Commit 0426115b67 ("UefiCpuPkg: Remove unused API in
SmmCpuFeaturesLib.h", 2022-12-21) removed the declaration of the function
SmmCpuFeaturesAllocatePageTableMemory() from the "SmmCpuFeaturesLib.h"
library class header.
Remove the API's (null-)implementation from OvmfPkg/SmmCpuFeaturesLib as
well.
Testing: OVMF builds, boots, and suspends/resumes (see earlier in this
series).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4235
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Similarly to the "cadence" mentioned in commit d272449d9e ("OvmfPkg:
raise DXEFV size to 11 MB", 2018-05-29), it's been ~1.75 years since
commit 5e75c4d1fe ("OvmfPkg: raise DXEFV size to 12 MB", 2020-03-11),
and we've outgrown DXEFV again (with NOOPT builds). Increase the DXEFV
size to 13MB now.
Do not modify all platform FDF files under OvmfPkg. "BhyveX64.fdf" is
still at 11MB, "OvmfXen.fdf" at 10MB. The "AmdSevX64.fdf",
"CloudHvX64.fdf", "IntelTdxX64.fdf" and "MicrovmX64.fdf" flash devices
could be modified similarly (from 12MB to 13MB), but I don't use or build
those platforms.
Tested on:
- IA32, q35, SMM_REQUIRE, Fedora 30 guest
- X64, pc (i440fx), no SMM, RHEL-7.9 guest
- IA32X64, q35, SMM_REQUIRE, RHEL-7.9 guest
Test steps:
- configure 3 VCPUs
- boot
- run "taskset -c $I efibootmgr" with $I covering 0..2
- systemctl suspend
- resume from virt-manager
- run "taskset -c $I efibootmgr" with $I covering 0..2
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4236
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Per my bisection: nasm broke the parsing of the "--" end-of-options
delimiter in commit 55568c1193df ("nasm: scan the command line twice",
2016-10-03), part of the nasm-2.13 release. The parsing remains broken in
at least nasm-2.15.03. The (invalid) error message is: "more than one
input file specified". I've filed the following ticket for upstream nasm
(and ndisasm): <https://bugzilla.nasm.us/show_bug.cgi?id=3392829>.
Since the delimiter is not necessary in practice (due to $STEM being
"VbeShim", i.e., not starting with a hyphen), simply remove the delimiter.
Tested by enabling DEBUG in "VbeShim.asm", running the script, building
OVMF, booting Windows 7, and checking the firmware log (debug console).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3876
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Prevent stack underrun in the event of a timer interrupt storm in
LocalApicTimerDxe and 8254TimerDxe interrupt handlers by using the
helper functions provided by NestedInterruptTplLib.
This fixes the same problem as addressed in commit 239b50a86
("OvmfPkg: End timer interrupt later to avoid stack overflow under
load"), but does so without breaking nested timer interrupts.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2815
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4162
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
UEFI requires us to support nested interrupts, but provides no way for
an interrupt handler to call RestoreTPL() without implicitly
re-enabling interrupts. In a virtual machine, it is possible for a
large burst of interrupts to arrive. We must prevent such a burst
from leading to stack underrun, while continuing to allow nested
interrupts to occur.
This can be achieved by allowing, when provably safe to do so, an
inner interrupt handler to return from the interrupt without restoring
the TPL and with interrupts remaining disabled after IRET, with the
deferred call to RestoreTPL() then being issued from the outer
interrupt handler. This is necessarily messy and involves direct
manipulation of the interrupt stack frame, and so should not be
implemented as open-coded logic within each interrupt handler.
Add the Nested Interrupt TPL Library (NestedInterruptTplLib) to
provide helper functions that can be used by nested interrupt handlers
in place of RaiseTPL()/RestoreTPL().
Example call tree for a timer interrupt occurring at TPL_APPLICATION
with a nested timer interrupt that makes its own call to RestoreTPL():
outer TimerInterruptHandler()
InterruptedTPL == TPL_APPLICATION
...
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = TPL_APPLICATION;
gBS->RestoreTPL (TPL_APPLICATION);
EnableInterrupts();
dispatch a TPL_CALLBACK event
gEfiCurrentTpl = TPL_CALLBACK;
nested timer interrupt occurs
inner TimerInterruptHandler()
InterruptedTPL == TPL_CALLBACK
...
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = TPL_CALLBACK;
gBS->RestoreTPL (TPL_CALLBACK);
EnableInterrupts();
DisableInterrupts();
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = TPL_APPLICATION;
IRET re-enables interrupts
... finish dispatching TPL_CALLBACK events ...
gEfiCurrentTpl = TPL_APPLICATION;
DisableInterrupts();
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = 0;
sees IsrState->DeferredRestoreTPL == FALSE and returns
IRET re-enables interrupts
Example call tree for a timer interrupt occurring at TPL_APPLICATION
with a nested timer interrupt that defers its call to RestoreTPL() to
the outer instance of the interrupt handler:
outer TimerInterruptHandler()
InterruptedTPL == TPL_APPLICATION
...
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = TPL_APPLICATION;
gBS->RestoreTPL (TPL_APPLICATION);
EnableInterrupts();
dispatch a TPL_CALLBACK event
... finish dispatching TPL_CALLBACK events ...
gEfiCurrentTpl = TPL_APPLICATION;
nested timer interrupt occurs
inner TimerInterruptHandler()
InterruptedTPL == TPL_APPLICATION;
...
sees InterruptedTPL == IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL
IsrState->DeferredRestoreTPL = TRUE;
DisableInterruptsOnIret();
IRET returns without re-enabling interrupts
DisableInterrupts();
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = 0;
sees IsrState->DeferredRestoreTPL == TRUE and loops
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = TPL_APPLICATION;
gBS->RestoreTPL (TPL_APPLICATION); <-- deferred call
EnableInterrupts();
DisableInterrupts();
IsrState->InProgressRestoreTPL = 0;
sees IsrState->DeferredRestoreTPL == FALSE and returns
IRET re-enables interrupts
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4162
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Deferring the EOI until after the call to RestoreTPL() means that any
callbacks invoked by RestoreTPL() will run with timer interrupt
delivery disabled. If any such callbacks themselves rely on timers to
implement timeout loops, then the callbacks will get stuck in an
infinite loop from which the system will never recover.
This reverts commit 239b50a86 ("OvmfPkg: End timer interrupt later to
avoid stack overflow under load").
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4162
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
qemu uses the etc/e820 fw_cfg file not only for memory, but
also for reservations. Handle reservations by adding resource
descriptor hobs for them.
A typical qemu configuration has a small reservation between
lapic and flash:
# sudo cat /proc/iomem
[ ... ]
fee00000-fee00fff : Local APIC
feffc000-feffffff : Reserved <= HERE
ffc00000-ffffffff : Reserved
[ ... ]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The Hii form is named "MainFormState" and the EFI variable is named
"PlatformConfig". Take into account the different names.
Fixes: aefcc91805 ("OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Handle all requests in ExtractConfig and RouteConfig")
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr can be used to check the cc guest
type, including td-guest or sev-guest. CcProbe() can do the same
thing but CcProbeLib should be included in the dsc which uses
AcpiPlatformDxe. The difference between PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
and CcProbe() is that PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr cannot be used
in multi-processor scenario but CcProbe() can. But there is no such
issue in AcpiPlatformDxe.
So we use PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr instead of CcProbeLib so that
it is simpler.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Copy the function BuildPlatformInfoHob() from OvmfPkg/PlatformPei.
QemuFwCfgLib expect this HOB to be present, or fails to do anything.
InternalQemuFwCfgIsAvailable() from QemuFwCfgPeiLib module will not
check if the HOB is actually present for example and try to use a NULL
pointer.
Fixes: cda98df162 ("OvmfPkg/QemuFwCfgLib: remove mQemuFwCfgSupported + mQemuFwCfgDmaSupported")
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4172
TDVF once accepts memory only by BSP. To improve the boot performance
this patch introduce the multi-core accpet memory. Multi-core means
BSP and APs work together to accept memory.
TDVF leverages mailbox to wake up APs. It is not enabled in MpInitLib
(Which requires SIPI). So multi-core accept memory cannot leverages
MpInitLib to coordinate BSP and APs to work together.
So TDVF split the accept memory into 2 phases.
- AcceptMemoryForAPsStack:
BSP accepts a small piece of memory which is then used by APs to setup
stack. We assign a 16KB stack for each AP. So a td-guest with 256 vCPU
requires 255*16KB = 4080KB.
- AcceptMemory:
After above small piece of memory is accepted, BSP commands APs to
accept memory by sending AcceptPages command in td-mailbox. Together
with the command and accpet-function, the APsStack address is send
as well. APs then set the stack and jump to accept-function to accept
memory.
AcceptMemoryForAPsStack accepts as small memory as possible and then jump
to AcceptMemory. It fully takes advantage of BSP/APs to work together.
After accept memory is done, the memory region for APsStack is not used
anymore. It can be used as other private memory. Because accept-memory
is in the very beginning of boot process and it will not impact other
phases.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4172
TDVF APs once did nothing but spin around to wait for the Wakeup command.
This patch enables APs to handle the AcceptPages command. Once APs find
the AcceptPages command, it set its stack and jump to the function of
ApAcceptMemoryResourceRange (which will be introduced in the following
patch).
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4172
This patch moves the TDX APs nasm code from SecEntry.nasm to
IntelTdxAPs.nasm. IntelTdxX64 and OvmfPkgX64 use the same nasm so that
it can be easier to be managed. In the following patch there will be
AcceptMemory related changes in IntelTdxAPs.nasm.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4172
In the following patches TdxMailboxLib will be included in
PlatformInitLib. While PlatformInitLib is imported by some IA32/X64
platforms (for example AmdSevX64.dsc). So TdxMailboxLibNull is added in
those platforms which don't support TDX feature.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4172
TdxMailboxLib is designed only for TDX guest which arch is X64. This
patch set the VALID_ARCHITECTURES of TdxMailboxLib as X64.
Because in the following patches TdxMailboxLib will be included in
PlatformInitLib. While PlatformInitLib is imported by some X64 platforms
(for example AmdSevX64.dsc). So we need a NULL instance of TdxMailboxLib
which VALID_ARCHITECTURES is X64 as well. Based on this consideration
we design TdxMailboxLibNull.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4172
TdxMailboxLib once was designed to be used in DXE phase. But now it is
going to be used in SEC/PEI phase (in the following patches). Global
variables are not allowed. The library is refactored after those global
variables are deleted.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Add CpuPageTableLib required by MpInitLib in OvmfPkg.
Signed-off-by: Yuanhao Xie <yuanhao.xie@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
In the commit 4f173db8b4 "OvmfPkg/PlatformInitLib: Add functions for
EmuVariableNvStore", it introduced a PlatformValidateNvVarStore() function
for checking the integrity of NvVarStore.
In some cases when the VariableHeader->StartId is VARIABLE_DATA, the
VariableHeader->State is not just one of the four primary states:
VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION, VAR_DELETED, VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY, VAR_ADDED.
The state may combined two or three states, e.g.
0x3C = (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED) & VAR_DELETED
or
0x3D = VAR_ADDED & VAR_DELETED
When the variable store has those variables, system booting/rebooting will
hangs in a ASSERT:
NvVarStore Variable header State was invalid.
ASSERT
/mnt/working/source_code-git/edk2/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/Platform.c(819):
((BOOLEAN)(0==1))
Adding more log to UpdateVariable() and PlatformValidateNvVarStore(), we
saw some variables which have 0x3C or 0x3D state in store.
e.g.
UpdateVariable(), VariableName=BootOrder
L1871, State=0000003F <-- VAR_ADDED
State &= VAR_DELETED=0000003D
FlushHobVariableToFlash(), VariableName=BootOrder
...
UpdateVariable(), VariableName=InitialAttemptOrder
L1977, State=0000003F
State &= VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION=0000003E
L2376, State=0000003E
State &= VAR_DELETED=0000003C
FlushHobVariableToFlash(), VariableName=InitialAttemptOrder
...
UpdateVariable(), VariableName=ConIn
L1977, State=0000003F
State &= VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION=0000003E
L2376, State=0000003E
State &= VAR_DELETED=0000003C
FlushHobVariableToFlash(), VariableName=ConIn
...
So, only allowing the four primary states is not enough. This patch changes
the falid states list (Follow Jiewen Yao's suggestion):
1. VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY (0x7F)
- Header added (*)
2. VAR_ADDED (0x3F)
- Header + data added
3. VAR_ADDED & VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION (0x3E)
- marked as deleted, but still valid, before new data is added. (*)
4. VAR_ADDED & VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_DELETED (0x3C)
- deleted, after new data is added.
5. VAR_ADDED & VAR_DELETED (0x3D)
- deleted directly, without new data.
(*) means to support surprise shutdown.
And removed (VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION) and (VAR_DELETED) because they are
invalid states.
v2:
Follow Jiewen Yao's suggestion to add the following valid states:
VAR_ADDED & VAR_DELETED (0x3D)
VAR_ADDED & VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION (0x3E)
VAR_ADDED & VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_DELETED (0x3C)
and removed the following invalid states:
VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION
VAR_DELETED
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Add support to use the reserved shared memory within the IoMmu library.
This improves boot times for all SEV guests, with SEV-SNP benefiting the
most as it avoids the page state change call to the hypervisor.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4171
IoMmuDxe once was designed to support DMA operation when SEV is enabled.
After TDX is enabled in IoMmuDxe, some files' name in IoMmuDxe need to
be more general. So this patch rename:
AmdSevIoMmu.h -> CcIoMmu.h
AmdSevIoMmu.c -> CcIoMmu.c
Accordingly there are some udates in IoMmuDxe.c and IoMmuDxe.inf.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4171
A typical QEMU fw_cfg read bytes with IOMMU for td guest is that:
(QemuFwCfgReadBytes@QemuFwCfgLib.c is the example)
1) Allocate DMA Access buffer
2) Map actual data buffer
3) start the transfer and wait for the transfer to complete
4) Free DMA Access buffer
5) Un-map actual data buffer
In step 1/2, Private memories are allocated, converted to shared memories.
In Step 4/5 the shared memories are converted to private memories and
accepted again. The final step is to free the pages.
This is time-consuming and impacts td guest's boot perf (both direct boot
and grub boot) badly.
In a typical grub boot, there are about 5000 calls of page allocation and
private/share conversion. Most of page size is less than 32KB.
This patch allocates a memory region and initializes it into pieces of
memory with different sizes. A piece of such memory consists of 2 parts:
the first page is of private memory, and the other pages are shared
memory. This is to meet the layout of common buffer.
When allocating bounce buffer in IoMmuMap(), IoMmuAllocateBounceBuffer()
is called to allocate the buffer. Accordingly when freeing bounce buffer
in IoMmuUnmapWorker(), IoMmuFreeBounceBuffer() is called to free the
bounce buffer. CommonBuffer is allocated by IoMmuAllocateCommonBuffer
and accordingly freed by IoMmuFreeCommonBuffer.
This feature is tested in Intel TDX pre-production platform. It saves up
to hundreds of ms in a grub boot.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Adds a reference to the new build instructions on the TianoCore wiki
that currently describe building with containers and Stuart.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Rely on CcProbe() to identify when running on TDX so that ACPI tables
can be retrieved differently for Cloud Hypervisor. Instead of relying on
the PVH structure to find the RSDP pointer, the tables are individually
passed through the HOB.
Signed-off-by: Jiaqi Gao <jiaqi.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
This is required for passing the ACPI tables from the VMM up to the
guest OS. They are transferred through this GUID extension.
Signed-off-by: Jiaqi Gao <jiaqi.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Rely on the CcProbe() function to identify when running on TDX. This
allows the firmware to follow a different codepath for Cloud Hypervisor,
which means it doesn't rely on PVH to find out about memory below 4GiB.
instead it falls back onto the CMOS to retrieve that information.
Signed-off-by: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4186
Commit 079a58276b ("OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei: Mark SEV launch secret
area as reserved") marked the launch secret area itself (1 page) as
reserved so the guest OS can use it during the lifetime of the OS.
However, the address and size of the secret area held in the
CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_LOCATION struct are declared as STATIC in
OVMF (in AmdSev/SecretDxe); therefore there's no guarantee that it will
not be written over by OS data.
Fix this by allocating the memory for the
CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_LOCATION struct with the
EfiACPIReclaimMemory memory type to ensure the guest OS will not reuse
this memory.
Fixes: 079a58276b ("OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei: Mark SEV launch secret ...")
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
When running under SEV-ES, a page of shared memory is allocated for the
GHCB during the SEC phase at address 0x809000. This page of memory is
eventually passed to the OS as EfiConventionalMemory. When running
SEV-SNP, this page is not PVALIDATE'd in the RMP table, meaning that if
the guest OS tries to access the page, it will think that the host has
voilated the security guarantees and will likely crash.
This patch validates this page immediately after EDK2 switches to using
the GHCB page allocated for the PEI phase.
This was tested by writing a UEFI application that reads to and writes
from one byte of each page of memory and checks to see if a #VC
exception is generated indicating that the page was not validated.
Fixes: 6995a1b79b ("OvmfPkg: Create a GHCB page for use during Sec phase")
Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4179
According to UEFI Spec 2.10 it is supposed to return the mapping from PCR
index to CC MR index:
//
// In the current version, we use the below mapping for TDX:
//
// TPM PCR Index | CC Measurement Register Index | TDX-measurement register
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// 0 | 0 | MRTD
// 1, 7 | 1 | RTMR[0]
// 2~6 | 2 | RTMR[1]
// 8~15 | 3 | RTMR[2]
In the current implementation TdMapPcrToMrIndex returns the index of RTMR,
not the MR index.
After fix the spec unconsistent, other related codes are updated
accordingly.
1) The index of event log uses the input MrIndex.
2) MrIndex is decreated by 1 before it is sent for RTMR extending.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> [ruleof2]
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> [jejb]
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> [jyao1]
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [tlendacky]
Cc: Arti Gupta <ARGU@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Arti Gupta <ARGU@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4184
According to the Uefi spec 2.10 Section 38.2.2.
EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL.GetCapability, the minor version of
StructureVersion and ProtocolVersion should be 0.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> [ruleof2]
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> [jejb]
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> [jyao1]
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [tlendacky]
Cc: Arti Gupta <ARGU@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Arti Gupta <ARGU@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Remove global variables, store the state in PlatformInfoHob instead.
Probing for fw_cfg happens on first use, at library initialization
time the Hob might not be present yet.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Move the code to a new QemuFwCfgProbe() function. Use direct Io*() calls
instead of indirect QemuFwCfg*() calls to make sure we don't get
recursive calls. Also simplify CC guest detection.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
This variant does not use global variables.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Use PlatformInfoHob->FeatureControlValue instead.
OnMpServicesAvailable() will find PlatformInfoHob using
GetFirstGuidHob() and pass a pointer to the WriteFeatureControl
callback.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable. Let
BuildPlatformInfoHob() allocate and return PlatformInfoHob instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable in S3Verification() and
Q35BoardVerification() functions. Pass a pointer to the PlatformInfoHob
instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable in NoexecDxeInitialization()
function. Pass a pointer to the PlatformInfoHob instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable in MemTypeInfoInitialization()
function. Pass a pointer to the PlatformInfoHob instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable in PublishPeiMemory()
and GetPeiMemoryCap() functions. Pass a pointer to the PlatformInfoHob
instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable in
Q35TsegMbytesInitialization() and
Q35SmramAtDefaultSmbaseInitialization() ) functions.
Pass a pointer to the PlatformInfoHob instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable in PeiFvInitialization()
function. Pass a pointer to the PlatformInfoHob instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Stop using the mPlatformInfoHob global variable in AmdSevInitialize()
and AmdSevEsInitialize() functions. Pass a pointer to the
PlatformInfoHob instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Instead of using hard-coded strings ("0.0.0" for BiosVersion etc)
which is mostly useless read the PCDs (PcdFirmwareVendor,
PcdFirmwareVersionString and PcdFirmwareReleaseDateString) and
build the string table dynamuically at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
According to the Intel GHCI specification document section 2.4.1, the
goal for instructions that do not have a corresponding TDCALL is for the
handler to treat the instruction as a NOP.
INVD does not have a corresponding TDCALL. This patch makes the #VE
handler treat INVD as a NOP.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
There should be a check that the FV HeaderLength cannot be an odd
number. Otherwise in the following CalculateSum16 there would be an
ASSERT.
In ValidateFvHeader@QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FwBlockServices.c
there a is similar check to the FwVolHeader->HeaderLength.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4123
APIs which are defined in CcExitLib.h are added with the CcExit prefix.
This is to make the APIs' name more meaningful.
This change impacts OvmfPkg/UefiCpuPkg.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4123
VmgExitLib once was designed to provide interfaces to support #VC handler
and issue VMGEXIT instruction. After TDVF (enable TDX feature in OVMF) is
introduced, this library is updated to support #VE as well. Now the name
of VmgExitLib cannot reflect what the lib does.
This patch renames VmgExitLib to CcExitLib (Cc means Confidential
Computing). This is a simple renaming and there is no logic changes.
After renaming all the VmgExitLib related codes are updated with
CcExitLib. These changes are in OvmfPkg/UefiCpuPkg/UefiPayloadPkg.
Cc: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Sean Rhodes <sean@starlabs.systems>
Cc: James Lu <james.lu@intel.com>
Cc: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: James Lu <james.lu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4125
EPT-violation #VE should be always on shared memory, which means the
shared bit of the GuestPA should be set. But in current #VE Handler
it is not checked. When it occurs, stop TD immediately and log out
the error.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guorui Yu <ruogui.ygr@alibaba-inc.com>
Tested-by: Guorui Yu <ruogui.ygr@alibaba-inc.com>
RFC: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3937
After EdkiiMemoryAcceptProtocol is implemented in TdxDxe driver, we can
call it to accept pages in DXE phase.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
RFC: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3937
Memory usage may exceed the amount accepted at the begining (SEC), TDVF
needs to accept memory dynamically when OUT_OF_RESOURCE occurs.
Another usage is in SetOrClearSharedBit. If a memory region is changed from
shared to private, it must be accepted again.
EdkiiMemoryAcceptProtocol is defined in MdePkg and is implementated /
installed in TdxDxe for Intel TDX memory acceptance.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
RFC: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3937
There are below major changes in PlatformInitLib/PlatformPei
1. ProcessHobList
The unaccepted memory is accepted if it is under 4G address.
Please be noted: in current stage, we only accept the memory under 4G.
We will re-visit here in the future when on-demand accept memory is
required.
2. TransferTdxHobList
Transfer the unaccepted memory hob to EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY hob
if it is accepted.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
RFC: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3937
BZ3937_EFI_RESOURCE_MEMORY_UNACCEPTED is defined in MdeModulePkg. The
files which use the definition are updated as well.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
NOR flash emulation under KVM involves switching between two modes,
where array mode is backed by a read-only memslot, and programming mode
is fully emulated, i.e., the memory region is not backed by anything,
and the faulting accesses are forwarded to the VMM by the hypervisor,
which translates them into NOR flash programming commands.
Normally, we are limited to the use of device attributes when mapping
such regions, given that the programming mode has MMIO semantics.
However, when running under KVM, the chosen memory attributes only take
effect when in array mode, since no memory mapping exists otherwise.
This means we can tune the memory mapping so it behaves a bit more like
a ROM, by switching to EFI_MEMORY_WC attributes. This means we no longer
need a special CopyMem() implementation that avoids unaligned accesses
at all cost.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
Currently, when dealing with small updates that can be written out
directly (i.e., if they only involve clearing bits and not setting bits,
as the latter requires a block level erase), we iterate over the data
one word at a time, read the old value, compare it, write the new value,
and repeat, unless we encountered a value that we cannot write (0->1
transition), in which case we fall back to a block level operation.
This is inefficient for two reasons:
- reading and writing a word at a time involves switching between array
and programming mode for every word of data, which is
disproportionately costly when running under KVM;
- we end up writing some data twice, as we may not notice that a block
erase is needed until after some data has been written to flash.
So replace this sequence with a single read of up to twice the buffered
write maximum size, followed by one or two buffered writes if the data
can be written directly. Otherwise, fall back to the existing block
level sequence, but without writing out part of the data twice.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
NorFlashWriteSingleWord() switches into programming mode and back into
array mode for every single word that it writes. Under KVM, this
involves tearing down the read-only memslot, and setting it up again,
which is costly and unnecessary.
Instead, move the array mode switch into the callers, and only make the
switch when the writing is done.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
We never boot from NOR flash, and generally rely on the firmware volume
PI protocols to expose the contents. So drop the block I/O protocol
implementation from VirtNorFlashDxe.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
We only use NOR flash for firmware volumes, either for executable images
or for the variable store. So we have no need for exposing disk I/O on
top of the NOR flash partitions so let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
We inherited a feature from the ArmPlatformPkg version of this driver
that never gets enabled. Let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
QEMU's mach-virt is loosely based on ARM Versatile Express, and inherits
its NOR flash driver, which is now being used on other QEMU emulated
architectures as well.
In order to permit ourselves the freedom to optimize this driver for
use under KVM emulation, let's clone it into OvmfPkg, so we have a
version we can hack without the risk of regressing bare metal platforms.
The cloned version is mostly identical to the original, but it depends
on the newly added VirtNorFlashPlatformLib library class instead of the
original one from ArmPlatformPkg. Beyond that, only cosmetic changes
related to #include order etc were made.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
Create a new library class in Ovmf that duplicates the existing
NorFlashPlatformLib, but which will be tied to the VirtNorFlashDxe
driver that will be introduced in a subsequent patch. This allows us to
retire the original from ArmPlatformPkg.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
Per the UEFI specification, a device driver implementation should return
EFI_UNSUPPORTED if the ChildHandle argument in
EFI_COMPONENT_NAME2_PROTOCOL.GetControllerName() is not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitrije Pavlov <Dimitrije.Pavlov@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Samer El-Haj-Mahmoud <Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang <sunny.wang@arm.com>
While the actual implementation (using qemu fw_cfg) is qemu-specific,
the idea to store the boot order as configured by the VMM in EFI
variables is not. So lets give the variables a more neutral name while
we still can (i.e. no stable tag yet with the new feature).
While being at it also fix the NNNN format (use %x instead of %d for
consistency with BootNNNN).
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
This reverts commit 60d55c4156.
Now that we have stateless secure boot support (which doesn't
need SMM) in OVMF we can enable the build option for MicroVM.
Bring it back by reverting the commit removing it.
Also add the new PlatformPKProtectionLib.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Compiler flag is needed to make (stateless) secure boot be actually
secure, i.e. restore EFI variables from ROM on reset.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
In case the 64-bit pci mmio window is larger than the default size
of 32G be generous and hand out larger chunks of address space for
prefetchable mmio bridge windows.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
In case we have a reliable PhysMemAddressWidth use that to dynamically
size the 64bit address window. Allocate 1/8 of the physical address
space and place the window at the upper end of the address space.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Try detect physical address space, when successful use it.
Otherwise go continue using the current guesswork code path.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Add some qemu specific quirks to PlatformAddressWidthFromCpuid()
to figure whenever the PhysBits value returned by CPUID is
something real we can work with or not.
See the source code comment for details on the logic.
Also apply some limits to the address space we are going to use:
* Place a hard cap at 47 PhysBits (128 TB) to avoid using addresses
which require 5-level paging support.
* Cap at 40 PhysBits (1 TB) in case the CPU has no support for
gigabyte pages, to avoid excessive amounts of pages being
used for page tables.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
When finding an unsupported entry just skip over and continue
with the next entry instead of stop processing altogether.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
See comment for details. Needed to avoid the parser abort,
so we can continue parsing the bootorder fw_cfg file.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Traditional q35 memory layout is 2.75 GB of low memory, leaving room
for the pcie mmconfig at 0xb0000000 and the 32-bit pci mmio window at
0xc0000000. Because of that OVMF tags the memory range above
0xb0000000 as uncachable via mtrr.
A while ago qemu started to gigabyte-align memory by default (to make
huge pages more effective) and q35 uses only 2G of low memory in that
case. Which effectively makes the 32-bit pci mmio window start at
0x80000000.
This patch updates the mtrr setup code accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
PeilessStartupLib is running in SEC phase. In this phase global variable
is not allowed to be modified. This patch moves mPageTablePool to stack
and pass it as input parameter between functions.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Wire up the newly added UefiDriverEntrypoint in a way that ties dispatch
of the Ip4Dxe and Ip6Dxe drivers to QEMU fw_cfg variables
'opt/org.tianocore/IPv4Support' and 'opt/org.tianocore/IPv6Support'
respectively.
Setting both variables to 'n' disables IP based networking entirely,
without the need for additional code changes at the NIC driver or
network boot protocol level.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
All QEMU based OVMF platforms override the same set of network
components, to specify NULL library class resolutions that modify the
behavior of those components in a QEMU specific way.
Before adding more occurrences of that, let's drop those definitions in
a common include file.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Add a new library that can be incorporated into any driver built from
source, and which permits loading of the driver to be inhibited based on
the value of a QEMU fw_cfg boolean variable. This will be used in a
subsequent patch to allow dispatch of the IPv4 and IPv6 network protocol
driver to be controlled from the QEMU command line.
This approach is based on the notion that all UEFI and DXE drivers share
a single UefiDriverEntryPoint implementation, which we can easily swap
out at build time with one that will abort execution based on the value
of some QEMU fw_cfg variable.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The DEBUG macro updated in this patch previously contained 11 print
specifiers in the debug string but passeed 13 arguments. This change
attempts to update the macro to the author's intention so the number
of specifiers match the number of arguments.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Both ACPI shutdown and ACPI PM timer devices has been moved to different
port addresses in the latest version of Cloud Hypervisor. These changes
need to be reflected on the OVMF firmware.
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Add VgaInb() helper function to read vga registers. With that in place
fix the unblanking. We need to put the ATT_ADDRESS_REGISTER flip flop
into a known state, which is done by reading the
INPUT_STATUS_1_REGISTER. Reading the INPUT_STATUS_1_REGISTER only works
when the device is in color mode, so make sure that bit (0x01) is set in
MISC_OUTPUT_REGISTER.
Currently the mode setting works more by luck because
ATT_ADDRESS_REGISTER flip flop happens to be in the state we need.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The function reads the boot order from qemu fw_cfg, translates it into
device paths and stores them in 'QemuBootOrderNNNN' variables. In case
there is no boot ordering configured the function will do nothing.
Use case: Allow applications loaded via 'qemu -kernel bootloader.efi'
obey the boot order.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The current ACPI Reclaim memory size is set as 0x10 (64KiB). The ACPI
table size will be increased if the memory slots' number of the guest
gets increased. In the guest with more memory slots, the ACPI Reclaim
memory size may not be sufficient for hibernation. This may cause
resume failure of the hibernated guest that was booted up with a fresh
copied writable OVMF_VARS file. However, the failure doesn't happen in
following hibernation/resume cycles.
The ACPI_MAX_RAM_SLOTS is set as 256 in the current QEMU. With
ACPI_MAX_RAM_SLOTS, 18 pages are required to be allocated in ACPI
Reclaim memory. However, due to the 0x10 (16 pages) setting, 2 extra
pages will be allocated in other space. This may break the
hibernation/resume in the above scenario.
This patch increases the ACPI Reclaim memory size to 0x12, i.e.
PcdMemoryTypeEfiACPIReclaimMemory is set as 0x12 (18 pages).
Signed-off-by: Annie Li <annie.li@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reference: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4031
This patch is similar to the c477b2783f patch for Td guest.
Host VMM may inject OptionRom which is untrusted in Sev guest. So PCI
OptionRom needs to be ignored if it is Sev guest. According to
"Table 20. ACPI 2.0 & 3.0 QWORD Address Space Descriptor Usage"
PI spec 1.7, type-specific flags can be set to 0 when Address
Translation Offset == 6 to skip device option ROM.
Without this patch, Sev guest may shows invalid MMIO opcode error
as following:
Invalid MMIO opcode (F6)
ASSERT /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/edk2-edk2-stable202202/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c(1041): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1))
The OptionRom must be disabled both on Td and Sev guests, so we direct
use CcProbe().
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
SECURE_BOOT_FEATURE_ENABLED is the build-flag defined when secure boot
is enabled. Currently this flag is used in below lib:
- OvmfPkg/PlatformPei
- PeilessStartupLib
So it is defined in below 5 .dsc
- OvmfPkg/CloudHv/CloudHvX64.dsc
- OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc
- OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
- OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
- OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Set PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved with the value in PlatformInfoHob. It
is the address of the EmuVariableNvStore reserved in Pei-less startup.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
OvmfPkg/Library/NvVarsFileLib allows loading variables into emulated
varstore from a on-disk NvVars file. We can't allow that when secure
boot is active. So check secure-boot feature and shortcut the
ConnectNvVarsToFileSystem() function when sb is enabled.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
EmuVariableNvStore is reserved and init with below 2 functions defined in
PlatformInitLib:
- PlatformReserveEmuVariableNvStore
- PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore
PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore works when secure boot feature is enabled.
This is because secure boot needs the EFI variables (PK/KEK/DB/DBX, etc)
and EmuVariableNvStore is cleared when OVMF is launched with -bios
parameter.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
ReserveEmuVariableNvStore is updated with below 2 functions defined in
PlatformInitLib:
- PlatformReserveEmuVariableNvStore
- PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore
PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore works when secure boot feature is enabled.
This is because secure boot needs the EFI variables (PK/KEK/DB/DBX, etc)
and EmuVariableNvStore is cleared when OVMF is launched with -bios
parameter.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
There are 3 functions added for EmuVariableNvStore:
- PlatformReserveEmuVariableNvStore
- PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore
- PlatformValidateNvVarStore
PlatformReserveEmuVariableNvStore allocate storage for NV variables early
on so it will be at a consistent address.
PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore copies the content in
PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageVariableBase to the storage allocated by
PlatformReserveEmuVariableNvStore. This is used in the case that OVMF is
launched with -bios parameter. Because in that situation UEFI variables
will be partially emulated, and non-volatile variables may lose their
contents after a reboot. This makes the secure boot feature not working.
PlatformValidateNvVarStore is renamed from TdxValidateCfv and it is used
to validate the integrity of FlashNvVarStore
(PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageVariableBase). It should be called before
PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore is called to copy over the content.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
TdxValidateCfv is used to validate the integrity of FlashNvVarStore
(PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageVariableBase) and it is not Tdx specific.
So it will be moved to PlatformInitLib and be renamed to
PlatformValidateNvVarStore in the following patch. And it will be called
before EmuVaribleNvStore is initialized with the content in
FlashNvVarStore.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
In previous implementation below Pci related PCDs were set based on the
ResourceDescriptor passed in TdHob.
- PcdPciMmio64Base / PcdPciMmio64Size
- PcdPciMmio32Base / PcdPciMmio32Size
- PcdPciIoBase / PcdPciIoSize
The PCDs will not be set if TdHob doesn't include these information. This
patch set the PCDs with the information initialized in PlatformInitLib
by default. Then TdxDxe will check the ResourceDescriptor in TdHob and
reset them if they're included.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3974
CcProbeLib once was designed to probe the Confidential Computing guest
type by checking the PcdOvmfWorkArea. But this memory is allocated with
either EfiACPIMemoryNVS or EfiBootServicesData. It cannot be accessed
after ExitBootService. Please see the detailed analysis in BZ#3974.
To fix this issue, CcProbeLib is redesigned as 2 implementation:
- SecPeiCcProbeLib
- DxeCcProbeLib
In SecPeiCcProbeLib we check the CC guest type by reading the
PcdOvmfWorkArea. Because it is used in SEC / PEI and we don't worry about
the issues in BZ#3974.
In DxeCcProbeLib we cache the GuestType in Ovmf work area in a variable.
After that the Guest type is returned with the cached value. So that we
don't need to worry about the access to Ovmf work area after
ExitBootService.
The reason why we probe CC guest type in 2 different ways is the global
varialbe. Global variable cannot be used in SEC/PEI and CcProbe is called
very frequently.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3974
SecPeiCcProbeLib is designed to probe the Confidential Computing guest
type in SEC/PEI phase. The CC guest type was set by each CC guest at
the beginning of boot up and saved in PcdOvmfWorkArea.
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Increase the maximum line length for debug messages.
While log messages should be short, they can still
get quite long, for example when printing device paths
or config strings in HII routing.
512 chars is an empirically good value.
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
There's no bhyve specific PlatformSecureLib any more. Use the default
one of OvmfPkg which works too.
Signed-off-by: Corvin Köhne <c.koehne@beckhoff.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
In an effort to clean the documentation of the above
package, remove duplicated words.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Per the UEFI specification, if the Request argument in
EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.ExtractConfig() is NULL or does not contain
any request elements, the implementation should return all of the settings
being abstracted for the particular ConfigHdr reference.
The current implementation returns EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER if Request is
NULL or does not contain any request elements. Instead, construct
a new ConfigRequest to handle these cases per the specification.
In addition, per the UEFI specification, if the Configuration argument in
EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.RouteConfig() has a ConfigHdr that
specifies a non-existing target, the implementation should return
EFI_NOT_FOUND.
The current implementation returns EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER if Configuration
has a non-existing target in ConfigHdr. Instead, perform a check and
return EFI_NOT_FOUND in this case.
Signed-off-by: Dimitrije Pavlov <Dimitrije.Pavlov@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Per UEFI Spec 2.9, EFI_HII_CONFIG_ROUTING_PROTOCOL.RouteConfig()
should return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER if caller passes in a NULL for
the Configuration parameter (see 35.4 EFI HII Configuration Routing
Protocol).
Add a check to return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER when Configuration is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Yuan Yu <yuanyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Add BUILD_SHELL flag, similar to the one in OvmfPkg/AmdSev,
to enable/disable building of the UefiShell as part of
the firmware image. The UefiShell should not be included for
secure production systems (e.g. SecureBoot) because it can be
used to circumvent security features.
The default value for BUILD_SHELL is TRUE to keep the default
behavior of the Ovmf build.
Note: the default for AmdSev is FALSE.
The BUILD_SHELL flag for AmdSev was introduced in b261a30c90.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The current implementation does not check if Language or DriverName
are NULL. This causes the SCT test suite to crash.
Add a check to return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER if any of these pointers
are NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitrije Pavlov <Dimitrije.Pavlov@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang <sunny.wang@arm.com>
Laszlo Ersek
Michael Brown
Gerd Hoffmann
Min M Xu
Anthony PERARD
Yuanhao Xie
Chun-Yi Lee
Tom Lendacky
Michael Kubacki
Sebastien Boeuf
Dov Murik
Adam Dunlap
Ryan Afranji
Ard Biesheuvel
Dimitrije Pavlov
annie li
Corvin Köhne
Pierre Gondois
Yuan Yu
Oliver Steffen