[atomicio.c atomicio.h misc.c misc.h scp.c sftp-client.c]
[sftp-client.h sftp.1 sftp.c]
add an option per-read/write callback to atomicio
factor out bandwidth limiting code from scp(1) into a generic bandwidth
limiter that can be attached using the atomicio callback mechanism
add a bandwidth limit option to sftp(1) using the above
"very nice" markus@
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]
[servconf.c servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow
selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
and their order of preference.
ok markus@
[mux.c]
"atomically" create the listening mux socket by binding it on a temorary
name and then linking it into position after listen() has succeeded.
this allows the mux clients to determine that the server socket is
either ready or stale without races. stale server sockets are now
automatically removed
ok deraadt
[jpake.c schnorr.c]
check that received values are smaller than the group size in the
disabled and unfinished J-PAKE code.
avoids catastrophic security failure found by Sebastien Martini
[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on
platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
(SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.
This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
client.
ok naddy@
[compress.c]
work around name-space collisions some buggy compilers (looking at you
gcc, at least in earlier versions, but this does not forgive your current
transgressions) seen between zlib and openssl
ok djm
[ssh-keygen.c]
Switch ECDSA default key size to 256 bits, which according to RFC5656
should still be better than our current RSA-2048 default.
ok djm@, markus@
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
reintroduce commit from tedu@, which I pulled out for release
engineering:
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a
man page for, so use that. ok djm
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
[auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c]
[packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the
string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
a string(3) function.
Use the new API in a few sensitive places.
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a man page
for, so use that. ok djm
[ssh.c]
close any extra file descriptors inherited from parent at start and
reopen stdin/stdout to /dev/null when forking for ControlPersist.
prevents tools that fork and run a captive ssh for communication from
failing to exit when the ssh completes while they wait for these fds to
close. The inherited fds may persist arbitrarily long if a background
mux master has been started by ControlPersist. cvs and scp were effected
by this.
"please commit" markus@
openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/strptime.c] Add strptime to
the compat library which helps on platforms like old IRIX. Based on work
by djm, tested by Tom Christensen.
regress/test-exec.sh] Under certain conditions when testing with sudo
tests would fail because the pidfile could not be read by a regular user.
"cat: cannot open ...../regress/pidfile: Permission denied (error 13)"
Make sure cat is run by $SUDO. no objection from me. djm@
[channels.c]
Fix a trio of bugs in the local/remote window calculation for datagram
data channels (i.e. TunnelForward):
Calculate local_consumed correctly in channel_handle_wfd() by measuring
the delta to buffer_len(c->output) from when we start to when we finish.
The proximal problem here is that the output_filter we use in portable
modified the length of the dequeued datagram (to futz with the headers
for !OpenBSD).
In channel_output_poll(), don't enqueue datagrams that won't fit in the
peer's advertised packet size (highly unlikely to ever occur) or which
won't fit in the peer's remaining window (more likely).
In channel_input_data(), account for the 4-byte string header in
datagram packets that we accept from the peer and enqueue in c->output.
report, analysis and testing 2/3 cases from wierbows AT us.ibm.com;
"looks good" markus@
[authfile.c]
commited the wrong version of the hostbased certificate diff; this
version replaces some strlc{py,at} verbosity with xasprintf() at
the request of markus@
[PROTOCOL.certkeys ssh-keygen.c]
tighten the rules for certificate encoding by requiring that options
appear in lexical order and make our ssh-keygen comply. ok markus@
[ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8]
Remove mentions of weird "addr/port" alternate address format for IPv6
addresses combinations. It hasn't worked for ages and we have supported
the more commen "[addr]:port" format for a long time. ok jmc@ markus@
[clientloop.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5]
add a "ControlPersist" option that automatically starts a background
ssh(1) multiplex master when connecting. This connection can stay alive
indefinitely, or can be set to automatically close after a user-specified
duration of inactivity. bz#1330 - patch by dwmw2 AT infradead.org, but
further hacked on by wmertens AT cisco.com, apb AT cequrux.com,
martin-mindrot-bugzilla AT earth.li and myself; "looks ok" markus@
[sftp-client.c]
bz#1797: fix swapped args in upload_dir_internal(), breaking recursive
upload depth checks and causing verbose printing of transfers to always
be turned on; patch from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov
[ssh-rsa.c]
more timing paranoia - compare all parts of the expected decrypted
data before returning. AFAIK not exploitable in the SSH protocol.
"groovy" deraadt@
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
[packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
[ssh.c ssh_config.5]
expand %h to the hostname in ssh_config Hostname options. While this
sounds useless, it is actually handy for working with unqualified
hostnames:
Host *.*
Hostname %h
Host *
Hostname %h.example.org
"I like it" markus@
[misc.c]
unbreak strdelim() skipping past quoted strings, e.g.
AllowUsers "blah blah" blah
was broken; report and fix in bz#1757 from bitman.zhou AT centrify.com
ok dtucker;
[ssh.c]
log the hostname and address that we connected to at LogLevel=verbose
after authentication is successful to mitigate "phishing" attacks by
servers with trusted keys that accept authentication silently and
automatically before presenting fake password/passphrase prompts;
"nice!" markus@
[ssh.c]
log the hostname and address that we connected to at LogLevel=verbose
after authentication is successful to mitigate "phishing" attacks by
servers with trusted keys that accept authentication silently and
automatically before presenting fake password/passphrase prompts;
"nice!" markus@
[channels.c session.c]
bz#1750: fix requirement for /dev/null inside ChrootDirectory for
internal-sftp accidentally introduced in r1.253 by removing the code
that opens and dup /dev/null to stderr and modifying the channels code
to read stderr but discard it instead; ok markus@
[channels.c mux.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.h]
bz#1327: remove hardcoded limit of 100 permitopen clauses and port
forwards per direction; ok markus@ stevesk@
[ssh-keyscan.c]
replace verbose and overflow-prone Linebuf code with read_keyfile_line()
based on patch from joachim AT joachimschipper.nl; bz#1565; ok dtucker@
[auth.c]
queue auth debug messages for bad ownership or permissions on the user's
keyfiles. These messages will be sent after the user has successfully
authenticated (where our client will display them with LogLevel=debug).
[servconf.c sshd_config.5]
expose some more sshd_config options inside Match blocks:
AuthorizedKeysFile AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly PermitTunnel
bz#1764; feedback from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; ok dtucker@
[mux.c]
Correct sizing of object to be allocated by calloc(), replacing
sizeof(state) with sizeof(*state). This worked by accident since
the struct contained a single int at present, but could have broken
in the future. patch from hyc AT symas.com
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c ssh-keygen.c]
Move the permit-* options to the non-critical "extensions" field for v01
certificates. The logic is that if another implementation fails to
implement them then the connection just loses features rather than fails
outright.
ok markus@
[PROTOCOL.mux clientloop.h mux.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c]
mux support for remote forwarding with dynamic port allocation,
use with
LPORT=`ssh -S muxsocket -R0:localhost:25 -O forward somehost`
feedback and ok djm@
[channels.c channels.h mux.c ssh.c]
Pause the mux channel while waiting for reply from aynch callbacks.
Prevents misordering of replies if new requests arrive while waiting.
Extend channel open confirm callback to allow signalling failure
conditions as well as success. Use this to 1) fix a memory leak, 2)
start using the above pause mechanism and 3) delay sending a success/
failure message on mux slave session open until we receive a reply from
the server.
motivated by and with feedback from markus@
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c]
[key.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listed
in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name
to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to
specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable.
When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option.
For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config
option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing
the list of acceptable names.
If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the
username to appear in principals continues to apply.
These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces
and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates.
feedback and ok markus@
[sshconnect2.c]
bz#1502: authctxt.success is declared as an int, but passed by
reference to function that accepts sig_atomic_t*. Convert it to
the latter; ok markus@ dtucker@
[session.c]
set stderr to /dev/null for subsystems rather than just closing it.
avoids hangs if a subsystem or shell initialisation writes to stderr.
bz#1750; ok markus@
[mux.c]
set "detach_close" flag when registering channel cleanup callbacks.
This causes the channel to close normally when its fds close and
hangs when terminating a mux slave using ~. bz#1758; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/23 01:47:41
[ssh-keygen.c]
bz#1740: display a more helpful error message when $HOME is
inaccessible while trying to create .ssh directory. Based on patch
from jchadima AT redhat.com; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:58:45
[regress/cert-hostkey.sh regress/cert-userkey.sh]
regression tests for v01 certificate format
includes interop tests for v00 certs
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
[ssh-pkcs11.c]
retry lookup for private key if there's no matching key with CKA_SIGN
attribute enabled; this fixes fixes MuscleCard support (bugzilla #1736)
ok djm@
[sshconnect2.c]
show the key type that we are offering in debug(), helps distinguish
between certs and plain keys as the path to the private key is usually
the same.
[clientloop.c]
bz#1698: kill channel when pty allocation requests fail. Fixed
stuck client if the server refuses pty allocation.
ok dtucker@ "think so" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/26 03:13:17
[bufaux.c]
allow buffer_get_int_ret/buffer_get_int64_ret to take a NULL pointer
argument to allow skipping past values in a buffer
[ssh_config.5]
Reformat default value of PreferredAuthentications entry (current
formatting implies ", " is acceptable as a separator, which it's not.
ok djm@
Damien Miller
Darren Tucker
Tim Rice