Now that the SMRAM at the default SMBASE is honored everywhere necessary,
implement the actual detection. The (simple) steps are described in
previous patch "OvmfPkg/IndustryStandard: add MCH_DEFAULT_SMBASE* register
macros".
Regarding CSM_ENABLE builds: according to the discussion with Jiewen at
https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/48082http://mid.mail-archive.com/74D8A39837DF1E4DA445A8C0B3885C503F7C9D2F@shsmsx102.ccr.corp.intel.com
if the platform has SMRAM at the default SMBASE, then we have to
(a) either punch a hole in the legacy E820 map as well, in
LegacyBiosBuildE820() [OvmfPkg/Csm/LegacyBiosDxe/LegacyBootSupport.c],
(b) or document, or programmatically catch, the incompatibility between
the "SMRAM at default SMBASE" and "CSM" features.
Because CSM is out of scope for the larger "VCPU hotplug with SMM"
feature, option (b) applies. Therefore, if the CSM is enabled in the OVMF
build, then PlatformPei will not attempt to detect SMRAM at the default
SMBASE, at all. This is approach (4) -- the most flexible one, for
end-users -- from:
http://mid.mail-archive.com/868dcff2-ecaa-e1c6-f018-abe7087d640c@redhat.comhttps://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/48348
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-12-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
When OVMF runs in a SEV guest, the initial SMM Save State Map is
(1) allocated as EfiBootServicesData type memory in OvmfPkg/PlatformPei,
function AmdSevInitialize(), for preventing unintended information
sharing with the hypervisor;
(2) decrypted in AmdSevDxe;
(3) re-encrypted in OvmfPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib, function
SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), which is called by
PiSmmCpuDxeSmm right after initial SMBASE relocation;
(4) released to DXE at the same location.
The SMRAM at the default SMBASE is a superset of the initial Save State
Map. The reserved memory allocation in InitializeRamRegions(), from the
previous patch, must override the allocating and freeing in (1) and (4),
respectively. (Note: the decrypting and re-encrypting in (2) and (3) are
unaffected.)
In AmdSevInitialize(), only assert the containment of the initial Save
State Map, in the larger area already allocated by InitializeRamRegions().
In SmmCpuFeaturesSmmRelocationComplete(), preserve the allocation of the
initial Save State Map into OS runtime, as part of the allocation done by
InitializeRamRegions(). Only assert containment.
These changes only affect the normal boot path (the UEFI memory map is
untouched during S3 resume).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-9-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
The 128KB SMRAM at the default SMBASE will be used for protecting the
initial SMI handler for hot-plugged VCPUs. After platform reset, the SMRAM
in question is open (and looks just like RAM). When BDS signals
EFI_DXE_MM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL (and so TSEG is locked down), we're
going to lock the SMRAM at the default SMBASE too.
For this, we have to reserve said SMRAM area as early as possible, from
components in PEI, DXE, and OS runtime.
* QemuInitializeRam() currently produces a single resource descriptor HOB,
for exposing the system RAM available under 1GB. This occurs during both
normal boot and S3 resume identically (the latter only for the sake of
CpuMpPei borrowing low RAM for the AP startup vector).
But, the SMRAM at the default SMBASE falls in the middle of the current
system RAM HOB. Split the HOB, and cover the SMRAM with a reserved
memory HOB in the middle. CpuMpPei (via MpInitLib) skips reserved memory
HOBs.
* InitializeRamRegions() is responsible for producing memory allocation
HOBs, carving out parts of the resource descriptor HOBs produced in
QemuInitializeRam(). Allocate the above-introduced reserved memory
region in full, similarly to how we treat TSEG, so that DXE and the OS
avoid the locked SMRAM (black hole) in this area.
(Note that these allocations only occur on the normal boot path, as they
matter for the UEFI memory map, which cannot be changed during S3
resume.)
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-8-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
The permanent PEI RAM that is published on the normal boot path starts
strictly above MEMFD_BASE_ADDRESS (8 MB -- see the FDF files), regardless
of whether PEI decompression will be necessary on S3 resume due to
SMM_REQUIRE. Therefore the normal boot permanent PEI RAM never overlaps
with the SMRAM at the default SMBASE (192 KB).
The S3 resume permanent PEI RAM is strictly above the normal boot one.
Therefore the no-overlap statement holds true on the S3 resume path as
well.
Assert the no-overlap condition commonly for both boot paths in
PublishPeiMemory().
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-7-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Introduce the Q35SmramAtDefaultSmbaseInitialization() function for
detecting the "SMRAM at default SMBASE" feature.
For now, the function is only a skeleton, so that we can gradually build
upon the result while the result is hard-coded as FALSE. The actual
detection will occur in a later patch.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-6-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Before adding another SMM-related, and therefore Q35-only, dynamically
detectable feature, extract the current board type check from
Q35TsegMbytesInitialization() to a standalone function.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-5-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
MaxCpuCountInitialization() currently handles the following options:
(1) QEMU does not report the boot CPU count (FW_CFG_NB_CPUS is 0)
In this case, PlatformPei makes MpInitLib enumerate APs up to the
default PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber value (64) minus 1, or until
the default PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds (50,000) elapses.
(Whichever is reached first.)
Time-limited AP enumeration had never been reliable on QEMU/KVM, which
is why commit 45a70db3c3 strated handling case (2) below, in OVMF.
(2) QEMU reports the boot CPU count (FW_CFG_NB_CPUS is nonzero)
In this case, PlatformPei sets
- PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber to the reported boot CPU count
(FW_CFG_NB_CPUS, which exports "PCMachineState.boot_cpus"),
- and PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds to practically "infinity"
(MAX_UINT32, ~71 minutes).
That causes MpInitLib to enumerate exactly the present (boot) APs.
With CPU hotplug in mind, this method is not good enough. Because,
using QEMU terminology, UefiCpuPkg expects
PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber to provide the "possible CPUs" count
("MachineState.smp.max_cpus"), which includes present and not present
CPUs both (with not present CPUs being subject for hot-plugging).
FW_CFG_NB_CPUS does not include not present CPUs.
Rewrite MaxCpuCountInitialization() for handling the following cases:
(1) The behavior of case (1) does not change. (No UefiCpuPkg PCDs are set
to values different from the defaults.)
(2) QEMU reports the boot CPU count ("PCMachineState.boot_cpus", via
FW_CFG_NB_CPUS), but not the possible CPUs count
("MachineState.smp.max_cpus").
In this case, the behavior remains unchanged.
The way MpInitLib is instructed to do the same differs however: we now
set the new PcdCpuBootLogicalProcessorNumber to the boot CPU count
(while continuing to set PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber identically).
PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds becomes irrelevant.
(3) QEMU reports both the boot CPU count ("PCMachineState.boot_cpus", via
FW_CFG_NB_CPUS), and the possible CPUs count
("MachineState.smp.max_cpus").
We tell UefiCpuPkg about the possible CPUs count through
PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber. We also tell MpInitLib the boot CPU
count for precise and quick AP enumeration, via
PcdCpuBootLogicalProcessorNumber. PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds is
irrelevant again.
This patch is a pre-requisite for enabling CPU hotplug with SMM_REQUIRE.
As a side effect, the patch also enables S3 to work with CPU hotplug at
once, *without* SMM_REQUIRE.
(Without the patch, S3 resume fails, if a CPU is hot-plugged at OS
runtime, prior to suspend: the FW_CFG_NB_CPUS increase seen during resume
causes PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber to increase as well, which is not
permitted.
With the patch, PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber stays the same, namely
"MachineState.smp.max_cpus". Therefore, the CPU structures allocated
during normal boot can accommodate the CPUs at S3 resume that have been
hotplugged prior to S3 suspend.)
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1515
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20191022221554.14963-4-lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
EFI_XEN_OVMF_INFO is only useful to retrieve the E820 table. The
mXenHvmloaderInfo isn't used yet, but will be use in a further patch to
retrieve the E820 table.
Also remove the unused pointer from the XenInfo HOB as that information
is only useful in the XenPlatformPei.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1689
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190813113119.14804-11-anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Change referenced MSR name to avoid later build failure.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
For the driver's INF file, this commit will remove the redundant reference
to 'IntelFrameworkModulePkg/IntelFrameworkModulePkg.dec'.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
(This is a replacement for commit 39b9a5ffe6 ("OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: fix
MTRR for low-RAM sizes that have many bits clear", 2019-05-16).)
Reintroduce the same logic as seen in commit 39b9a5ffe6 for the pc
(i440fx) board type.
For q35, the same approach doesn't work any longer, given that (a) we'd
like to keep the PCIEXBAR in the platform DSC a fixed-at-build PCD, and
(b) QEMU expects the PCIEXBAR to reside at a lower address than the 32-bit
PCI MMIO aperture.
Therefore, introduce a helper function for determining the 32-bit
"uncacheable" (MMIO) area base address:
- On q35, this function behaves statically. Furthermore, the MTRR setup
exploits that the range [0xB000_0000, 0xFFFF_FFFF] can be marked UC with
just two variable MTRRs (one at 0xB000_0000 (size 256MB), another at
0xC000_0000 (size 1GB)).
- On pc (i440fx), the function behaves dynamically, implementing the same
logic as commit 39b9a5ffe6 did. The PciBase value is adjusted to the
value calculated, similarly to commit 39b9a5ffe6. A further
simplification is that we show that the UC32 area size truncation to a
whole power of two automatically guarantees a >=2GB base address.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1859
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
This reverts commit 60e95bf509.
The original fix for <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814>
triggered a bug / incorrect assumption in QEMU.
QEMU assumes that the PCIEXBAR is below the 32-bit PCI window, not above
it. When the firmware doesn't satisfy this assumption, QEMU generates an
\_SB.PCI0._CRS object in the ACPI DSDT that does not reflect the
firmware's 32-bit MMIO BAR assignments. This causes OSes to re-assign
32-bit MMIO BARs.
Working around the problem in the firmware looks less problematic than
fixing QEMU. Revert the original changes first, before implementing an
alternative fix.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1859
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
This reverts commit 9a2e8d7c65.
The original fix for <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814>
triggered a bug / incorrect assumption in QEMU.
QEMU assumes that the PCIEXBAR is below the 32-bit PCI window, not above
it. When the firmware doesn't satisfy this assumption, QEMU generates an
\_SB.PCI0._CRS object in the ACPI DSDT that does not reflect the
firmware's 32-bit MMIO BAR assignments. This causes OSes to re-assign
32-bit MMIO BARs.
Working around the problem in the firmware looks less problematic than
fixing QEMU. Revert the original changes first, before implementing an
alternative fix.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1859
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
This reverts commit 75136b2954.
The original fix for <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814>
triggered a bug / incorrect assumption in QEMU.
QEMU assumes that the PCIEXBAR is below the 32-bit PCI window, not above
it. When the firmware doesn't satisfy this assumption, QEMU generates an
\_SB.PCI0._CRS object in the ACPI DSDT that does not reflect the
firmware's 32-bit MMIO BAR assignments. This causes OSes to re-assign
32-bit MMIO BARs.
Working around the problem in the firmware looks less problematic than
fixing QEMU. Revert the original changes first, before implementing an
alternative fix.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1859
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
This reverts commit 39b9a5ffe6.
The original fix for <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814>
triggered a bug / incorrect assumption in QEMU.
QEMU assumes that the PCIEXBAR is below the 32-bit PCI window, not above
it. When the firmware doesn't satisfy this assumption, QEMU generates an
\_SB.PCI0._CRS object in the ACPI DSDT that does not reflect the
firmware's 32-bit MMIO BAR assignments. This causes OSes to re-assign
32-bit MMIO BARs.
Working around the problem in the firmware looks less problematic than
fixing QEMU. Revert the original changes first, before implementing an
alternative fix.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1859
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Assume that we boot OVMF in a QEMU guest with 1025 MB of RAM. The
following assertion will fire:
> ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status = Out of Resources)
> ASSERT OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c(696): !EFI_ERROR (Status)
That's because the range [1025 MB, 4 GB) that we try to mark as
uncacheable with MTRRs has size 3071 MB:
0x1_0000_0000
-0x0_4010_0000
--------------
0x0_BFF0_0000
The integer that stands for the uncacheable area size has 11 (eleven) bits
set to 1. As a result, covering this size requires 11 variable MTRRs (each
MTRR must cover a naturally aligned, power-of-two sized area). But, if we
need more variable MTRRs than the CPU can muster (such as 8), then
MtrrSetMemoryAttribute() fails, and we refuse to continue booting (which
is justified, in itself).
Unfortunately, this is not difficult to trigger, and the error message is
well-hidden from end-users, in the OVMF debug log. The following
mitigation is inspired by SeaBIOS:
Truncate the uncacheable area size to a power-of-two, while keeping the
end fixed at 4 GB. Such an interval can be covered by just one variable
MTRR.
This may leave such an MMIO gap, between the end of low-RAM and the start
of the uncacheable area, that is marked as WB (through the MTRR default).
Raise the base of the 32-bit PCI MMIO aperture accordingly -- the gap will
not be used for anything.
On Q35, the minimal 32-bit PCI MMIO aperture (triggered by RAM size 2815
MB) shrinks from
0xE000_0000 - 0xAFF0_0000 = 769 MB
to
0xE000_0000 - 0xC000_0000 = 512 MB
On i440fx, the minimal 32-bit PCI MMIO aperture (triggered by RAM size
3583 MB) shrinks from
0xFC00_0000 - 0xDFF0_0000 = 449 MB
to
0xFC00_0000 - 0xE000_0000 = 448 MB
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1666941
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1701710
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Commit 7b8fe63561 ("OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: enable PCIEXBAR (aka MMCONFIG
/ ECAM) on Q35", 2016-03-10) claimed that,
On Q35 machine types that QEMU intends to support in the long term, QEMU
never lets the RAM below 4 GB exceed 2 GB.
Alas, this statement came from a misunderstanding that occurred while we
worked out the interface contract. In fact QEMU does allow the 32-bit RAM
extend up to 0xB000_0000 (exclusive), in case the RAM size falls in the
range (0x8000_0000, 0xB000_0000) (i.e., the RAM size is greater than
2048MB and smaller than 2816MB).
In turn, such a RAM size (justifiedly) triggers
ASSERT (TopOfLowRam <= PciExBarBase);
in MemMapInitialization(), because we placed the 256MB PCIEXBAR at
0x8000_0000 (2GB) exactly, relying on the interface contract. (And, the
32-bit PCI window would follow the PCIEXBAR, covering the [0x9000_0000,
0xFC00_0000) range.)
In order to fix this, reorder the 32-bit PCI window against the PCIEXBAR,
as follows:
- start the 32-bit PCI window where it starts on i440fx as well, that is,
at 2GB or TopOfLowRam, whichever is higher;
- unlike on i440fx, where the 32-bit PCI window extends up to 0xFC00_0000,
stop it at 0xE000_0000 on q35,
- place the PCIEXBAR at 0xE000_0000.
(We cannot place the PCIEXBAR at 0xF000_0000 because the 256MB MMIO area
that starts there is not entirely free.)
Before this patch, the 32-bit PCI window used to only *end* at the same
spot (namely, 0xFC00_0000) between i440fx and q35; now it will only
*start* at the same spot (namely, 2GB or TopOfLowRam, whichever is higher)
between both boards.
On q35, the maximal window shrinks from
0xFC00_0000 - 0x9000_0000 = 0x6C00_0000 == 1728 MB
to
0xE000_0000 - 0x8000_0000 == 1536 MB.
We lose 192 MB of the aperture; however, the aperture is now aligned at
1GB, rather than 256 MB, and so it could fit a 1GB BAR even.
Regarding the minimal window (triggered by RAM size 2815MB), its size is
0xE000_0000 - 0xAFF0_0000 = 769 MB
which is not great, but probably better than a failed ASSERT.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1666941
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1701710
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
In the MemMapInitialization() function, we currently assign PciBase
different values, on both branches of the board type check. Hoist the
PciBase assignment from the i440fx branch in front of the "if". This is a
no-op for the i440fx branch. On the q35 branch, we overwrite this value,
hence the change is a no-op on q35 as well.
This is another refactoring for simplifying the rest of this series.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1666941
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1701710
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
In the MemMapInitialization() function, we currently have a common
PciSize assignment, shared between i440fx and q35. In order to simplify
the rest of this series, lift and duplicate the assignment identically to
both board-specific branches.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1814
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1666941
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1701710
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
This is for conformance with the TCG "Platform Reset Attack Mitigation
Specification". Because clearing the CPU caches at boot doesn't impact
performance significantly, do it unconditionally, for simplicity's
sake.
Flush the cache on all logical processors, thanks to
EFI_PEI_MP_SERVICES_PPI and CacheMaintenanceLib.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: remove bogus Message-Id line from commit msg]
ResourcePublicationLib class name is ResourcePublicationLib.
INF and DSC files are updated to use the correct one.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: insert empty line between commit msg body and tags]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Removing rules for Ipf sources file:
* Remove the source file which path with "ipf" and also listed in
[Sources.IPF] section of INF file.
* Remove the source file which listed in [Components.IPF] section
of DSC file and not listed in any other [Components] section.
* Remove the embedded Ipf code for MDE_CPU_IPF.
Removing rules for Inf file:
* Remove IPF from VALID_ARCHITECTURES comments.
* Remove DXE_SAL_DRIVER from LIBRARY_CLASS in [Defines] section.
* Remove the INF which only listed in [Components.IPF] section in DSC.
* Remove statements from [BuildOptions] that provide IPF specific flags.
* Remove any IPF sepcific sections.
Removing rules for Dec file:
* Remove [Includes.IPF] section from Dec.
Removing rules for Dsc file:
* Remove IPF from SUPPORTED_ARCHITECTURES in [Defines] section of DSC.
* Remove any IPF specific sections.
* Remove statements from [BuildOptions] that provide IPF specific flags.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Chen A Chen <chen.a.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
QEMU calculates the UINT64 value in "etc/reserved-memory-end" in a quite
complex way, in the pc_memory_init() function. Log the value as a
DEBUG_VERBOSE message to support debugging.
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1353591
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
The header defines the OVMF_INFO_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS macro and the
EFI_XEN_OVMF_INFO structure, which are used in "Xen.c".
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: http://mid.mail-archive.com/E92EE9817A31E24EB0585FDF735412F56327F7D3@ORSMSX113.amr.corp.intel.com
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
The header file declares several functions and global variables that are
shared between various translation units in this module.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: http://mid.mail-archive.com/E92EE9817A31E24EB0585FDF735412F56327F7D3@ORSMSX113.amr.corp.intel.com
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
The header file declares the CmosRead8() and CmosWrite8() functions, which
are implemented in "Cmos.c" and called from "MemDetect.c" and
"Platform.c".
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Ref: http://mid.mail-archive.com/E92EE9817A31E24EB0585FDF735412F56327F7D3@ORSMSX113.amr.corp.intel.com
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
In the next two patches, we'll temporarily decrypt the pages containing
the initial SMRAM save state map, for SMBASE relocation. (Unlike the
separate, relocated SMRAM save state map of each VCPU, the original,
shared map behaves similarly to a "common buffer" between guest and host.)
The decryption will occur near the beginning of the DXE phase, in
AmdSevDxe, and the re-encryption will occur in PiSmmCpuDxeSmm, via OVMF's
SmmCpuFeaturesLib instance.
There is a non-trivial time gap between these two points, and the DXE
phase might use the pages overlapping the initial SMRAM save state map for
arbitrary purposes meanwhile. In order to prevent any information leak
towards the hypervisor, make sure the DXE phase puts nothing in those
pages until re-encryption is done.
Creating a memalloc HOB for the area in question is safe:
- the temporary SEC/PEI RAM (stack and heap) is based at
PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase, which is above 8MB,
- the permanent PEI RAM (installed in PlatformPei's PublishPeiMemory()
function) never starts below PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase, which is also above
8MB.
The allocated pages can be released to the DXE phase after SMBASE
relocation and re-encryption are complete.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
"Platform.h" declares the AmdSevInitialize() function without EFIAPI, but
the definition in "AmdSev.c" includes EFIAPI.
GCC toolchains without LTO do not catch this error because "AmdSev.c" does
not include "Platform.h"; i.e. the declaration used by callers such as
"Platform.c" is not actually matched against the function definition at
build time.
With LTO enabled, the mismatch is found -- however, as a warning only, due
to commit f8d0b96629 ("BaseTools GCC5: disable warnings-as-errors for
now", 2016-08-03).
Include the header in the C file (which turns the issue into a hard build
error on all GCC toolchains), plus sync the declaration from the header
file to the C file.
There's been no functional breakage because AmdSevInitialize() takes no
parameters.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Fixes: 13b5d743c8
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jaben Carsey <jaben.carsey@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
The following commit:
1fea9ddb4e OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of Secure Boot
sets the OptionRomImageVerificationPolicy to ALWAYS_EXECUTE the expansion
ROMs attached to the emulated PCI devices. A expansion ROM constitute
another channel through which a cloud provider (i.e hypervisor) can
inject a code in guest boot flow to compromise it.
When SEV is enabled, the bios code has been verified by the guest owner
via the SEV guest launch sequence before its executed. When secure boot,
is enabled, lets make sure that we do not allow guest bios to execute a
code which is not signed by the guest owner.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=728
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
"Platform PEIM Loaded" is an informative message, not an error report. Set
its debug mask to DEBUG_INFO.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
In OVMF we currently get the upper (>=4GB) memory size with the
GetSystemMemorySizeAbove4gb() function.
The GetSystemMemorySizeAbove4gb() function is used in two places:
(1) It is the starting point of the calculations in GetFirstNonAddress().
GetFirstNonAddress() in turn
- determines the placement of the 64-bit PCI MMIO aperture,
- provides input for the GCD memory space map's sizing (see
AddressWidthInitialization(), and the CPU HOB in
MiscInitialization()),
- influences the permanent PEI RAM cap (the DXE core's page tables,
built in permanent PEI RAM, grow as the RAM to map grows).
(2) In QemuInitializeRam(), GetSystemMemorySizeAbove4gb() determines the
single memory descriptor HOB that we produce for the upper memory.
Respectively, there are two problems with GetSystemMemorySizeAbove4gb():
(1) It reads a 24-bit count of 64KB RAM chunks from the CMOS, and
therefore cannot return a larger value than one terabyte.
(2) It cannot express discontiguous high RAM.
Starting with version 1.7.0, QEMU has provided the fw_cfg file called
"etc/e820". Refer to the following QEMU commits:
- 0624c7f916b4 ("e820: pass high memory too.", 2013-10-10),
- 7d67110f2d9a ("pc: add etc/e820 fw_cfg file", 2013-10-18)
- 7db16f2480db ("pc: register e820 entries for ram", 2013-10-10)
Ever since these commits in v1.7.0 -- with the last QEMU release being
v2.9.0, and v2.10.0 under development --, the only two RAM entries added
to this E820 map correspond to the below-4GB RAM range, and the above-4GB
RAM range. And, the above-4GB range exactly matches the CMOS registers in
question; see the use of "pcms->above_4g_mem_size":
pc_q35_init() | pc_init1()
pc_memory_init()
e820_add_entry(0x100000000ULL, pcms->above_4g_mem_size, E820_RAM);
pc_cmos_init()
val = pcms->above_4g_mem_size / 65536;
rtc_set_memory(s, 0x5b, val);
rtc_set_memory(s, 0x5c, val >> 8);
rtc_set_memory(s, 0x5d, val >> 16);
Therefore, remedy the above OVMF limitations as follows:
(1) Start off GetFirstNonAddress() by scanning the E820 map for the
highest exclusive >=4GB RAM address. Fall back to the CMOS if the E820
map is unavailable. Base all further calculations (such as 64-bit PCI
MMIO aperture placement, GCD sizing etc) on this value.
At the moment, the only difference this change makes is that we can
have more than 1TB above 4GB -- given that the sole "high RAM" entry
in the E820 map matches the CMOS exactly, modulo the most significant
bits (see above).
However, Igor plans to add discontiguous (cold-plugged) high RAM to
the fw_cfg E820 RAM map later on, and then this scanning will adapt
automatically.
(2) In QemuInitializeRam(), describe the high RAM regions from the E820
map one by one with memory HOBs. Fall back to the CMOS only if the
E820 map is missing.
Again, right now this change only makes a difference if there is at
least 1TB high RAM. Later on it will adapt to discontiguous high RAM
(regardless of its size) automatically.
-*-
Implementation details: introduce the ScanOrAdd64BitE820Ram() function,
which reads the E820 entries from fw_cfg, and finds the highest exclusive
>=4GB RAM address, or produces memory resource descriptor HOBs for RAM
entries that start at or above 4GB. The RAM map is not read in a single
go, because its size can vary, and in PlatformPei we should stay away from
dynamic memory allocation, for the following reasons:
- "Pool" allocations are limited to ~64KB, are served from HOBs, and
cannot be released ever.
- "Page" allocations are seriously limited before PlatformPei installs the
permanent PEI RAM. Furthermore, page allocations can only be released in
DXE, with dedicated code (so the address would have to be passed on with
a HOB or PCD).
- Raw memory allocation HOBs would require the same freeing in DXE.
Therefore we process each E820 entry as soon as it is read from fw_cfg.
-*-
Considering the impact of high RAM on the DXE core:
A few years ago, installing high RAM as *tested* would cause the DXE core
to inhabit such ranges rather than carving out its home from the permanent
PEI RAM. Fortunately, this was fixed in the following edk2 commit:
3a05b13106, "MdeModulePkg DxeCore: Take the range in resource HOB for
PHIT as higher priority", 2015-09-18
which I regression-tested at the time:
http://mid.mail-archive.com/55FC27B0.4070807@redhat.com
Later on, OVMF was changed to install its high RAM as tested (effectively
"arming" the earlier DXE core change for OVMF), in the following edk2
commit:
035ce3b37c, "OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Add memory above 4GB as tested",
2016-04-21
which I also regression-tested at the time:
http://mid.mail-archive.com/571E8B90.1020102@redhat.com
Therefore adding more "tested memory" HOBs is safe.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1468526
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest VMs have the concept of
private and shared memory. Private memory is encrypted with the
guest-specific key, while shared memory may be encrypted with hypervisor
key. Certain types of memory (namely instruction pages and guest page
tables) are always treated as private memory by the hardware.
For data memory, SEV guest VMs can choose which pages they would like
to be private. The choice is done using the standard CPU page tables
using the C-bit. When building the initial page table we mark all the
memory as private.
The patch sets the memory encryption PCD. The PCD is consumed by the
following edk2 modules, which manipulate page tables:
- PEI phase modules: CapsulePei, DxeIplPeim, S3Resume2Pei.
CapsulePei is not used by OVMF. DxeIplPeim consumes the PCD at the
end of the PEI phase, when it builds the initial page tables for the
DXE core / DXE phase. S3Resume2Pei does not consume the PCD in its
entry point function, only when DxeIplPeim branches to the S3 resume
path at the end of the PEI phase, and calls S3Resume2Pei's
EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI.S3RestoreConfig2() member function.
Therefore it is safe to set the PCD for these modules in PlatformPei.
- DXE phase modules: BootScriptExecutorDxe, CpuDxe, PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
They are all dispatched after the PEI phase, so setting the PCD for
them in PlatformPei is safe. (BootScriptExecutorDxe is launched "for
real" in the PEI phase during S3 resume, but it caches the PCD into a
static variable when its entry point is originally invoked in DXE.)
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Recognize an extended TSEG when available in
Q35TsegMbytesInitialization(), and set both PcdQ35TsegMbytes (for
OvmfPkg/SmmAccess) and "mQ35TsegMbytes" (for PlatformPei's own use)
accordingly. The new logic interfaces with the QEMU feature added in QEMU
commit 2f295167e0c4 ("q35/mch: implement extended TSEG sizes",
2017-06-08).
At this point we have to explicitly restrict Q35TsegMbytesInitialization()
to the Q35 board, but that's OK, because Q35TsegMbytesInitialization() is
only called when PcdSmmSmramRequire is set, and for that Q35 is already an
enforced requirement.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
In one of the next patches we'll turn PcdQ35TsegMbytes into a dynamic PCD,
to be set by PlatformPei. Introduce the Q35TsegMbytesInitialization()
function and the "mQ35TsegMbytes" global variable to support this.
Q35TsegMbytesInitialization() manages the PCD and caches its final value
into "mQ35TsegMbytes". Call Q35TsegMbytesInitialization() from
InitializePlatform() just in time for the current PCD consumers,
PublishPeiMemory(), InitializeRamRegions() and QemuInitializeRam() --
which is called from InitializeRamRegions() -- to be rebased on top of
"mQ35TsegMbytes".
Call Q35TsegMbytesInitialization() only when PcdSmmSmramRequire is TRUE,
given that PcdQ35TsegMbytes is consumed in that case only.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Widen PcdQ35TsegMbytes to UINT16, in preparation for setting it
dynamically to the QEMU-advertized extended TSEG size (which is 16-bits
wide).
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe now uses a 4KB (EFI_PAGE_SIZE) block size.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
For the emulated variable store, PlatformPei allocates reserved memory (as
early as possible, so that the address remains the same during reboot),
and PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved carries the address to
EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe.
However, EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe is excluded from the SMM_REQUIRE build,
and then noone consumes PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved. Don't waste
reserved memory whenever that's the case.
(Even a dynamic default for PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved would be
unnecessary; but that way the PcdSet64S() call in the
ReserveEmuVariableNvStore() function doesn't compile.)
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
In commit b24fca0575 ("OvmfPkg: introduce 4MB flash image (mainly) for
Windows HCK", 2017-04-29), I changed PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize to
264KB, in the then-new default 4MB build.
While PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize remains exactly half of the entire
non-volatile store (which is 528KB), 264KB isn't itself a power of two.
This triggers an assertion failure in AllocateAlignedRuntimePages() when
PlatformPei calls it from the ReserveEmuVariableNvStore() function,
passing PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize as the Alignment parameter:
> ASSERT MdePkg/Library/PeiMemoryAllocationLib/MemoryAllocationLib.c(196):
> (Alignment & (Alignment - 1)) == 0
Round up the alignment to the next power of two if necessary.
Fixes: b24fca0575
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
At this point we're ready to retire QemuFwCfgS3Enabled() from the
QemuFwCfgLib class, together with its implementations in:
- ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.c
- OvmfPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.c
Extend all modules that call the function with a new QemuFwCfgS3Lib class
dependency. Thanks to the previously added library class, instances, and
class resolutions, we can do this switch now as tightly as possible.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=394
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
These settings will allow CpuMpPei and CpuDxe to wait for the initial AP
check-ins exactly as long as necessary.
It is safe to set PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber and
PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds in OvmfPkg/PlatformPei.
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei installs the permanent PEI RAM, producing
gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid, and UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei has a depex on
gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid.
It is safe to read the fw_cfg item QemuFwCfgItemSmpCpuCount (0x0005). It
was added to QEMU in 2008 as key FW_CFG_NB_CPUS, in commit 905fdcb5264c
("Add common keys to firmware configuration"). Even if the key is
unavailable (or if fw_cfg is entirely unavailable, for example on Xen),
QemuFwCfgRead16() will return 0, and then we stick with the current
behavior.
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
These are deprecated / disabled under the
DISABLE_NEW_DEPRECATED_INTERFACES feature test macro.
Introduce a variable called PcdStatus, and use it to assert the success of
these operations (there is no reason for them to fail here).
Cc: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=166
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Correct some typos (discovered with the codespell utility)
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
VS2015x86 reports the following warning for
"OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c":
> MemDetect.c(357): error C2220: warning treated as error - no 'object'
> file generated
> MemDetect.c(357): warning C4244: '=': conversion from 'UINT64' to
> 'UINT32', possible loss of data
LowerMemorySize is first assigned from GetSystemMemorySizeBelow4gb(),
which returns UINT32. Change the type of LowerMemorySize accordingly.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Under certain circumstances, QEMU exposes the "etc/msr_feature_control"
fw_cfg file, with a 64-bit little endian value. The firmware is supposed
to write this value to MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL (0x3a), on all processors,
on the normal and the S3 resume boot paths.
Utilize EFI_PEI_MPSERVICES_PPI to implement this feature.
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Fixes: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/issues/97
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Move the permanent PEI memory for the S3 resume boot path to the top of
the low RAM (just below TSEG if the SMM driver stack is included in the
build). The new size is derived from CpuMpPei's approximate memory demand.
Save the base address and the size in new global variables, regardless of
the boot path. On the normal boot path, use these variables for covering
the area with EfiACPIMemoryNVS type memory.
PcdS3AcpiReservedMemoryBase and PcdS3AcpiReservedMemorySize become unused
in PlatformPei; remove them.
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
CpuMpPei will have to place the AP startup vector in memory under 1MB. For
this, CpuMpPei borrows memory under 1MB, but it needs a memory resource
descriptor HOB to exist there even on the S3 resume path (see the
GetWakeupBuffer() function). Produce such a HOB as an exception on the S3
resume path.
CpuMpPei is going be dispatched no earlier than PlatformPei, because
CpuMpPei has a depex on gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid, and PlatformPei
calls PublishSystemMemory().
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Laszlo Ersek
Leif Lindholm
Anthony PERARD
Eric Dong
Hao A Wu
Michael D Kinney
Marc-André Lureau
Liming Gao
chenc2
Brijesh Singh
Thomas Huth