REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1946
The patch changes SMM environment to use 5 level paging when CPU
supports it.
Signed-off-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7365eb2c8c)
This reverts commit 7365eb2c8c.
Commit
7c5010c7f8 MdePkg/BaseLib.h: Update IA32_CR4 structure for 5-level paging
technically breaks the EDKII development process documented in
https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/EDK-II-Development-Process
and Maintainers.txt in EDKII repo root directory.
The voilation is commit 7c5010c7f8 doesn't have a Reviewed-by or
Acked-by from MdePkg maintainers.
In order to revert 7c5010c7f8, 7365eb2c8 needs to revert first otherwise
simply reverting 7c5010c7f8 will cause build break.
Signed-off-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1946
The patch changes SMM environment to use 5 level paging when CPU
supports it.
Signed-off-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521
We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget.
http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master
This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver.
This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM.
If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack.
SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and
restore OS CET context at SmmExit.
Test:
1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled)
Boot test:
CET supported or not supported CPU
on CET supported platform
CET enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled
Single core/Multiple core
PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled
PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled
CET exception test:
#CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled.
Other exception test:
#PF for normal stack overflow
#PF for NX protection
#PF for RO protection
CET env test:
Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE
The test case can be found at
https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg
2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only)
test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE.
qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4
-serial file:serial.log
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd
QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty)
3) not tested
IA32 CET enabled platform
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Within function GetUefiMemoryAttributesTable(), add a check to avoid
possible null pointer dereference.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
It treats the UEFI runtime page with EFI_MEMORY_RO attribute as
invalid SMM communication buffer.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
It treats GCD untested memory as invalid SMM
communication buffer.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
AllocateCodePages() is used to allocate buffer for IDT range,
the code pages will be set to RO in SetMemMapAttributes(),
then the code to set IDT range to RO in PatchGdtIdtMap() is
redundant and could be removed.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
When StackGuard is enabled on IA32, the #double fault exception
is reported instead of #page fault.
This issue does not exist on X64, or IA32 without StackGuard.
The fix at e4435f710c was incomplete.
It is because AllocateCodePages() is used to allocate buffer for
GDT and TSS, the code pages will be set to RO in SetMemMapAttributes().
But IA32 Stack Guard need use task switch to switch stack that need
write GDT and TSS, so AllocateCodePages() could not be used.
This patch uses AllocatePages() instead of AllocateCodePages() to
allocate buffer for GDT and TSS if StackGuard is enabled on IA32.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Heap guard makes use of paging mechanism to implement its functionality. But
there's no protocol or library available to change page attribute in SMM mode.
A new protocol gEdkiiSmmMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid is introduced to make it
happen. This protocol provide three interfaces
struct _EDKII_SMM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL {
EDKII_SMM_GET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES GetMemoryAttributes;
EDKII_SMM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES SetMemoryAttributes;
EDKII_SMM_CLEAR_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ClearMemoryAttributes;
};
Since heap guard feature need to update page attributes. The page table
should not set to be read-only if heap guard feature is enabled for SMM
mode. Otherwise this feature cannot work.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ayellet Wolman <ayellet.wolman@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=624 reports
memory protection crash in PiSmmCpuDxeSmm, Ia32 build with
RAM above 4GB (of which 2GB are placed in 64-bit address).
It is because UEFI builds identity mapping page tables,
>4G address is not supported at Ia32 build.
This patch is to get the PhysicalAddressBits that is used
to build in PageTbl.c(Ia32/X64), and use it to check whether
the address is supported or not in ConvertMemoryPageAttributes().
With this patch, the debug messages will be like below.
UefiMemory protection: 0x0 - 0x9F000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x100000 - 0x807000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x808000 - 0x810000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x818000 - 0x820000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x1510000 - 0x7B798000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x7B79B000 - 0x7E538000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x7E539000 - 0x7E545000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x7E55A000 - 0x7E61F000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x7E62B000 - 0x7F6AB000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x7F703000 - 0x7F70B000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x7F70F000 - 0x7F778000 Success
UefiMemory protection: 0x100000000 - 0x180000000 Unsupported
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Originally-suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This PCD holds the address mask for page table entries when memory
encryption is enabled on AMD processors supporting the Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) feature.
The mask is applied when page tables entriees are created or modified.
CC: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Leo Duran <leo.duran@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
This patch sets the normal OS buffer EfiLoaderCode/Data,
EfiBootServicesCode/Data, EfiConventionalMemory, EfiACPIReclaimMemory
to be not present after SmmReadyToLock.
To access these region in OS runtime phase is not a good solution.
Previously, we did similar check in SmmMemLib to help SMI handler
do the check. But if SMI handler forgets the check, it can still
access these OS region and bring risk.
So here we enforce the policy to prevent it happening.
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
This patch fixes https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=246
Previously, when SMM exception happens after EndOfDxe,
with StackGuard enabled on IA32, the #double fault exception
is reported instead of #page fault.
Root cause is below:
Current EDKII SMM page protection will lock GDT.
If IA32 stack guard is enabled, the page fault handler will do task switch.
This task switch need write busy flag in GDT, and write TSS.
However, the GDT and TSS is locked at that time, so the
double fault happens.
We decide to not lock GDT for IA32 StackGuard enabled.
This issue does not exist on X64, or IA32 without StackGuard.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=277
Remove dependency on layout of PROCESSOR_SMM_DESCRIPTOR
everywhere possible. The only exception is the standard
SMI entry handler template that is included with the
PiSmmCpuDxeSmm module. This allows an instance of the
SmmCpuFeaturesLib to provide alternate
PROCESSOR_SMM_DESCRIPTOR structure layouts.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
PiSmmCpu driver may split page for page attribute request.
Current logic not only propagates the super page attribute to
the leaf page attribut, but also to the directory page attribute.
However, the later might be wrong because we cannot clear protection
without touching directory page attribute.
The effective protection is the strictest combination
across the levels.
We should always clear protection on directory page and set
protection on leaf page for easy clearing later.
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
When XD is not supported, the BIT63 is reserved.
We should not set BIT63 in the page table.
Test OVMF IA32/IA32X64 with XD enabled/disabled.
Analyzed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
PiSmmCpuDxeSmm consumes SmmAttributesTable and setup page table:
1) Code region is marked as read-only and Data region is non-executable,
if the PE image is 4K aligned.
2) Important data structure is set to RO, such as GDT/IDT.
3) SmmSaveState is set to non-executable,
and SmmEntrypoint is set to read-only.
4) If static page is supported, page table is read-only.
We use page table to protect other components, and itself.
If we use dynamic paging, we can still provide *partial* protection.
And hope page table is not modified by other components.
The XD enabling code is moved to SmiEntry to let NX take effect.
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ray Ni
Michael D Kinney
Jiewen Yao
Hao Wu
Star Zeng
Jian J Wang
Leo Duran