subset of directives are supported.
ok djm@
Damien Miller
Darren Tucker
Tim Rice