A subsequent patch in the series will make the
ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellCommandLib/UefiShellCommandLib.inf
instance dependent on the OrderedCollectionLib class. Because the shell
binary in this platform consumes the above UefiShellCommandLib instance,
resolve OrderedCollectionLib.
Cc: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
Cc: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Maurice Ma <maurice.ma@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3151
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-6-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
A subsequent patch in the series will make the
ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellCommandLib/UefiShellCommandLib.inf
instance dependent on the OrderedCollectionLib class. Because the shell
binary in this platform consumes the above UefiShellCommandLib instance,
resolve OrderedCollectionLib.
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3151
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-5-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Some UEFI shell commands read and write files in chunks. The chunk size is
given by "PcdShellFileOperationSize", whose default in
"ShellPkg/ShellPkg.dec" is 4KB (0x1000).
The virtio-fs daemon of QEMU advertizes a 128KB maximum buffer size by
default, for the FUSE_WRITE operation.
By raising PcdShellFileOperationSize 32-fold, the number of FUSE write
requests shrinks proportionately, when writing large files. And when a
Virtio Filesystem is not used, a 128KB chunk size is still not
particularly wasteful.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3125
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-4-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Some UEFI shell commands read and write files in chunks. The chunk size is
given by "PcdShellFileOperationSize", whose default in
"ShellPkg/ShellPkg.dec" is 4KB (0x1000).
The virtio-fs daemon of QEMU advertizes a 128KB maximum buffer size by
default, for the FUSE_WRITE operation.
By raising PcdShellFileOperationSize 32-fold, the number of FUSE write
requests shrinks proportionately, when writing large files. And when a
Virtio Filesystem is not used, a 128KB chunk size is still not
particularly wasteful.
Some ad-hoc measurements on my laptop, using OVMF:
- The time it takes to copy a ~270MB file from a Virtio Filesystem to the
same Virtio Filesystem improves from ~9 seconds to ~1 second.
- The time it takes to compare two identical ~270MB files on the same
Virtio Filesystem improves from ~11 seconds to ~3 seconds.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3125
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-3-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
The COMP shell command compares two files byte for byte. In order to
retrieve the bytes to compare, it currently invokes
gEfiShellProtocol->ReadFile() on both files, using a single-byte buffer
every time. This is very inefficient; the underlying
EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL.Read() function may be costly.
Read both file operands in chunks of "PcdShellFileOperationSize" bytes.
Draw bytes for comparison from the internal read-ahead buffers.
Some ad-hoc measurements on my laptop, using OVMF, and the 4KB default of
"PcdShellFileOperationSize":
- When comparing two identical 1MB files that are served by EnhancedFatDxe
on top of VirtioScsiDxe, this patch brings no noticeable improvement;
the comparison completes in <1s both before and after.
- When comparing two identical 1MB files served by VirtioFsDxe, the
comparison time improves from 2 minutes 25 seconds to <1s.
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3123
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
We faced a problem with passing through a PCI device with 64GB BAR to UEFI
guest. The BAR is expectedly programmed into 64-bit PCI aperture at 64G
address which pushes physical address space to 37 bits. That is above
36-bit width that OVMF exposes currently to a guest without tweaking
PcdPciMmio64Size knob.
The reverse calculation using this knob was inhereted from QEMU-KVM
platform code where it serves the purpose of finding max accessible
physical address without necessary trusting emulated CPUID physbits value
(that could be different from host physbits). On Xen we expect to use
CPUID policy to level the data correctly to prevent situations with guest
physbits > host physbits e.g. across migrations.
The next aspect raising concern - resource consumption for DXE IPL page
tables and time required to map the whole address space in case of using
CPUID bits directly. That could be mitigated by enabling support for 1G
pages in DXE IPL configuration. 1G pages are available on most CPUs
produced in the last 10 years and those without don't have many phys bits.
Remove all the redundant code now (including PcdPciMmio64.. handling
that's not used on Xen anyway) and grab physbits directly from CPUID that
should be what baremetal UEFI systems do.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Message-Id: <1610509335-23314-1-git-send-email-igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: fix up authorship from groups.io-mangled From line]
[lersek@redhat.com: wrap commit message at 74 characters]
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3105
This new library uses a platform agnostic algorithm to get CPU
cache information. It provides user with an API(GetCpuCacheInfo)
to get detailed CPU cache information by each package, each core
type included in this package, and each cache level & type.
This library can be used by code that produces SMBIOS_TABLE_TYPE7
SMBIOS table.
Signed-off-by: Jason Lou <yun.lou@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3105
The UefiCpuPkg/CpuCacheInfoLib will reference new definition
about CPUID_HYBRID_INFORMATION Leaf(1Ah).
Signed-off-by: Jason Lou <yun.lou@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Commit 8015f3f6d4 ("ArmPlatformPkg: Enable support for flash in
64-bit address space") updated the NorFlash DXE and StMM drivers to
take alternate PCDs into account when discovering the base of the
NOR flash regions.
This introduced a disparity between the declarations of the PCD references
in the .INF files, which permits the use of dynamic PCDs, and the code
itself, which now uses FixedPcdGet() accessors. On platforms that actually
use dynamic PCDs, this results in a build error.
So let's clean this up:
- for the DXE version, use the generic PcdGet() accessors, so dynamic PCDs
are permitted
- for the standalone MM version, redeclare the PCDs as [FixedPcd] in the
.INF description, and switch to the FixedPcdGet() accessors.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vijayenthiran Subramaniam <vijayenthiran.subramaniam@arm.com>
I will no longer work for ARM as of next month, and will therefore
lose access to my @arm.com email account. I intend to remain active
in the Tianocore project nonetheless, so let's update my email accounts
to one that is not tied to my current or future employer.
Cc: <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3149
Address MEM64 BAR in type unknown if sizing fail in high 32bit.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zarcd Zhong <zarcd.zhong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Platform specific implementation of acquiring credential
to access to Redfish service. This is the platform library
which incorporates with Redfish Credential DXE driver under
Redfish package.
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3113
According to FAT specification, the length of file path
should not larger than 260. When the length exceed 260,
function FatLocateOFile will return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
and the parameter FileHandle will be NULL. Then on the
top-level function?an exception happens when the NULL
pointer is passed and be used.
So adding return value check after calling
LibGetFileHandleFromMenu, if return value is not success,
stop calling LibFindFiles.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Move HTTP header manipulation functions to DxeHttpLib from
HttpBootSupport.c. These general functions are used by both
Http BOOT and RedfishLib (patches will be sent later).
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Cc: Fan Wang <fan.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
In the following corner case, the build report
will crash. This patch is to fix this problem.
Case:
Multiple SKU are used and 2 more DynamicHii structure Pcds
are set in dsc file under different SKU. And 1 more of those
Pcds are not used in any INF file.
Signed-off-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Yuwei Chen<yuwei.chen@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3138
PcdPcieResizableBarSupport was added in MdeModulePkg.dec, update
UNI file as the documentation of the PCD.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Heng Luo <heng.luo@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3138
Change default value of PcdPcieResizableBarSupport to FALSE, avoid it
impacts existing platforms.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Heng Luo <heng.luo@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3084
When DXE drivers are dispatched above 4GB memory in 64bit
mode, the address setCodeSelectorLongJump in stack will
be override by parameter. Jump to Qword is not supported
by some processors. So use "o64 retf" instead.
Signed-off-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
This patch fixed the hang in UEFICpuPkg when it is dispatched above 4GB.
In UEFI BIOS case CpuInfoInHob is provided to DXE under 4GB from PEI.
When using UEFI payload and bootloaders, CpuInfoInHob will be allocated
above 4GB since it is not provided from bootloader. so we need update
the code to make sure this hob could be accessed correctly in this case.
Signed-off-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
This patch makes two refinements to reduce SMRAM consumption in CpuS3.c.
1. Only do CopyRegisterTable() when register table is not empty,
IsRegisterTableEmpty() is created to check whether the register table
is empty or not.
Take empty PreSmmInitRegisterTable as example, about 24K SMRAM consumption
could be reduced when mAcpiCpuData.NumberOfCpus=1024.
sizeof (CPU_REGISTER_TABLE) = 24
mAcpiCpuData.NumberOfCpus = 1024 = 1K
mAcpiCpuData.NumberOfCpus * sizeof (CPU_REGISTER_TABLE) = 24K
2. Only copy table entries buffer instead of whole buffer.
AllocatedSize in SourceRegisterTableList is the whole buffer size.
Actually, only the table entries buffer needs to be copied, and the size
is TableLength * sizeof (CPU_REGISTER_TABLE_ENTRY).
Take AllocatedSize=0x1000=4096, TableLength=100 and NumberOfCpus=1024 as example,
about 1696K SMRAM consumption could be reduced.
sizeof (CPU_REGISTER_TABLE_ENTRY) = 24
TableLength = 100
TableLength * sizeof (CPU_REGISTER_TABLE_ENTRY) = 2400
AllocatedSize = 0x1000 = 4096
AllocatedSize - TableLength * sizeof (CPU_REGISTER_TABLE_ENTRY) = 4096 - 2400 = 1696
NumberOfCpus = 1024 = 1K
NumberOfCpus * (AllocatedSize - TableLength * sizeof (CPU_REGISTER_TABLE_ENTRY)) = 1696K
This patch also corrects the CopyRegisterTable() function description.
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210111015419.28368-1-star.zeng@intel.com>
Neither of the "CPU Socket Unpopulated" or "Do not reboot" messages
should contain the word "Bits".
Remove them and update the identifier for the "Do not reboot" message
to remove the word "BITS".
Signed-off-by: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
The EfiGetVariable() is used in the entry of this module. So, the
variable services are required to be ready before they are used. This
patch adds the arch protocol gEfiVariableArchProtocolGuid to dependency
expression to guarantee that this module will be started once the
variable protocol is available.
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nhi Pham <nhi@os.amperecomputing.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Open source project jansson is leveraged by edk2 JsonLib.
Add jansson to the required submodule in CiSettings.py.
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
Cc: Bret Barkelew <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Bret Barkelew <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Add EDK2 port jansson library (JsonLib) to RedfishPkg
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
edk2 JsonLib which is the edk2 port of open source
jansson library.
(https://github.com/akheron/jansson)
jansson library is the open source project to manipulate
JSON data structure.
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Redfish CRT library is currently used by edk2 JsonLib
(open source jansson project) and edk2 RedfishLib
(libredfish open source project). Redfish CrtLib library
provides the necessary C runtime equivalent edk2 functions
for open source projects.
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Add git submodule "jansson" library, which is the open
source project (https://github.com/akheron/jansson) used
to manipulate JSON data structure. jansson library is
wrapped as edk2 JsonLib and the use cases will be the
edk2 Redfish feature drivers and edk2 port of libredfish
(https://github.com/DMTF/libredfish).
jansson open source project is under MIT license.
(refer to ReadMe.rst under edk2).
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
This library provides UCS2 to UFT8 or vise versa functions to
manipulate UCS2/UTF8 strings. This library is currently used
by edk2 port of open source jansson library.
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@hpe.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Cc: Peter O'Hanley <peter.ohanley@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Nickle Wang <nickle.wang@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Commit 55ee36b0c4
("EmbeddedPkg/RealTimeClockRuntimeDxe: Use helper functions from TimeBaseLib")
added a TimeBaseLib dependency to RealTimeClockRuntimeDxe, which now breaks
build of OvmfXen.dsc.
Add a resolution for EmbeddedPkg/Library/TimeBaseLib/TimeBaseLib.inf.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Commit 55ee36b0c4
("EmbeddedPkg/RealTimeClockRuntimeDxe: Use helper functions from TimeBaseLib")
added a TimeBaseLib dependency to RealTimeClockRuntimeDxe, which now breaks
build of EmbeddedPkg.dsc.
Add a resolution for EmbeddedPkg/Library/TimeBaseLib/TimeBaseLib.inf.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Nhi Pham <nhi@os.amperecomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Use the correct type in the sizeof() expression to calculate the size
of the newly allocated EFI_HOB_MEMORY_POOL hob.
Link: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3139
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Bugzilla: 3048 (https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3048)
Add a new parser for the Arm Error Source Table (AEST) described in
the ACPI for the Armv8 RAS Extensions 1.1 Platform Design Document,
dated 28 September 2020.
(https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0085/0101/)
AEST enables kernel-first handling of errors in a system that supports
the Armv8 RAS extensions. It covers Armv8.2+ RAS extensions for PEs
and the RAS system architecture for non-PE system components.
Signed-off-by: Marc Moisson-Franckhauser <marc.moisson-franckhauser@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Bugzilla: 3049 (https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3049)
Add definition for the Arm Error Source Table (AEST) described in
the ACPI for the Armv8 RAS Extensions 1.1 Platform Design Document,
dated 28 September 2020.
(https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0085/0101/)
Signed-off-by: Marc Moisson-Franckhauser <marc.moisson-franckhauser@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
When SEV-ES is active, and MMIO operation will trigger a #VC and the
VmgExitLib exception handler will process this MMIO operation.
A malicious hypervisor could try to extract information from encrypted
memory by setting a reserved bit in the guests nested page tables for
a non-MMIO area. This can result in the encrypted data being copied into
the GHCB shared buffer area and accessed by the hypervisor.
Prevent this by ensuring that the MMIO source/destination is un-encrypted
memory. For the APIC register space, access is allowed in general.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <0cf28470ad5e694af45f7f0b35296628f819567d.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
Protect the GHCB backup pages used by an SEV-ES guest when S3 is
supported.
Regarding the lifecycle of the GHCB backup pages:
PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase
(a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM
If SEV-ES is enabled, the GHCB backup pages are initialized when a
nested #VC is received during the SEC phase
[OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitVcHandler.c].
(b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE
If S3 and SEV-ES are enabled, then InitializeRamRegions()
[OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] protects the ranges with an AcpiNVS
memory allocation HOB, in PEI.
If S3 is disabled, then these ranges are not protected. PEI switches to
the GHCB backup pages in permanent PEI memory and DXE will use these
PEI GHCB backup pages, so we don't have to preserve
PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase.
(c) how it is protected from the OS
If S3 is enabled, then (b) reserves it from the OS too.
If S3 is disabled, then the range needs no protection.
(d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path
It is rewritten same as in (a), which is fine because (b) reserved it.
(e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path
It is rewritten same as in (a).
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <119102a3d14caa70d81aee334a2e0f3f925e1a60.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In order to be able to issue messages or make interface calls that cause
another #VC (e.g. GetLocalApicBaseAddress () issues RDMSR), add support
for nested #VCs.
In order to support nested #VCs, GHCB backup pages are required. If a #VC
is received while currently processing a #VC, a backup of the current GHCB
content is made. This allows the #VC handler to continue processing the
new #VC. Upon completion of the new #VC, the GHCB is restored from the
backup page. The #VC recursion level is tracked in the per-vCPU variable
area.
Support is added to handle up to one nested #VC (or two #VCs total). If
a second nested #VC is encountered, an ASSERT will be issued and the vCPU
will enter CpuDeadLoop ().
For SEC, the GHCB backup pages are reserved in the OvmfPkgX64.fdf memory
layout, with two new fixed PCDs to provide the address and size of the
backup area.
For PEI/DXE, the GHCB backup pages are allocated as boot services pages
using the memory allocation library.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <ac2e8203fc41a351b43f60d68bdad6b57c4fb106.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
Update the MemEncryptSevLib library to include an interface that can
report the encryption state on a range of memory. The values will
represent the range as being unencrypted, encrypted, a mix of unencrypted
and encrypted, and error (e.g. ranges that aren't mapped).
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <0d98f4d42a2b67310c29bac7bcdcf1eda6835847.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In preparation for a new interface to be added to the MemEncryptSevLib
library that will be used in SEC, create an SEC version of the library.
This requires the creation of SEC specific files.
Some of the current MemEncryptSevLib functions perform memory allocations
which cannot be performed in SEC, so these interfaces will return an error
during SEC. Also, the current MemEncryptSevLib library uses some static
variables to optimize access to variables, which cannot be used in SEC.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <bc7fa76cc23784ab3f37356b6c10dfec61942c38.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
Creating an SEC version of the library requires renaming an existing file
which will result in the existing code failing ECC. Prior to renaming the
existing file, fix the coding style to avoid the ECC failure.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f765d867da4a703e0a0db35e26515a911482fd40.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
Check the DR7 cached indicator against a specific value. This makes it
harder for a hypervisor to just write random data into that field in an
attempt to use an invalid DR7 value.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <65157c1155a9c058c43678400dfc0b486e327a3e.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
The PCIe MMCONFIG range should be treated as an MMIO range. However,
there is a comment in the code explaining why AddIoMemoryBaseSizeHob()
is not called. The AmdSevDxe walks the GCD map looking for MemoryMappedIo
or NonExistent type memory and will clear the encryption bit for these
ranges.
Since the MMCONFIG range does not have one of these types, the encryption
bit is not cleared for this range. Add support to detect the presence of
the MMCONFIG range and clear the encryption bit. This will be needed for
follow-on support that will validate that MMIO is not being performed to
an encrypted address range under SEV-ES.
Even though the encryption bit was set for this range, this still worked
under both SEV and SEV-ES because the address range is marked by the
hypervisor as MMIO in the nested page tables:
- For SEV, access to this address range triggers a nested page fault (NPF)
and the hardware supplies the guest physical address (GPA) in the VMCB's
EXITINFO2 field as part of the exit information. However, the encryption
bit is not set in the GPA, so the hypervisor can process the request
without any issues.
- For SEV-ES, access to this address range triggers a #VC. Since OVMF runs
identity mapped (VA == PA), the virtual address is used to avoid the
lookup of the physical address. The virtual address does not have the
encryption bit set, so the hypervisor can process the request without
any issues.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <711ae2dcb6cb29e4c60862c18330cff627269b81.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
The early assembler code performs validation for some of the SEV-related
information, specifically the encryption bit position. The new
MemEncryptSevGetEncryptionMask() interface provides access to this
validated value.
To ensure that we always use a validated encryption mask for an SEV-ES
guest, update all locations that use CPUID to calculate the encryption
mask to use the new interface.
Also, clean up some call areas where extra masking was being performed
and where a function call was being used instead of the local variable
that was just set using the function.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <9de678c0d66443c6cc33e004a4cac0a0223c2ebc.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
To ensure that we always use a validated encryption mask for an SEV-ES
guest, create a new interface in the MemEncryptSevLib library to return
the encryption mask. This can be used in place of the multiple locations
where CPUID is used to retrieve the value (which would require validation
again) and allows the validated mask to be returned.
The PEI phase will use the value from the SEV-ES work area. Since the
SEV-ES work area isn't valid in the DXE phase, the DXE phase will use the
PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask PCD which is set during PEI.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e12044dc01b21e6fc2e9535760ddf3a38a142a71.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
The early assembler code performs validation for some of the SEV-related
information, specifically the encryption bit position. To avoid having to
re-validate the encryption bit position as the system proceeds through its
boot phases, save the validated encryption bit position in the SEV-ES work
area for use by later phases.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <2609724859cf21f0c6d45bc323e94465dca4e621.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
If a hypervisor incorrectly reports through CPUID that SEV-ES is not
active, ensure that a #VC exception was not taken. If it is found that
a #VC was taken, then the code enters a HLT loop.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <afa2030b95b852313b13982df82d472187e59b92.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
To help mitigate against ROP attacks, add some checks to validate the
encryption bit position that is reported by the hypervisor.
The first check is to ensure that the hypervisor reports a bit position
above bit 31. After extracting the encryption bit position from the CPUID
information, the code checks that the value is above 31. If the value is
not above 31, then the bit position is not valid, so the code enters a
HLT loop.
The second check is specific to SEV-ES guests and is a two step process.
The first step will obtain random data using RDRAND and store that data to
memory before paging is enabled. When paging is not enabled, all writes to
memory are encrypted. The random data is maintained in registers, which
are protected. The second step is that, after enabling paging, the random
data in memory is compared to the register contents. If they don't match,
then the reported bit position is not valid, so the code enters a HLT
loop.
The third check is after switching to 64-bit long mode. Use the fact that
instruction fetches are automatically decrypted, while a memory fetch is
decrypted only if the encryption bit is set in the page table. By
comparing the bytes of an instruction fetch against a memory read of that
same instruction, the encryption bit position can be validated. If the
compare is not equal, then SEV/SEV-ES is active but the reported bit
position is not valid, so the code enters a HLT loop.
To keep the changes local to the OvmfPkg, an OvmfPkg version of the
Flat32ToFlat64.asm file has been created based on the UefiCpuPkg file
UefiCpuPkg/ResetVector/Vtf0/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <cb9c5ab23ab02096cd964ed64115046cc706ce67.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In order to allow for the SEV-ES workarea to be used for other purposes
and by other files, move the definition into the BaseMemEncryptSevLib
header file, MemEncryptSevLib.h.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <07d66f3384bd54da97d540e89b9f3473a6d17231.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
Simplify and consolidate the SEV and SEV-ES checks into a single routine.
This new routine will use CPUID to check for the appropriate CPUID leaves
and the required values, as well as read the non-interceptable SEV status
MSR (0xc0010131) to check SEV and SEV-ES enablement.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <43a660624c32b5f6c2610bf42ee39101c21aff68.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Laszlo Ersek
Igor Druzhinin
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Ard Biesheuvel
Zarcd Zhong
Abner Chang
wenyi,xie via groups.io
Bob Feng
Luo, Heng
Guo Dong
Zeng, Star
Rebecca Cran
Nhi Pham
Leif Lindholm
Liu, WeiX C
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Tom Lendacky