audk/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/X64/SmiEntry.nasm

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;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ;
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
; Copyright (c) 2016 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
; Copyright (c) 2020, AMD Incorporated. All rights reserved.<BR>
; SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
;
; Module Name:
;
; SmiEntry.nasm
;
; Abstract:
;
; Code template of the SMI handler for a particular processor
;
;-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%include "StuffRsbNasm.inc"
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
%include "Nasm.inc"
;
; Variables referenced by C code
;
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
%define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6A2
%define MSR_IA32_CET_SH_STK_EN 0x1
%define MSR_IA32_CET_WR_SHSTK_EN 0x2
%define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN 0x4
%define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN 0x8
%define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN 0x10
%define MSR_IA32_CET_SUPPRESS_DIS 0x20
%define MSR_IA32_CET_SUPPRESS 0x400
%define MSR_IA32_CET_TRACKER 0x800
%define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6A4
%define MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR 0x6A8
%define CR4_CET 0x800000
%define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE 0x1A0
%define MSR_EFER 0xc0000080
%define MSR_EFER_XD 0x800
;
; Constants relating to PROCESSOR_SMM_DESCRIPTOR
;
%define DSC_OFFSET 0xfb00
%define DSC_GDTPTR 0x30
%define DSC_GDTSIZ 0x38
%define DSC_CS 14
%define DSC_DS 16
%define DSC_SS 18
%define DSC_OTHERSEG 20
;
; Constants relating to CPU State Save Area
;
%define SSM_DR6 0xffd0
%define SSM_DR7 0xffc8
%define PROTECT_MODE_CS 0x8
%define PROTECT_MODE_DS 0x20
%define LONG_MODE_CS 0x38
%define TSS_SEGMENT 0x40
%define GDT_SIZE 0x50
extern ASM_PFX(SmiRendezvous)
extern ASM_PFX(gSmiHandlerIdtr)
extern ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
extern ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugExit)
global ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase)
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "XdSupported" with PatchInstructionX86() "mXdSupported" is a global BOOLEAN variable, initialized to TRUE. The CheckFeatureSupported() function is executed on all processors (not concurrently though), called from SmmInitHandler(). If XD support is found to be missing on any CPU, then "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE, and further processors omit the check. Afterwards, "mXdSupported" is read by several assembly and C code locations. The tricky part is *where* "mXdSupported" is allocated (defined): - Before commit 717fb60443fb ("UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Add paging protection.", 2016-11-17), it used to be a normal global variable, defined (allocated) in "SmmProfile.c". - With said commit, we moved the definition (allocation) of "mXdSupported" into "SmiEntry.nasm". The variable was defined over the last byte of a "mov al, 1" instruction, so that setting it to FALSE in CheckFeatureSupported() would patch the instruction to "mov al, 0". The subsequent conditional jump would change behavior, plus all further read references to "mXdSupported" (in C and assembly code) would read back the source (imm8) operand of the patched MOV instruction as data. This trick required that the MOV instruction be encoded with DB. In order to get rid of the DB, we have to split both roles: we need a label for the code patching, and "mXdSupported" has to be defined (allocated) independently of the code patching. Of course, their values must always remain in sync. (1) Reinstate the "mXdSupported" definition and initialization in "SmmProfile.c" from before commit 717fb60443fb. Change the assembly language definition ("global") to a declaration ("extern"). (2) Define the "gPatchXdSupported" label (type X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL) in "SmiEntry.nasm", and add the C-language declaration to "SmmProfileInternal.h". Replace the DB with the MOV mnemonic (keeping the imm8 source operand with value 1). (3) In CheckFeatureSupported(), whenever "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE, patch the assembly code in sync, with PatchInstructionX86(). Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866 Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 00:17:13 +01:00
extern ASM_PFX(mXdSupported)
global ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported)
global ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported)
global ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack)
global ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3)
global ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded)
global ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate)
global ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerSize)
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
extern ASM_PFX(mCetSupported)
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetSupported)
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetPl0Ssp)
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSsp)
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSspTable)
DEFAULT REL
SECTION .text
BITS 16
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
_SmiEntryPoint:
mov bx, _GdtDesc - _SmiEntryPoint + 0x8000
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET + DSC_GDTSIZ]
dec ax
mov [cs:bx], ax
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET + DSC_GDTPTR]
mov [cs:bx + 2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx] ; lgdt fword ptr cs:[bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2],ax
mov edi, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi + (@ProtectedMode - _SmiEntryPoint) + 0x8000]
mov [cs:bx-0x6],eax
mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffafff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0
BITS 32
@ProtectedMode:
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
o16 mov ds, ax
o16 mov es, ax
o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
mov esp, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode
BITS 64
ProtFlatMode:
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3):
mov cr3, rax
mov eax, 0x668 ; as cr4.PGE is not set here, refresh cr3
mov cl, strict byte 0 ; source operand will be patched
ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded):
cmp cl, 0
je SkipEnable5LevelPaging
;
; Enable 5-Level Paging bit
;
bts eax, 12 ; Set LA57 bit (bit #12)
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:
mov cr4, rax ; in PreModifyMtrrs() to flush TLB.
; Load TSS
sub esp, 8 ; reserve room in stack
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2] ; eax = GDT base
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax + TSS_SEGMENT + 5], dl ; clear busy flag
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax
; enable NXE if supported
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "XdSupported" with PatchInstructionX86() "mXdSupported" is a global BOOLEAN variable, initialized to TRUE. The CheckFeatureSupported() function is executed on all processors (not concurrently though), called from SmmInitHandler(). If XD support is found to be missing on any CPU, then "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE, and further processors omit the check. Afterwards, "mXdSupported" is read by several assembly and C code locations. The tricky part is *where* "mXdSupported" is allocated (defined): - Before commit 717fb60443fb ("UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Add paging protection.", 2016-11-17), it used to be a normal global variable, defined (allocated) in "SmmProfile.c". - With said commit, we moved the definition (allocation) of "mXdSupported" into "SmiEntry.nasm". The variable was defined over the last byte of a "mov al, 1" instruction, so that setting it to FALSE in CheckFeatureSupported() would patch the instruction to "mov al, 0". The subsequent conditional jump would change behavior, plus all further read references to "mXdSupported" (in C and assembly code) would read back the source (imm8) operand of the patched MOV instruction as data. This trick required that the MOV instruction be encoded with DB. In order to get rid of the DB, we have to split both roles: we need a label for the code patching, and "mXdSupported" has to be defined (allocated) independently of the code patching. Of course, their values must always remain in sync. (1) Reinstate the "mXdSupported" definition and initialization in "SmmProfile.c" from before commit 717fb60443fb. Change the assembly language definition ("global") to a declaration ("extern"). (2) Define the "gPatchXdSupported" label (type X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL) in "SmiEntry.nasm", and add the C-language declaration to "SmmProfileInternal.h". Replace the DB with the MOV mnemonic (keeping the imm8 source operand with value 1). (3) In CheckFeatureSupported(), whenever "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE, patch the assembly code in sync, with PatchInstructionX86(). Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866 Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 00:17:13 +01:00
mov al, strict byte 1 ; source operand may be patched
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd
; If MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE is supported, clear XD Disable bit
mov al, strict byte 1 ; source operand may be patched
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported):
cmp al, 1
jz MsrIa32MiscEnableSupported
; MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE not supported
sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx ; don't try to restore the XD Disable bit just before RSM
jmp EnableNxe
;
; Check XD disable bit
;
MsrIa32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx ; save MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE[63-32]
test edx, BIT2 ; MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE[34]
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB ; clear XD Disable bit if it is set
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD ; enable NXE
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:
; Switch into @LongMode
push LONG_MODE_CS ; push cs hardcore here
call Base ; push return address for retf later
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode - Base; offset for far retf, seg is the 1st arg
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1 ; enable LME
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023 ; enable paging + WP + NE + MP + PE
mov cr0, rbx
retf
@LongMode: ; long mode (64-bit code) starts here
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, ASM_PFX(gSmiHandlerIdtr)
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi + DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx + DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx + DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx + DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
mov rbx, [rsp + 0x8] ; rbx <- CpuIndex
; enable CET if supported
mov al, strict byte 1 ; source operand may be patched
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz CetDone
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_S_CET
rdmsr
push rdx
push rax
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP
rdmsr
push rdx
push rax
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR
rdmsr
push rdx
push rax
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_S_CET
mov eax, MSR_IA32_CET_SH_STK_EN
xor edx, edx
wrmsr
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetPl0Ssp):
xor edx, edx
wrmsr
mov rcx, cr0
btr ecx, 16 ; clear WP
mov cr0, rcx
mov [eax], eax ; reload SSP, and clear busyflag.
xor ecx, ecx
mov [eax + 4], ecx
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSspTable):
xor edx, edx
wrmsr
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSsp):
cmp eax, 0
jz CetInterruptDone
mov [eax], eax ; reload SSP, and clear busyflag.
xor ecx, ecx
mov [eax + 4], ecx
CetInterruptDone:
mov rcx, cr0
bts ecx, 16 ; set WP
mov cr0, rcx
mov eax, 0x668 | CR4_CET
mov cr4, rax
SETSSBSY
CetDone:
;
; Save FP registers
;
sub rsp, 0x200
fxsave64 [rsp]
add rsp, -0x20
mov rcx, rbx
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191 Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax, then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5 doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work. ; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed ... mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) call rax Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5. One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address. mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler _SmiHandlerAbsAddr: jmp rax ... call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address, can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed, the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified. ... mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr: call rax Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
call rax
mov rcx, rbx
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191 Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax, then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5 doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work. ; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed ... mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) call rax Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5. One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address. mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler _SmiHandlerAbsAddr: jmp rax ... call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address, can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed, the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified. ... mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr: call rax Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(SmiRendezvous)
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax
mov rcx, rbx
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191 Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax, then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5 doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work. ; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed ... mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) call rax Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5. One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address. mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler _SmiHandlerAbsAddr: jmp rax ... call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address, can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed, the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified. ... mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr: call rax Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugExit)
CpuSmmDebugExitAbsAddr:
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
;
; Restore FP registers
;
fxrstor64 [rsp]
add rsp, 0x200
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, ASM_PFX(mCetSupported)
mCetSupportedAbsAddr:
mov al, [rax]
cmp al, 0
jz CetDone2
mov eax, 0x668
mov cr4, rax ; disable CET
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR
pop rax
pop rdx
wrmsr
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP
pop rax
pop rdx
wrmsr
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_S_CET
pop rax
pop rdx
wrmsr
CetDone2:
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191 Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax, then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5 doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work. ; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed ... mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) call rax Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5. One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address. mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler _SmiHandlerAbsAddr: jmp rax ... call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address, can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed, the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified. ... mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr: call rax Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; lea rax, [ASM_PFX(mXdSupported)]
mXdSupportedAbsAddr:
mov al, [rax]
cmp al, 0
jz .1
pop rdx ; get saved MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE[63-32]
test edx, BIT2
jz .1
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
or dx, BIT2 ; set XD Disable bit if it was set before entering into SMM
wrmsr
.1:
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
StuffRsb64
rsm
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerSize) DW $ - _SmiEntryPoint
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191 Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax, then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5 doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work. ; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed ... mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) call rax Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5. One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address. mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler _SmiHandlerAbsAddr: jmp rax ... call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address, can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed, the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified. ... mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr: call rax Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
;
; Retrieve the address and fill it into mov opcode.
;
; It is called in the driver entry point first.
; It is used to fix up the real address in mov opcode.
; Then, after the code logic is copied to the different location,
; the code can also run.
;
global ASM_PFX(PiSmmCpuSmiEntryFixupAddress)
ASM_PFX(PiSmmCpuSmiEntryFixupAddress):
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(gSmiHandlerIdtr)]
lea rcx, [SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr]
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191 Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax, then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5 doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work. ; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed ... mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) call rax Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5. One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address. mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler _SmiHandlerAbsAddr: jmp rax ... call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address, can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed, the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified. ... mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr: call rax Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)]
lea rcx, [CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr]
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(SmiRendezvous)]
lea rcx, [SmiRendezvousAbsAddr]
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugExit)]
lea rcx, [CpuSmmDebugExitAbsAddr]
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(mXdSupported)]
lea rcx, [mXdSupportedAbsAddr]
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(mCetSupported)]
lea rcx, [mCetSupportedAbsAddr]
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
ret