2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ;
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
; Copyright (c) 2016 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
2020-06-22 15:18:25 +02:00
|
|
|
; Copyright (c) 2020, AMD Incorporated. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
2019-04-04 01:07:22 +02:00
|
|
|
; SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Module Name:
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; SmiEntry.nasm
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Abstract:
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Code template of the SMI handler for a particular processor
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
;-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-21 06:45:55 +01:00
|
|
|
%include "StuffRsbNasm.inc"
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
%include "Nasm.inc"
|
2018-08-16 03:32:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
;
|
2020-02-07 02:08:30 +01:00
|
|
|
; Variables referenced by C code
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6A2
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_SH_STK_EN 0x1
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_WR_SHSTK_EN 0x2
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN 0x4
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN 0x8
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN 0x10
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_SUPPRESS_DIS 0x20
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_SUPPRESS 0x400
|
|
|
|
%define MSR_IA32_CET_TRACKER 0x800
|
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|
|
%define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6A4
|
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|
|
%define MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR 0x6A8
|
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|
%define CR4_CET 0x800000
|
|
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|
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
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|
%define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE 0x1A0
|
|
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|
%define MSR_EFER 0xc0000080
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|
%define MSR_EFER_XD 0x800
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
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|
;
|
|
|
|
; Constants relating to PROCESSOR_SMM_DESCRIPTOR
|
|
|
|
;
|
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|
|
%define DSC_OFFSET 0xfb00
|
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|
|
%define DSC_GDTPTR 0x30
|
|
|
|
%define DSC_GDTSIZ 0x38
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%define DSC_CS 14
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|
%define DSC_DS 16
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|
%define DSC_SS 18
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|
%define DSC_OTHERSEG 20
|
|
|
|
;
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|
|
; Constants relating to CPU State Save Area
|
|
|
|
;
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|
%define SSM_DR6 0xffd0
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%define SSM_DR7 0xffc8
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%define PROTECT_MODE_CS 0x8
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%define PROTECT_MODE_DS 0x20
|
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|
%define LONG_MODE_CS 0x38
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%define TSS_SEGMENT 0x40
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|
%define GDT_SIZE 0x50
|
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extern ASM_PFX(SmiRendezvous)
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|
|
extern ASM_PFX(gSmiHandlerIdtr)
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|
extern ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
|
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|
|
extern ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugExit)
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-01 23:01:08 +01:00
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase)
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "XdSupported" with PatchInstructionX86()
"mXdSupported" is a global BOOLEAN variable, initialized to TRUE. The
CheckFeatureSupported() function is executed on all processors (not
concurrently though), called from SmmInitHandler(). If XD support is found
to be missing on any CPU, then "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE, and further
processors omit the check. Afterwards, "mXdSupported" is read by several
assembly and C code locations.
The tricky part is *where* "mXdSupported" is allocated (defined):
- Before commit 717fb60443fb ("UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Add paging
protection.", 2016-11-17), it used to be a normal global variable,
defined (allocated) in "SmmProfile.c".
- With said commit, we moved the definition (allocation) of "mXdSupported"
into "SmiEntry.nasm". The variable was defined over the last byte of a
"mov al, 1" instruction, so that setting it to FALSE in
CheckFeatureSupported() would patch the instruction to "mov al, 0". The
subsequent conditional jump would change behavior, plus all further read
references to "mXdSupported" (in C and assembly code) would read back
the source (imm8) operand of the patched MOV instruction as data.
This trick required that the MOV instruction be encoded with DB.
In order to get rid of the DB, we have to split both roles: we need a
label for the code patching, and "mXdSupported" has to be defined
(allocated) independently of the code patching. Of course, their values
must always remain in sync.
(1) Reinstate the "mXdSupported" definition and initialization in
"SmmProfile.c" from before commit 717fb60443fb. Change the assembly
language definition ("global") to a declaration ("extern").
(2) Define the "gPatchXdSupported" label (type X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL)
in "SmiEntry.nasm", and add the C-language declaration to
"SmmProfileInternal.h". Replace the DB with the MOV mnemonic (keeping
the imm8 source operand with value 1).
(3) In CheckFeatureSupported(), whenever "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE,
patch the assembly code in sync, with PatchInstructionX86().
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 00:17:13 +01:00
|
|
|
extern ASM_PFX(mXdSupported)
|
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported)
|
2020-06-22 15:18:25 +02:00
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported)
|
2018-02-01 23:23:59 +01:00
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack)
|
2018-02-01 23:40:29 +01:00
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3)
|
2019-09-06 00:18:47 +02:00
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded)
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate)
|
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerSize)
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
extern ASM_PFX(mCetSupported)
|
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetSupported)
|
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetPl0Ssp)
|
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSsp)
|
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSspTable)
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT REL
|
|
|
|
SECTION .text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BITS 16
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
|
|
|
|
_SmiEntryPoint:
|
|
|
|
mov bx, _GdtDesc - _SmiEntryPoint + 0x8000
|
|
|
|
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET + DSC_GDTSIZ]
|
|
|
|
dec ax
|
|
|
|
mov [cs:bx], ax
|
|
|
|
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET + DSC_GDTPTR]
|
|
|
|
mov [cs:bx + 2], eax
|
|
|
|
o32 lgdt [cs:bx] ; lgdt fword ptr cs:[bx]
|
|
|
|
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
mov [cs:bx-0x2],ax
|
2018-02-01 23:01:08 +01:00
|
|
|
mov edi, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
lea eax, [edi + (@ProtectedMode - _SmiEntryPoint) + 0x8000]
|
|
|
|
mov [cs:bx-0x6],eax
|
|
|
|
mov ebx, cr0
|
|
|
|
and ebx, 0x9ffafff3
|
|
|
|
or ebx, 0x23
|
|
|
|
mov cr0, ebx
|
|
|
|
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
_GdtDesc:
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
DW 0
|
|
|
|
DD 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BITS 32
|
|
|
|
@ProtectedMode:
|
|
|
|
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
|
|
|
|
o16 mov ds, ax
|
|
|
|
o16 mov es, ax
|
|
|
|
o16 mov fs, ax
|
|
|
|
o16 mov gs, ax
|
|
|
|
o16 mov ss, ax
|
2018-02-01 23:23:59 +01:00
|
|
|
mov esp, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
jmp ProtFlatMode
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BITS 64
|
|
|
|
ProtFlatMode:
|
2018-02-01 23:40:29 +01:00
|
|
|
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3):
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
mov cr3, rax
|
|
|
|
mov eax, 0x668 ; as cr4.PGE is not set here, refresh cr3
|
2019-06-12 11:26:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov cl, strict byte 0 ; source operand will be patched
|
2019-09-06 00:18:47 +02:00
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded):
|
2019-06-12 11:26:45 +02:00
|
|
|
cmp cl, 0
|
|
|
|
je SkipEnable5LevelPaging
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Enable 5-Level Paging bit
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
bts eax, 12 ; Set LA57 bit (bit #12)
|
|
|
|
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
mov cr4, rax ; in PreModifyMtrrs() to flush TLB.
|
|
|
|
; Load TSS
|
|
|
|
sub esp, 8 ; reserve room in stack
|
|
|
|
sgdt [rsp]
|
|
|
|
mov eax, [rsp + 2] ; eax = GDT base
|
|
|
|
add esp, 8
|
|
|
|
mov dl, 0x89
|
|
|
|
mov [rax + TSS_SEGMENT + 5], dl ; clear busy flag
|
|
|
|
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
|
|
|
|
ltr ax
|
|
|
|
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
; enable NXE if supported
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: patch "XdSupported" with PatchInstructionX86()
"mXdSupported" is a global BOOLEAN variable, initialized to TRUE. The
CheckFeatureSupported() function is executed on all processors (not
concurrently though), called from SmmInitHandler(). If XD support is found
to be missing on any CPU, then "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE, and further
processors omit the check. Afterwards, "mXdSupported" is read by several
assembly and C code locations.
The tricky part is *where* "mXdSupported" is allocated (defined):
- Before commit 717fb60443fb ("UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Add paging
protection.", 2016-11-17), it used to be a normal global variable,
defined (allocated) in "SmmProfile.c".
- With said commit, we moved the definition (allocation) of "mXdSupported"
into "SmiEntry.nasm". The variable was defined over the last byte of a
"mov al, 1" instruction, so that setting it to FALSE in
CheckFeatureSupported() would patch the instruction to "mov al, 0". The
subsequent conditional jump would change behavior, plus all further read
references to "mXdSupported" (in C and assembly code) would read back
the source (imm8) operand of the patched MOV instruction as data.
This trick required that the MOV instruction be encoded with DB.
In order to get rid of the DB, we have to split both roles: we need a
label for the code patching, and "mXdSupported" has to be defined
(allocated) independently of the code patching. Of course, their values
must always remain in sync.
(1) Reinstate the "mXdSupported" definition and initialization in
"SmmProfile.c" from before commit 717fb60443fb. Change the assembly
language definition ("global") to a declaration ("extern").
(2) Define the "gPatchXdSupported" label (type X86_ASSEMBLY_PATCH_LABEL)
in "SmiEntry.nasm", and add the C-language declaration to
"SmmProfileInternal.h". Replace the DB with the MOV mnemonic (keeping
the imm8 source operand with value 1).
(3) In CheckFeatureSupported(), whenever "mXdSupported" is set to FALSE,
patch the assembly code in sync, with PatchInstructionX86().
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
2018-02-02 00:17:13 +01:00
|
|
|
mov al, strict byte 1 ; source operand may be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
cmp al, 0
|
|
|
|
jz @SkipXd
|
2020-06-22 15:18:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
; If MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE is supported, clear XD Disable bit
|
|
|
|
mov al, strict byte 1 ; source operand may be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported):
|
|
|
|
cmp al, 1
|
|
|
|
jz MsrIa32MiscEnableSupported
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
; MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE not supported
|
|
|
|
sub esp, 4
|
|
|
|
xor rdx, rdx
|
|
|
|
push rdx ; don't try to restore the XD Disable bit just before RSM
|
|
|
|
jmp EnableNxe
|
|
|
|
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Check XD disable bit
|
|
|
|
;
|
2020-06-22 15:18:25 +02:00
|
|
|
MsrIa32MiscEnableSupported:
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
|
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
|
|
sub esp, 4
|
|
|
|
push rdx ; save MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE[63-32]
|
|
|
|
test edx, BIT2 ; MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE[34]
|
2020-06-22 15:18:25 +02:00
|
|
|
jz EnableNxe
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
and dx, 0xFFFB ; clear XD Disable bit if it is set
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
2020-06-22 15:18:25 +02:00
|
|
|
EnableNxe:
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
|
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
|
|
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD ; enable NXE
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
jmp @XdDone
|
|
|
|
@SkipXd:
|
|
|
|
sub esp, 8
|
|
|
|
@XdDone:
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
; Switch into @LongMode
|
|
|
|
push LONG_MODE_CS ; push cs hardcore here
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
call Base ; push return address for retf later
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
Base:
|
|
|
|
add dword [rsp], @LongMode - Base; offset for far retf, seg is the 1st arg
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
or ah, 1 ; enable LME
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
mov rbx, cr0
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
or ebx, 0x80010023 ; enable paging + WP + NE + MP + PE
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
mov cr0, rbx
|
|
|
|
retf
|
|
|
|
@LongMode: ; long mode (64-bit code) starts here
|
2018-01-11 10:05:15 +01:00
|
|
|
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, ASM_PFX(gSmiHandlerIdtr)
|
|
|
|
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
lidt [rax]
|
|
|
|
lea ebx, [rdi + DSC_OFFSET]
|
|
|
|
mov ax, [rbx + DSC_DS]
|
|
|
|
mov ds, eax
|
|
|
|
mov ax, [rbx + DSC_OTHERSEG]
|
|
|
|
mov es, eax
|
|
|
|
mov fs, eax
|
|
|
|
mov gs, eax
|
|
|
|
mov ax, [rbx + DSC_SS]
|
|
|
|
mov ss, eax
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
mov rbx, [rsp + 0x8] ; rbx <- CpuIndex
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
; enable CET if supported
|
|
|
|
mov al, strict byte 1 ; source operand may be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetSupported):
|
|
|
|
cmp al, 0
|
|
|
|
jz CetDone
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_S_CET
|
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
|
|
push rdx
|
|
|
|
push rax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP
|
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
|
|
push rdx
|
|
|
|
push rax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR
|
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
|
|
push rdx
|
|
|
|
push rax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_S_CET
|
|
|
|
mov eax, MSR_IA32_CET_SH_STK_EN
|
|
|
|
xor edx, edx
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP
|
|
|
|
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetPl0Ssp):
|
|
|
|
xor edx, edx
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
mov rcx, cr0
|
|
|
|
btr ecx, 16 ; clear WP
|
|
|
|
mov cr0, rcx
|
|
|
|
mov [eax], eax ; reload SSP, and clear busyflag.
|
|
|
|
xor ecx, ecx
|
|
|
|
mov [eax + 4], ecx
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR
|
|
|
|
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSspTable):
|
|
|
|
xor edx, edx
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov eax, strict dword 0 ; source operand will be patched
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(mPatchCetInterruptSsp):
|
|
|
|
cmp eax, 0
|
|
|
|
jz CetInterruptDone
|
|
|
|
mov [eax], eax ; reload SSP, and clear busyflag.
|
|
|
|
xor ecx, ecx
|
|
|
|
mov [eax + 4], ecx
|
|
|
|
CetInterruptDone:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov rcx, cr0
|
|
|
|
bts ecx, 16 ; set WP
|
|
|
|
mov cr0, rcx
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov eax, 0x668 | CR4_CET
|
|
|
|
mov cr4, rax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SETSSBSY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CetDone:
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Save FP registers
|
|
|
|
;
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
sub rsp, 0x200
|
2018-03-23 20:54:19 +01:00
|
|
|
fxsave64 [rsp]
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
add rsp, -0x20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov rcx, rbx
|
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191
Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler
is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax,
then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5
doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the
relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work.
; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed
...
mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
call rax
Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5.
One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to
another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original
code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address.
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler
_SmiHandlerAbsAddr:
jmp rax
...
call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address,
can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed,
the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is
requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should
not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified.
...
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
call rax
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
|
|
|
|
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
|
|
|
|
call rax
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
mov rcx, rbx
|
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191
Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler
is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax,
then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5
doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the
relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work.
; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed
...
mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
call rax
Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5.
One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to
another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original
code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address.
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler
_SmiHandlerAbsAddr:
jmp rax
...
call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address,
can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed,
the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is
requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should
not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified.
...
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
call rax
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(SmiRendezvous)
|
|
|
|
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
|
|
|
|
call rax
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
mov rcx, rbx
|
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191
Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler
is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax,
then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5
doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the
relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work.
; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed
...
mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
call rax
Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5.
One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to
another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original
code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address.
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler
_SmiHandlerAbsAddr:
jmp rax
...
call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address,
can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed,
the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is
requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should
not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified.
...
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
call rax
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugExit)
|
|
|
|
CpuSmmDebugExitAbsAddr:
|
|
|
|
call rax
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
add rsp, 0x20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Restore FP registers
|
|
|
|
;
|
2018-03-23 20:54:19 +01:00
|
|
|
fxrstor64 [rsp]
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
add rsp, 0x200
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, ASM_PFX(mCetSupported)
|
|
|
|
mCetSupportedAbsAddr:
|
|
|
|
mov al, [rax]
|
|
|
|
cmp al, 0
|
|
|
|
jz CetDone2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov eax, 0x668
|
|
|
|
mov cr4, rax ; disable CET
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR
|
|
|
|
pop rax
|
|
|
|
pop rdx
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP
|
|
|
|
pop rax
|
|
|
|
pop rdx
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_S_CET
|
|
|
|
pop rax
|
|
|
|
pop rdx
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
CetDone2:
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191
Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler
is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax,
then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5
doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the
relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work.
; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed
...
mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
call rax
Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5.
One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to
another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original
code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address.
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler
_SmiHandlerAbsAddr:
jmp rax
...
call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address,
can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed,
the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is
requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should
not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified.
...
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
call rax
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; lea rax, [ASM_PFX(mXdSupported)]
|
|
|
|
mXdSupportedAbsAddr:
|
2016-10-23 17:19:52 +02:00
|
|
|
mov al, [rax]
|
|
|
|
cmp al, 0
|
|
|
|
jz .1
|
|
|
|
pop rdx ; get saved MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE[63-32]
|
|
|
|
test edx, BIT2
|
|
|
|
jz .1
|
|
|
|
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
|
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
|
|
or dx, BIT2 ; set XD Disable bit if it was set before entering into SMM
|
|
|
|
wrmsr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.1:
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 03:32:10 +02:00
|
|
|
StuffRsb64
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
rsm
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-30 08:24:19 +01:00
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerSize) DW $ - _SmiEntryPoint
|
2016-06-14 10:35:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191
Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler
is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax,
then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5
doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the
relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work.
; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed
...
mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
call rax
Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5.
One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to
another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original
code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address.
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler
_SmiHandlerAbsAddr:
jmp rax
...
call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address,
can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed,
the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is
requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should
not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified.
...
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
call rax
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; Retrieve the address and fill it into mov opcode.
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
; It is called in the driver entry point first.
|
|
|
|
; It is used to fix up the real address in mov opcode.
|
|
|
|
; Then, after the code logic is copied to the different location,
|
|
|
|
; the code can also run.
|
|
|
|
;
|
2018-01-11 10:05:15 +01:00
|
|
|
global ASM_PFX(PiSmmCpuSmiEntryFixupAddress)
|
|
|
|
ASM_PFX(PiSmmCpuSmiEntryFixupAddress):
|
|
|
|
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(gSmiHandlerIdtr)]
|
|
|
|
lea rcx, [SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr]
|
|
|
|
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
|
|
|
|
|
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Update SmiEntry function run the same position
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1191
Before commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89, jmp _SmiHandler
is commented. And below code, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) is moved into rax,
then call it. But, this code doesn't work in XCODE5 tool chain. Because XCODE5
doesn't generated the absolute address in the EFI image. So, rax stores the
relative address. Once this logic is moved to another place, it will not work.
; jmp _SmiHandler ; instruction is not needed
...
mov rax, ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
call rax
Commit e21e355e2ca7fefb15b4df7078f995d3fb9c2b89 is to support XCODE5.
One tricky way is selected to fix it. Although SmiEntry logic is copied to
another place and run, but here jmp _SmiHandler is enabled to jmp the original
code place, then call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry) with the relative address.
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; mov rax, _SmiHandler
_SmiHandlerAbsAddr:
jmp rax
...
call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
Now, BZ 1191 raises the issue that SmiHandler should run in the copied address,
can't run in the common address. So, jmp _SmiHandler is required to be removed,
the code is kept to run in copied address. And, the relative address is
requried to be fixed up to the absolute address. The necessary changes should
not affect the behavior of platforms that already consume PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
OVMF SMM boot to shell with VS2017, GCC5 and XCODE5 tool chain has been verified.
...
mov rax, strict qword 0 ; call ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)
CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr:
call rax
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2018-09-21 02:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugEntry)]
|
|
|
|
lea rcx, [CpuSmmDebugEntryAbsAddr]
|
|
|
|
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(SmiRendezvous)]
|
|
|
|
lea rcx, [SmiRendezvousAbsAddr]
|
|
|
|
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(CpuSmmDebugExit)]
|
|
|
|
lea rcx, [CpuSmmDebugExitAbsAddr]
|
|
|
|
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(mXdSupported)]
|
|
|
|
lea rcx, [mXdSupportedAbsAddr]
|
2018-01-11 10:05:15 +01:00
|
|
|
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
|
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM.
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/
https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lea rax, [ASM_PFX(mCetSupported)]
|
|
|
|
lea rcx, [mCetSupportedAbsAddr]
|
|
|
|
mov qword [rcx - 8], rax
|
2018-01-11 10:05:15 +01:00
|
|
|
ret
|